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Name of researcher: Joseph Karanja
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Problem
This study examines how the concept of inerrancy of 
Scripture presupposes a particular understanding of divine 
sovereignty. Investigation is based on the writings of Carl 
F. H. Henry, a contemporary American evangelical theologian.
Method
This investigation uses case—study approach. It 
consists of a descriptive analysis of Carl Henry's concepts 
of inerrancy and sovereignty as individual concepts and the 
sense in which the former presupposes the latter. General 
inferences are based on that analysis.
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Results
This study shows that Henry's concept of sovereignty 
is an indispensable presupposition in his concept of 
inerrancy. Among other things, sovereignty denotes Gad's 
absolute causality, thereby providing the theological 
grounds on which scriptural inerrancy is predicated.
Conelusions
The concept of inerrancy is best explained in 
theological contexts where divine sovereignty is affirmed 
and understood in absolute causal terms.
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CHAPTER I
INTRODUCTION
The idea of inerrancy1 has been a focus of much 
discussion in the recent past.3 Discussion often consists
1As a word, "inerrancy" refers to a view of 
Scripture which affirms that biblical truth was originally 
revealed and written down without error.
The "Chicago Statement on Biblical Inerrancy," 
written by a number of conservative evangelical theologians, 
seems to reflect the basic understanding of the term 
“inerrancy." The fourth point in the preamble of the 
Articles reads: “Being wholly and verbally God-given,
Scripture is without error or fault in all its teaching, no 
less in what it states about God's acts in creation and the 
events of world history, and about its own literary origins 
under God, than in its witness to God's saving grace in 
individual lives" (Norman L. Geisler, ed., Inerrancy CGrand 
Rapids: Zondervan Publishing House, 1979], 494).
3Mark A. Noll lists twenty—seven books, most of 
which have been published since 1979, on the subject of 
inerrancy and related issues. See his article,
“Evangelicals and the Stuay of the Bible," in Evangelicalism 
and Modern America. George Marsden, ed. (Grand Rapids: 
William B. Eerdmans, 1984), 198—9, n. 39.
Another bibliography, more recent and comprehensive 
(includes journal articles), is found ir» The Proceed in ~is of 
the Conference on Biblical Inerrancy 1987 (Nashville: 
Broadman Press, 1987), 543—54; henceforth referred to as The 
Proceedings 1987.
Perhaps the most telling evidence of the importance 
of the question of inerrancy was the formation of the 
International Conference on Biblical Inerrancy (ICBI) in the 
1970s. The ICBI has produced two official consensus 
statements and, at least, six volumes consisting of 
conference papers on inerrancy. For the 1978 "Chicago 
Statement on Biblical Inerrancy," see Geisler, ed.,
Inerrancy. 493—502. For the 1982 "Chicago Statement on 
Biblical Hermeneutics” and a partial list of books published 
by ICBI, see Earl D. Radmacher and Robert D. Preus, eds., 
Hermeneutics. Inerrancy, and the Bible: Papers rroin
1
r
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2of debates between conservative evangelical theologians who 
defend inerrancy1 and critics who oppose it. Among critics, 
there is a tendency to give the impression that inerrancy is 
a baseless guiding principle which conservatives use in 
reading the Bible. In other words, inerrancy is depicted as 
a merely dogmatic opinion devoid of any meaningful 
theological content or context.3
Conservatives have expressed concern over the 
failure of many criticisms to take inerrancy seriously as a 
theological concept.3 It has also been stated by John
International Conference on Biblical Inerrancy. Summit II 
(Grand Rapids: Zondervan Publishing House, 1984), S31-7.
1Some of the prominent contemporary advocates of 
inerrancy are the executive council members of the ICBI.
They include Gleason Archer, Kenneth Kantzer, James Packer, 
Robert Preus, Earl Radmacher, Francis Schaefer, and R. 
Sproul. See Geisler, Inerrancy. Preface.
The association between inerrancy and conservative 
evangelicalism has also been observed by Avery Dulles in 
Models of Revelation (New York: Doubleday & Company, 1983), 
37; and Donald K. McKim, What Christians Believe About the 
Bible (Nashville: Thomas Nelson Publishers, 1985), 88—89.
3James Barr, for example, describes inerrancy as a 
non-intellectual principle to which members of "theology- 
less" movements feel obliged to subject all the 
interpretation of the Bible. He argues that if the 
conservatives have a theology at all, it is “fragmented,
. . . fossilized, . . . and inactive" (Fundamentalism
[Philade. .hia: Westminster Press, 1978], 160—1).
For similar approaches to inerrancy, see Paul J. 
Achtemeier, The Inspiration of Scripture: Problems and 
Proposals (Philadelphia: Westminster Press, 1980), 34—36, 
50—75; and Robert Gnuse, The Authority of the Bible:
Theories of Inspiration. Revelation, and the Canon of 
Scripture (New York: Paulist Press, 1985), 22—33.
3T h ' entiment is evident in reviews written by
conservatx iologians on books that criticize inerrancy.
Carl F. H. Henry, for example, writes of Barr's “radical 
misconceptions of fundamentalist doctrines and exaggerations 
that become misrepresentations, . . .  uncritical association 
of fundamentalism with conservative evangelicalism,"
r
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3Setzer, himself a critic of inerrancy, that the reason why 
many criticisms make little, if any, impact on inerrancy is 
because most of the "critical theologians have merely 
knocked down a 'straw man' . - . and left the conservative
position undisturbed.1,1 In view of that fact, Setzer 
strongly suggests that to be effective, an analysis of 
inerrancy must include an investigation of the 
presuppositions on which the idea is built.3 A 
presupposition is here understood to denote a premise, a 
concept, or idea that controls, influences, conditions, and 
logically comes prior to another. A presupposition does not
especially in America, and an “importation into the term 
'fundamentalism' everything he finds to be odious in 
evangelical Christianity" (review of Fundamentalism, by 
James Barr, part 1, Christianity Today 22 (June 2, 1978): 
23—25). See also parts 2 and 3 in the same journal, 22 
(June 23, 1978): 25, and 22 (July 21, 1978): 29-32; and 
William W. Wells, "Blasting Bible Believers," review of 
Fundamental ism, by James Barr, Christianity Today 22 (June
2, 1978): 30-34.
Commenting on The Inspiration of Scripture by Paul 
Achtemeier, L. Russ Bush writes that the author "comes 
close, yet at crucial points fails to grasp the heart of 
evangelical methods” (review in Southwestern Journal of 
Theoloov 24 [Fall 1982]: 107). It has also been observed by 
Geisler that "despite a claim to the contrary (p. 178), 
Achtemeier does not take either the Bible or the 
conservative scholars seriously" (review in Bibliotheca 
Sacra 138 [April 1981]: 179).
"■John S. Setzer, "A Critique of the Fundamentalist 
Doctrine of the Inerrancy of the Biblical Autographs in 
Historical, Philosophical, Exegetical and Hermeneutical 
Perspective" (Ph. D. diss., Duke University, 1965), Preface, 
xxi. He adds on the same page that "The general 
ineffectiveness of the small amount of anti—inerrancy 
polemic that critical scholars have produced thus far [by 
1965] is due to an unperceptive methodology which permits 
them to attack a position the essence of which they do not 
sufficiently comprehend" (ibid.).
3Setzer, "A Critique of Fundamentalist Doctrine,"
104.
r ~
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4always surface in the discussions of the idea that it 
influences. It is simply assumed most of the time.1
□ne of the ideas which have been suggested as 
constituting a presupposition on which inerrancy stands is 
the concept of divine sovereignty. Various writers have 
made direct and indirect allusions to this fact.3 Survey of 
literature, however, seems to reveal at least three reasons 
why an additional study on how inerrancy presupposes 
sovereignty is needed. First, the resources available on 
the subject consist mainly of short articles which do not 
analyze thoroughly the issues involved in the proposition 
that the concept of inerrancy presupposes the concept of 
divine sovereignty.3 Second, the few important 
contributions available on the subject interpret the 
connection between inerrancy and sovereignty in a manner
1For a definition of the term presupposition, see 
Josef de Vries, "Presupposition," Philosophical Dictionary. 
ed. Walter Brugger and ed. and trans. Kenneth Baker
(Spokane, Washington: Gonzaga University Press, 1972), 320.
3See Randall Basinger and David Basinger, 
"Inerrancy, Dictation and the Freewill Debate," Evangelical 
Quarterly 55 (July 1983): 177—80; Geisler, "A Response to 
Basinger Brothers," Evanoelical Quarterly 57 (1985): 349—
53; Du11es, Models of Revelation. 40; Dewey M . Beeg1e , The 
Inspiration of Scripture (Philadelphia: Westminster Press, 
1963), 167—9; id., Scripture. Tradition, and Infallibility 
(Grand Rapids: William B. Eerdmans, 1973), 264—7; Clark H. 
Pinnock, The Scripture Principle (San Francisco: Harper & 
Row, 1984), 100—5; Setzer, "A Critique of Fundamentalist 
Doctrine," 106—76; L. Russ Bush, “The Roots of Conservative 
Perspectives on Inerrancy (Warfield)," in The Proceedings 
1987. 273—88; D. Clair Davis, "Inerrancy and Westminster 
Calvinism," in Harvie M. Conn, ed., Inerrancy and 
Hermeneutic: A Tradition. A Challenge. A Debate (Grand 
Rapids: Baker Book House, 1988), 35—46.
3 Ibid.
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5that could easily jettison biblical authority.1 Third, very 
few case studies exist on the subject.3 Case studies are 
generally helpful in that they are more specific and less 
likely to make a caricature of others' views.3 Case studies 
are also useful in establishing general patterns in an area 
of study so that valid and we11-supported inferences can be 
made.
This study is based r>n the writings of Carl F. H. 
Henry. The appropriateness of selecting Carl Henry as a 
case study arises out of a number of factors. As a major 
contemporary thinker whose contributions in theology cannot
xSetzer, for example, states that " . . .  the copies 
and translations [of the Bible] are errant" (ibid., 139). He 
writes of . . errors in the overwhelming proportion of
the books that historically have passed as his [God's] word 
. . ." (ibid.).
Further, after citing a list of "errors" in the 
Bible, Setzer also writes: "It may by concluded that the 
exhibition of these nineteen exemplary apparent 
contradictions sufficiently demonstrate that the Bible is 
replete with too many confusing and textually insoluble 
formal problems to be the totally supernatural product that 
fundamentalists believe it to be" (ibid., 283).
It seems to me that with these remarks, it is 
difficult, if not impossible, to offer a viable rationale 
for affirming a strong biblical authority in matters of 
theology, ethics, and Christian experience.
“Apart from a dissertation by John Setzer in which a 
complete chapter is devoted to an analysis of the connection 
between inerrancy and sovereignty in the writings of 
Cornelius Van Til, Edward Carnell, and Gordon Clark, I have 
not come across any other case studies on the subject. See 
Setzer, 106—76.
3In the case of inerrancy, there are various 
differences between advocates of this concept and it is not 
likely that a general approach to the subject will not 
misinterpret certain specific details of some advocates.
f
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6go unnoticed (1 Henry is widely recognized as an authentic 
representative of an important section of Protestant 
Christianity in America, the conservative evangelicals.3 It 
seems safe to assume, on this basis, that to know Henry is 
one way of understanding American evangelicalism.3 Henry's
^During the last decade, Carl Henry has received 
much attention in scholarly circles. His magnum opus. Bod. 
Revelation and Authority. 6 vols. (Waco, Texas: Word Books, 
1976-B3) has been reviewed in various journals by more than 
twenty theologians in America and Europe. They all 
recognize the series as a landmark in conservative 
evangelical theology in America. In addition, more than ten 
dissertations have been written or based on Henry's ideas. 
Four of these are particularly notable: Larry D. Sharp,
"Carl Henry: A Neo—evangelical Theologian" (n.p., 1972); 
Richard Allan Purdy, "Carl Henry and Contemporary 
Apologetics: An Assessment of the Rational Apologetic 
Methodology of Carl F. H. Henry in the Context of the 
Current Impasse between Reformed and Evangelical 
Apologetics," (Ph. D. diss., New York University, 1980); 
Miroslav M. Kis, "Revelation and Ethics: Dependence, 
Interdependence or Independence? A Comparative Study of 
Reinhold Niebuhr and Carl F. H. Henry" (Ph. D. diss., McGill 
University, 1984); and Thomas Reginald McNeal, "A Critical 
Analysis of the Doctrine of God in the Theology of Carl F.
H. Henry," (Ph. D. diss., Southwestern Baptist Theological 
Seminary, 1986).
aCarl Henry has been referred to as "the honored 
dean of evangelical theologians" by Kenneth S. Kantzer, 
review of God. Revelation and Authority, by Carl Henry, 
Christianity Today 27 (May 20, 1983), 72. Henry's 
biographer, Bob Patterson, describes Henry as the 
evangelicals' "outstanding theological spokesman . . .  who 
best represents the characteristics of evangelical thought 
. . ." (Makers of Modern Theological Mind: Carl F. H. Henry 
[Waco, Texas: Word Books Publishers 19B3], 18). Henry has 
written about thirty books and edited more than ten others 
(see bibliography at the end of this study). He has also 
written numerous articles for symposiums and scholarly 
journals.
3The conservative evangelicals in America whom Henry 
represents form the moderate right group in the Protestant 
movement. They distinguish themselves from 
“fundamentalists" who constitute the extreme right of the 
movement. For the history of the two groups, including 
their similarities and differences, see Harold J. Ockenga, 
"From Fundamentalism, Through New Evangelicalism, to
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
7prolific writing also provides new insights that call for a 
fresh look at the correlation between inerrancy and divine 
sovereignty.1
Evangelicalism," in Evangelical Roots, ed. Kenneth S.
Kantzer (Nashville: Thomas Nelson, Publishers, 1978), 35—
46; and Ronald H. Nash, The New Evangelicalism (Grand 
Rapids: Zondervan Publishing House, 1963), 13—32. For an 
analysis of the place that conservative evangelicals occupy 
in the religious and social life of contemporary America, 
see Richard G. Hutcheson, Jr., Mainline Churches and the 
Evangelicals: A Challenging Crisis? (Atlanta: John Knox 
Press, 19S1); and James Davison Hunter, American 
Evangelical ism: Conservative Religion and the Quandary of 
Modernity (New Brunswick, New Jersey: Rutgers University 
Press, 1983).
1Henry is mentioned by John Setzer in his study (p. 
37, n.) but Setzer assumes that whatever Henry had to say on 
inerrancy and sovereignty or the correlation between the two 
is sufficiently covered in his analysis of Van Til, Clark, 
and Carnell. However, despite certain basic similarities 
between Henry and the three theologians— due to their 
orientation in the Calvinistic tradition— Henry is critical 
of various aspects of Van Til's and Carnell's theologies in 
his major work, which was published more than ten years 
after Setzer completed his dissertation. See, for example, 
God. Revelation and Authority. 1:236—8; henceforth cited as 
GRA.
Further dissociation of Henry from the theologians 
studied by Setzer is made by Richard Purdy who presents Van 
Til and Clark as defenders of the traditional Reformed 
dogmatics while Henry and Norman Geisler are presented as 
evangelical theologians whose methodology is a significant 
departure from the traditional Reformed theology (see Purdy, 
"Carl Henry and Contemporary Apologetics"). These 
differences seem to be important enough to warrant a study 
of the same question which Setzer investigated with Carl 
Henry specifically in mind.
It cannot be overlooked, however, that Setzer may 
have left Henry out of his study due to the fact that 
Henry's writings before 1965 were mainly on areas other than 
the doctrine of revelation (John Setzer, "A Critique of 
Fundamentalist Doctrine," 137). Investigation seems to 
indicate that not until the publication of God. Revelation 
and Authority did Henry's contribution to the subjects of 
inerrancy and sovereignty become clear.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
aPurpose of the Study 
This study is a descriptive analysis of the concepts 
of inerrancy and sovereignty as they are found in the 
writings of Carl F. H. Henry for the purpose of determining 
how inerrancy presupposes the concept of sovereignty. 
Implications of the study are then made on the basis of that 
analysis.
Delimitations of the Study 
This study has three main delimitations. First, the 
project is undertaken primarily in the interest of the idea 
of inerrancy. Certainly, both concepts of inerrancy and 
sovereignty are analyzed in their own right as individual 
ideas in order to make their meanings clear and distinct, 
but the final observations and conclusions are made with the 
significance of the study to the idea of inerrancy in mind.
Second, this study is limited to those aspects of 
the two concepts which have a bearing on how inerrancy 
presupposes sovereignty. It is recognized that the two 
concepts involve much more than can be covered in this 
study. Thus, many related issues are either left out or 
briefly mentioned to maintain the thematic coherence of the 
investigation.1 Care has been taken, however, to ensure 
that the observations and conclusions made are in harmony 
with the wider scope of the two concepts.
Examples of these issues are topics such as 
scriptural canon, infallibility, archaeology, historical 
criticism, hermeneutics, divine attributes, election, 
predestination, foreknowledge, miracles, etc.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
9Third, the study is not intended to validate or 
contravene Henry's concepts of inerrancy, sovereignty, or 
the connection between them. In other wards, this study is 
not intended to show if or not Henry's views are correct. 
That is a task of future commentators on the subject. 
Presently, the evaluation which is included is in connection 
with the analysis of Henry's views for the purpose of 
determining the nature of the correlation between inerrancy 
and sovereignty.
Methodo1ogv
This presentation is based primarily on what Henry 
has written in his six—volume series, God. Revelation and 
Authority.* The scries is a rich resource of Henry's ideas 
on inerrancy and sovereignty and represents the most concise 
and mature thoughts of Henry on theological subjects. In 
view of this, I have opted to concentrate an the six volumes 
□ue to limitations of time and space.
The idea under investigation in this study, i.e. how 
inerrancy presupposes sovereignty, is not stated in explicit
AAs stated previously, the series is referred to as 
GRA in the study. The volume number and page reference(s) 
follow that abbreviation.
The first volume is a philosophical prolegomenon 
that deals with questions of theological method. In it, 
Henry surveys various contemporary approaches to theology 
and concludes that the survival of Christianity is dependent 
on a clear recognition of propositional revelation in the 
Bible. In vols. 2—4, Henry deals with the doctrine of 
revelation while, in the last two volumes he focuses 
attention on the doctrine of God. Henry gives his 
exposition on the major doctrines of evangelical faith in 
the context of the doctrine of GgH .
F
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terms by Carl Henry.1 If that were the case, the need to 
investigate his views in a study like this would be less 
compelling. In view of this fact, a research methodology 
has been adopted which aims at making explicit what is 
implicit. First, it consists of a descriptive analysis of 
the two concepts as they are found in GRft. This stage of 
the investigation seeks to make Henry's views clear and 
distinct. Second, methodology includes also an 
interpretation of the two concepts from the perspective of 
those elements in them and facts about them that point 
toward the idea that inerrancy presupposes sovereignty. 
Third, an evaluation of the idea that inerrancy presupposes 
sovereignty in Henry is made on the basis of the evidence 
presented in the first two stages of the methodology.
Overview of Study
This study is divided into five chapters. After the 
present introductory chapter, two chapters are devoted to a 
descriptive analysis of each of the two concepts under 
investigation in this study. In chapter 2, the idea of 
inerrancy is examined in terms of Henry's theological 
heritage, the meaning of inerrancy and the place of 
inerrancy in the theology of Henry. Chapter 3 has its focus 
on Henry's concept of divine sovereignty. Brief remarks are 
made concerning the background behind Henry's understanding
xEach of the two concepts has several pages devoted 
to it in the series (see GRA. 4:162—21*? for inerrancy and 
ibid., 5:307—33 for sovereignty) but nowhere does Henry 
state clearly that the two chapters are connected in any 
manner.
i
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of this concept. Particular attention is given, however, to 
the meaning of the concept and its role in Henry's theology.
Chapter 4 is an analytical and interpretive 
evaluation of the evidence from the previous two chapters 
and other relevant material from Henry's series for the 
purpose of clarifying the sense in which inerrancy 
presupposes sovereignty in Carl Henry. In the conclusion, 
which is chapter 5, the theme of the study is summarized, 
implications of the study highlighted and suggestions made 
for further exploration of the questions raised in this 
investigation. It is hoped that this presentation will help 
to clarify some of the issues which surround the concept of 
inerrancy.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
CHAPTER II
THE CONCEPT OF INERRANCY
The subject which concerns us in this study is the 
sense in which Henry's concept of inerrancy presupposes his 
concept of sovereignty. Since the basic question involves a 
relationship between two concepts, it is assumed that the 
connection requires a clear description and analysis of the 
ideas being connected. In this case, attention is given 
first to the meaning and significance of the concepts of 
inerrancy and sovereignty as independent ideas in order to 
better appreciate and understand the connection between 
them. The present chapter on inerrancy and the following 
one on sovereignty are devoted to the clarification of the 
two concepts as these are found in Henry's GRA.
The concept of inerrancy is one of the distinctive 
aspects of Henry's theology. Its significance is readily 
noticeable in Henry's own words that inerrancy is 
"theoretically and practically i m p o r t a n t . I n  view of such 
a statement, the need to investigate the meaning of 
inerrancy and the reasons why it seems so important to Henry 
cannot be overemphasized. Undoubtedly, not everything that 
Henry writes about inerrancy can possibly be presented here
^GRA, 4:209.
12
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as that Mould entail a wider coverage of material than is 
intended in this study. However, efforts are made at saying 
enough on the concept to make its core structure clear.
Discussion on inerrancy is here divided into five 
main sections. The first one is introductory. It briefly 
shows the sources from which Henry draws most of his basic 
arguments for inerrancy. The second consists of an analysis 
of inerrancy from the perspective of the basic concepts 
which constitute its meaning. The third is, in a sense, a 
continuation of the second. It further clarifies the 
meaning of inerrancy by answering the question of the extent 
or scope of biblical inerrancy. The fourth seeks to set the 
concept of inerrancy in the wider context of Henry's 
theology and to assess the role which it plays in that 
theology. Finally, a conclusion is made on the basis of 
those aspects of Henry's concept of inerrancy which point in 
the direction of the purpose of this study.
Inerrancy and Henry's Sources
Henry maintains that inerrancy is not a novel idea 
which he or other contemporary evangelicals have created in 
the twentieth century.1 For him, inerrancy has always been 
the historic position of the church from the earliest to 
modern times.2 It was the view held by Jesus and original
1See ibid., 4:367, 369.
2Henry refers to inerrancy as "the historic 
commitment of the Christian church" (ibid., 4:367).
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Bible writers.1 Church fathers, and particularly Augustine, 
and reformers also viewed the Bible as inerrant.2 For 
Henry, "Christian churches throughout the centuries have 
maintained the concept of inerrancy."3
However, while he views inerrancy as an idea 
originating in Bible times, Henry recognizes that inerrancy 
was not fully developed as a theological concept until a 
more recent past.'* It seems that the reason for this 
situation was that before eighteenth century, at least in 
America, inerrancy of Scripture was generally assumed and, 
as such, it was not an issue that called for detailed
1Henry states, “The doctrine of scriptural inerrancy 
is in fact implicit in the New Testament and in the very 
teaching of Jesus, and before that, even in the Old 
Testament" (ibid., 4:370).
aHenry does not state that the fathers taught 
inerrancy as such, but he argues that their views of 
Scripture excluded error in Scripture. Some of the fathers 
on whose views he comments are Clement of Rome (30—100), 
Polycarp (65—155), Justin Martyr (110—165), Iranaeus (120— 
202), Tertullian (145—220), Origen (185—254), Chrysostom 
(347-407), and Augustine (354—430). As far as the reformers 
(and the Protestant orthodox theologians after them) are 
concerned, Henry contends that they were all inerrantists 
(ibid., 4:370-2).
3 Ibid., 4:384. By Christian churches, Henry seems 
to mean the Apostolic Church, Roman Catholic Church (until 
Vatican II), the Reformers, and "classic evangelicalism.”
See ibid., 4:369—80.
*Henry writes that "While the Reformers emphasize 
the authority, power, clarity and self—authenticating nature 
of Scripture, they do not delineate any detailed doctrine of 
inspiration and inerrancy. This latter was done by 
seventeenth century Lutheran theologians. In America the 
doctrine of inerrancy became influential through L.
Gaussen’s Theooneustia and the teaching of Charles Hodge and 
B. B. Warfield and the so-called Princeton School" (ibid., 
4:369).
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
15
descriptions and discussion.1 For Henry, the rise of 
secularizing influence of enlightenment which led to the 
undermining of the authority of the Bible motivated 
Christian thinkers to see the need for a systematic 
exposition and defence of the idea of inerrancy.® As 
evidence seems to indicate, Henry considers the theologians 
of the Princeton Theological Seminary, and Benjamin B. 
Warfield, in particular, as the main architects of inerrancy 
as a theological concept.3 This brief historical background
AH. D. McDonald states, "Prior to the year 1860, the 
idea of infallibly inerrant Scripture was the prevailing 
idea" (Theories of Revelations An Historical Study. 1860— 
1960 CLondon: George Allen & Unwin, 1963], 196). For a
detailed study on how the critical spirit of the modern era 
led to undermining inerrancy, see Geisler*, ed., Biblical 
Errancv; An Analysis of Its Philosophical Roots (Grand 
Rapids: Zondervan Publishing House, 1981). See also Peter 
Maarten Van Bemmelen, Issues in Biblical Inspiration: Sandav 
and Warfield (Berrien Springs, Michigan: Andrews University 
Press, 1987), 17-117.
“Henry wonders if it was not during the age of 
Enlightenment that scholars "abandoned the tenets of 
transcendent divine revelation and special inspiration of 
the Bible" (GRA, 4:386). He agrees with Harold Lindsell 
that “The doctrine of biblical inerrancy has been normative 
since the days of the apostles. . . .  It was not until the 
last century and a half that the opponents of inerrancy . .
- have become a dominant force in Christianity" (ibid.,
4 : 367 ) .
3See ibid., 4:84, 163, 165, 253. Henry maintains 
that Warfield's concept of inerrancy is impeccable and that 
to qualify it is to weaken it (ibid., 4:165). The 
connection between Henry and the Princetonians has been made 
also by Donald G. Bloesch, review of GRA. vols. 3 & 4, 
Christian Century 97 (April 9, 1980): 414-5; and Alan 
Padgett, review of GRA, vols. 1—6, Journal of American 
Academy of Religion 52 (Dec. 1984): 7B5—6.
The foundational role which Warfield played in 
formulating the concept of inerrancy is widely recognized. 
Roger Nicole, a contemporary advocate of inerrancy, writes, 
"Indeed Warfield is one of the most notable and articulate 
modern advocates of the doctrine of biblical inspiration and 
inerrancy . . . "  See his article, "The Inspiration of
r
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is important for an understanding and appreciation of the 
reason why Henry mentions Warfield so frequently in his 
expositions on inerrancy.1 Not all of Henry's references to 
Warfield are covered here but those deemed significant are 
briefly mentioned in the appropriate contexts.
Another important source of Henry's concept of 
inerrancy is Gordon H. Clark.3 Henry remembers Clark as 
"one of the most brilliant faculty members” during his 
College days at Wheaton in Illinois.* The influence of 
Clark on Henry is readily admitted by Henry himself"* and
Scriptures J. D. Dunn versus B. B. W a r f i e l d Churchman 97 
(19B3): 19B. Barr, a critic of inerrancy, remarks along 
similar lines that "A conservative evangelical bibliography 
will almost certainly have Warfield's name on its list of 
authorities for the doctrine of Scripture; and any other 
names there are will in all probability have got their 
thoughts from Warfield" (Fundamental ism. 262). For an 
evaluation of Warfield and his colleagues at Princeton in 
regard to their role in defending inerrancy from a 
historical perspective, see George M. Marsden,
Fundamentalism and American Cultures The Shaping of 
Twentieth—Century Evangelicalism 1870—1925 (Oxfords Oxford 
University Press, 1980), 113—116.
1The main references to Warfield are in two
consecutive chapters in vol. 4 entitled, "The Inerrancy of 
Scripture" and "The Meaning of Inerrancy" (GRA. 4:162—210).
3A partial bibliography of Gordon Clark's 
publications (up to I960) is given by Ronald Nash, ed., The 
Philosophy of Gordon H. Clarks A Festschrift (Philadelphias 
Presbyterian and Reformed Publishing Company, 1968), 513—6. 
Clark's most important essays on Scripture have been 
compiled posthumously by John W. Robbins in Gordon H. Clark, 
God's Hammers The Bible and Its Critics (Jefferson,
Maryland: Trinity Foundation, 19B7).
3Carl F. H. Henry, Confessions of a Theologians An 
Autobiography (Waco, Texas: Word Books, 1986), 66—67, 71.
*After expressing his indebtedness to "scholars of 
various traditions," Henry writes, “To no contemporary do I 
owe profounder debt, however, than to Gordon Clark, as 
numerous index references will attest. . . .  He has offered
r
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acknowledged by reviewers of God. Revelation, and 
Authority. * It comes as no surprise, then, that Clark 
defends Henry's doctrine of Scripture against those who 
criticize it.2 A study of Clark's view on inerrancy is not 
intended in this study as that endeavor falls outside the 
scope of this study.3 However, as in the case of Warfield, 
a few references to Clark are made where it is deemed 
appropriate and when a statement from him helps to clarify a 
point in Henry.
The Meaning of Inerrancy
"The meaning of inerrancy" is a phrase that Henry 
himself uses as a title of one of the chapters in vol. 4 of 
God. Revelation, and Authority.-* In that chapter, Henry 
describes the meaning of inerrancy in terms of what 
"scriptural inerrancy does not imply" and what "inerrancy 
does imply." There are five negative implications and four 
positive ones. The chapter is then followed by a 
“Supplementary Note" which is a reproduction of "The Chicago 
Statement on Biblical Inerrancy" formulated in 1978. While
helpful comments on many of the chapters.” (GRA., 1:10).
xSee Padgett, review, 785—6; and James Daane, review 
of GRA. vol. 3, Reformed Journal 30 (May 1980): 27—29.
2See Clark, God's Hammer. 175—85. In a critique of 
one review of GRA. Clark here writes of "Henry—Clark 
position," "Henry—Clark view," and "Henry—Clark defence of 
Biblical inerrancy." He also states that "Henry and I are 
in extensive agreement" (ibid., 175, 180, 185).
3The reader is referred to the bibliography of 
Gordon Clark cited above for further reading.
'‘GRA, 4:201-19.
Ir
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the task of this section seems to be simplified by the 
contents of that chapter, other factors militate against a 
mere paraphrase of Mhat Henry writes there.
For one thing, the chapter does not deal adequately 
with the fundamental concepts that underlie inerrancy in 
Henry.1 Therefore, another approach to the meaning of 
inerrancy is needed which will bring together the various 
significant ideas on inerrancy from that chapter as well as 
from other sections in Henry's series. For yet another 
reason, a different approach is demanded by the goals of 
this study which are certainly of a different character from 
Henry's. As an apologist, Henry seeks to clarify various 
misunderstandings over inerrancy and to vindicate inerrancy 
as a logically defensible position. I am concerned about 
the fundamental concepts that sustain inerrancy and the 
grounds on which the idea stands.
This section consists of two sub—sections. The 
first one identifies the referent to which Henry applies the 
term "inerrancy." That identification is significant. It 
delimits the discussion in the whole chapter to a particular 
referent. The other sub—section identifies the meaning of 
"inerrancy" in Henry. In that section, the main ideas which 
constitute the concept of inerrancy are described and on 
that basis a working definition of the term "inerrancy" is 
provided.
AThe chapter seems mainly to address various 
misunderstandings of the term "inerrancy" (ibid.).
r ~
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The Inerrant Referent 
Henry states clearly that the term inerrancy is not 
to be indiscriminately applied to anything and everything 
called Christian Scriptures.1 He distinguishes between 
autographs— i.e., original manuscripts of the Bible— and 
copies, or apographs made from original manuscripts, 
translations from one language to another, and versions 
(variant renderings of the Bible in the same language).a 
According to Henry, autographs are the only writings which 
have the characteristic of inerrancy. The reason for this 
is that they “have a theooneustic quality."3 In other 
words, the autographs alone were “breathed out” or inspired 
by God.-* Consequently, the apographs cannot be inerrant
1Ibid., 4:220.
3Ibid., 4:231.
3Ibid., 4:233.
"*Ibid, 4:131. The Greek rendering, theooneustos. is 
used by Paul in 2 Tim 3:16. It is mostly translated as 
"inspired by God"— see, for example, King James Version, 
Revised Standard Version, New English Bible, New Jerusalem 
Bible. A few versions translate the word as "God—breathed"- 
—see, for example, New International Version, The Amplified 
Bible— a phrase which Henry uses quite frequently. 
Linguistically, theooneustos is a compound adjective 
comprising the noun theos. meaning God, and the adj'ective 
oneustos which is derived from the aorist stem of the verb 
oneo. meaning to breathe. See H. Wayne House, "Biblical 
Interpretation of 2 Timothy 3:16," Bibliotheca Sacra 137 
(Jan-Mar 1980): 57-5B; C. Spicq, O.P., Les Eoitres 
Pastorales, vol. 2 (Paris: Librairie Lecoffre, 1969), 7BB.
Benjamin Warfield made a thorough analysis of the 
word theooneustos in defending the view that Scripture is 
"God—spirited," "God—breathed," and "produced by the 
creative breath of God." See Benjamin B. Warfield, "God- 
inspired Scripture," The Presbyterian Review 11:89—130. The 
article is reprinted as chap. 6 in Warfield's The 
Inspiration and the Authority of Bible, ed. Samuel G. Craig 
(Philadelphia: Presbyterian and Reformed Publishing Company,
r
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because the term “inspiration" refers not to them but to the 
original manuscripts of the Bible. According to Henry, 
apographs are infallible, not inerrant.1
The shift of language from inerrant autographs to 
infallible apographs has been pointed to by critics as a 
weakness in the inerrancy position.* They argue that it is 
an admission, first, that inerrancy cannot be proved since 
the autographs are no longer extant and, second, that there 
are errors in the Bible which we possess.3 In response, 
Henry asserts that the shift in language does not weaken the 
inerrancy position. For him, it is a mere recognition of
1940), 245-96. Warfield's article has become the standard 
interpretation of the word theooneustos for many 
conservative evangelicals, Henry not excluded. See examples 
in Gordon H. Clark, The Pastoral Epistles (Jefferson, 
Maryland: Trinity Foundation, 1983), 179—05; Edward W. 
Goodrick, "Let's Put 2nd Timothy 3:16 Back in the Bible," 
Journal of the Evangelical Theological Society 25 (Oec 
1982), 479-07; Harold Lindsell, The Battle for the Bible 
(Grand Rapids: Zondervan Publishing House, 1976), 34; and 
Rene Pache, The Inspiration and Authority of Scripture, 
trans. Helen I. Needham (Chicago: Moody Press, 1969), 45—
46.
1GRA., 4:244. Warfield made the connection between 
inerrancy and the autographs in two articles: "The Inerrancy
of the Original Autographs" and "The Westminster Confession 
and the Original Autographs," in Benjamin B. Warfield, 
Selected Shorter k‘~ ’.nos of Beniamin B. Warfield, ed. John 
E. Meeter (Grand Rapids: Baker Book House, 1973), 2:580—
594; henceforth cited as Shorter Writings. He, however, 
expressed that the phrase "'the inerrancy of the original 
autographs' is not an altogether happy one . . .  as to the 
entire truthfulness of the Scriptures as given by God" 
(ibid., 2:582). Henry does not express any such caution.
2See Achtemeier, The Inspiration of Scripture. 52, 
53; Beegle, Scripture. Tradition, and Infallibility. 156—
8; Setzer, "A Critique of Fundamentalist Doctrine," 141—5.
3Achtemeier, The Inspiration of Scripture. 52—53.
f
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the fact that apographs are not directly inspired by God.* 
Further, the fact that these apographs are not inerrant does 
not mean that they are errant.3 They still remain 
"infallible" in the sense that “the Bible remains virtually 
unchanged and its teaching undimned."3 For Henry, what 
critics usually call errors in the Bible are not errors as 
such but only difficulties which can be resolved when all 
the relevant information an the passages in question has 
been brought together.'*
1SRfl. 4:233. What Henry asserts about the apographs
is that they have been "providentially preserved" throughout 
the centuries (ibid., 4:247).
3Ibid., 4:233.
3Ibid., 4:235.
*Ibid., 4:173. Henry here refers to Warfield as 
having defended this position. The reference is, possibly, 
to an article written jointly by Archibald A. Hodge and 
Warfield in 1B61, and recently compiled with other related 
articles by Nicole in Inspiration (Grand Rapids: Baker Book 
House, 1979), 40—61. The particular section in question 
here was written by Warfield himself.
In order to buttress this position, Henry adds that 
the number of so-called errors in the copies diminishes as 
one moves textually in the direction of the lost autographs 
(ibid., 4:354). The view which Henry expresses here is 
representative of the position held by most conservative 
evangelical theologians. See, for example, the response and 
comments of Gleason L. Archer on twenty alleged errors in 
the Bible: "Alleged Errors and Discrepancies in the Original 
Manuscripts of the Bible," in Inerrancy. ed. Geisler (Grand 
Rapids: Zondervan Publishing House, 1979), 55—82. Archer, 
like Henry, denies that there are any "genuine mistakes" or 
"demonstrable errors" of any sort in the original 
manuscripts. It has even been suggested by James A.
Bollard, a conservative evangelical, that the alleged errors 
are a result of textual criticism which is confined to a few 
early manuscripts and which ignores thousands of other 
manuscripts, each bearing independent testimony to the 
inerrancy of the autographs. See his article, “Re—examining 
New Testament Textual—Critical Principles and Practices Used 
to Negate Inerrancy," The Journal of the Evangelical 
Theological Society 25 (Dec 1982): 499-506. The 1978
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Henry also minimizes the difference between the 
autographs and the apographs by maintaining that there is a 
vital link between them.1 He contends that the apographs
"Chicago Statement on Inerrancy" by conservative theologians 
sums this point well in Article XIV; "We deny that alleged 
errors and discrepancies that have not yet been resolved 
vitiate the truth claims of the Bible" (Beisler, ed., 
Inerrancy. 497).
^-Undoubtedly, Henry urges evangelicals tc- "put at 
least some slight distance between . . .  the oldest extant 
copies and the autographs" (GRA., 4:232). For him, "modern 
textual scholars themselves disagree over the most reliable 
family of available copies; neither the oldest nor the most 
prevalent texts available to us from the past can be 
considered the final criteria of the original text and 
equated with the inerrant autographs" (ibid., 4:235). He 
identifies some of the errors in the copies as "skipped or 
duplicated words, misspellings, use of a wrong word due to a 
copyist's misunderstanding of dictation, faulty judgment or 
memory (recollection of the text in a different form or 
insertion of a marginal note into the body of the text)
. . . addition of vowel symbols and punctuation marks . . .
inclusion of grammatical or linguistic updating, and in some 
texts even elimination of an apparent incongruity or an 
attempted harmonization of passages" (ibid.). Yet, Henry 
asserts, "none of these alterations . . .  need involve a 
change in theological substance" (ibid.). Further, despite 
"whatever uncertainties copying has contributed" (ibid.,
232), the "text of Old and New Testaments has been preserved 
in the copies in a remarkably pure form. Not a single 
article of faith, not a single moral precept is in doubt" 
(ibid., 4:232, 235-6).
Before Henry, Warfield had already distinguished 
between "autographic codex" and "autographic text" of 
Scripture in clarifying the point that, in essence, 
inerrancy continue in the copies also. See Warfield on this 
in Shorter Writings. 2:583. Following Warfield's path, Greg 
L. Bahnsen explains the "autographic text" as the words of 
Scripture and "autographic codex" as the physical document 
of Scripture. He adds, "Loss of the latter does not 
automatically entail loss of the former. Certain 
manuscripts may have decayed or been lost, but the words of 
these manuscripts are still with us in good copies." See 
his article, "The Inerrancy of the Autographa," in 
Inerrancy. e d . Geisler, 172—3. Henry does not use that 
terminology. However, his statements that "acknowledgement 
of error in the copies and translations does not require 
insistence on error in the text of Scripture per se" (GRA. 
4:253) and that "scribal errors . . .  are to be 
distinguished from errors in Scripture per se" (ibid.,
F
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are efficacious and authoritative today only because there 
once existed inerrant autographs.1 for our present 
purposes, Me Mill not folloM this discussion further since 
focus is not on infallibility of the apographs but on the 
inerrancy of the autographs. Suffice it here to state that 
the shift of language— from inerrant autographs to 
infallible apographs— helps to clarify the fact that the 
term "inerrancy," as it is used in this study, has the 
original autographs as its primary referents.
Mhat Inerrancy Means 
To clarify the meaning of inerrancy in Henry, this 
section seeks to bring together his main ideas from the 
chapter on “The Meaning of Inerrancy" and to correlate these 
Mith other relevant data on the subject from the rest of 
Henry's series. Inerrancy is here described as signifying 
an attribute of Scripture, a quality of biblical 
propositions, an absence of error, and a presence of truth.3
4:358) are perfectly compatible Mith above distinctions.
According to Henry, "The promotion of original 
errancy [that the autographs erred] . . .  encourages 
selective and creative rearrangement of the biblical data 
that soon frustrate the purpose of Scripture ordained for 
the infallible copies. The affirmation of errant originals 
jeopardizes both the epistemological and the evangelistic 
utility of the copies and translations because the thesis of 
prophetic-apostolic errancy is repeatedly correlated Mith 
the superiority of contemporary ecclesiastical gnosis. All 
the infallible functions of confessedly errant copies are 
easily subverted once the errancy of the autographs is 
affirmed. . ." (GRA. 4:234).
aThese seem to be the most important and 
representative significations of the term "inerrancy" in 
Henry's theology.
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While .no single definition can do justice to the Mhole range 
of significations of the word “inerrancy,"1 a working 
definition will be attempted at the end of this section.
Inerrancy as an Attribute of Scripture
For Henry, Scripture is essentially the Word of God 
written. Henry recognizes the fact that this Word was often 
spoken before it was written down. To both spoken and 
written forms of the Word, he accords equal authority.2 But 
it is evident that Henry considers the written or 
“inscripturated" Word of God as the most significant locus 
of God's revelation.3 The reason Henry gives for this point 
is that what is written, in contrast to what is spoken, has 
a certain "fixity and durability.”-* It seems, therefore,
■‘■This is my opinion based on investigation of the 
concept of inerrancy in Henry. Other attempts to define the 
word "inerrancy" have also shown that there is no such a 
thing as a short and precise definition of the term. See 
Paul D. Feinberg, "The Meaning of Inerrancy," in Inerrancy. 
ed. Norman Geisler, 265—304; Stephen T. Davis, The Debate 
about the Bible; Inerrancy versus Infallibility 
(Philadelphia: Westminster Press, 1977), 23—48; and J.
Ramsey Michaels, "Inerrancy or Verbal Inspiration? An 
Evangelical Dilemma,” in Inerrancy and Common Sense, ed. 
Roger R. Nicole & J. Ramsey Michaels (Grand Rapids: Baker 
Book House, 1980), 49-70.
3See GRA. 4:32-40.
3The word "revelation" is used in the study to 
denote the whole content of knowledge which God has made 
available to man through various means. Further comments on 
revelation are given below.
*Henry stresses that "Writing obviously implies a 
permanence greater than that of the nonwritten, spoken word" 
(ibid., 4:37). For him, "the written word" has a certain 
"fixity and durability" (ibid.). Further, the "i.:-jt>ired 
scriptural writings only transmit the prophetic—apostolic 
message in permanent form" (ibid., 4:37—38).
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that for Henry, the" Bible is the document of revelation and 
the inscripturated Word of God.1 It is real and also 
objective.3
Consequently, like any other real object, the Bible 
is a book which possesses particular attributes, properties, 
qualities or characteristics that distinguish it from other 
literature. These attributes include, among others, 
perspicuity, efficacy, objective intelligibility, and 
sufficiency of Scripture.3 To these, inerrancy may be
1Henry views Scripture as "a uniquely inspired 
literature" and "a body of inspired writings that possess 
divine authority" (ibid., 4:406). He considers the canon of 
Scripture as fixed or closed. This topic is discussed in a 
chapter on canon (ibid., 4:405—49).
2This emphasis on the "Word of God written" is 
sometimes characterized by critics as a kind of bibliolatry— 
—book worship. One of the critics who makes this charge is 
Heinrich Emil Brunner who states that inerrancy is a type of 
bondage to the text that makes the Bible an idol or a 
"Paper— pope." See his book, Revelation and Reason, trans. 
Olive Wyon (Philadelphia: Westminster Press, 1946), 11, 1B1. 
See Henry's response to this criticism in GRA. 4:139, 381.
3For Henry, "the prophetic—apostolic writings are 
addressed to the people, not to professional theologians 
only. . . .All things necessary to salvation are lucid even
to the unlearned: to common folk everywhere it yields
unclouded doctrinal and moral norms" (GRA. 4:252—3).
Further, the meaning of Scripture "is clear to the mind of 
the ordinary reader" (ibid., 258). On the basis of an 
analysis presented by Kis on Henry in this respect, it 
appears that perspicuity of Scripture (general clarity of 
biblical contents) has tremendous consequences on Henry's 
hermeneutics and his understanding of the significance of 
human language in expressing divine realities. See his 
dissertation, "Revelation and Ethics,” 268.
Henry emphasizes that "The Word of God is a double- 
edged sword (Heb 4:2) that does not return to God short of 
accomplishing its task (Isa 55:11)." He continues to state 
that "The efficacy of Scripture is a consequence of the 
inerrancy of the autographs and an implicate of the 
infallibility of the transcripts." He refers to "Bible's 
amazing vitality and character as a spiritual oasis where 
men find God seeking, speaking, commanding and inviting
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added. Although Henry does not state explicitly that 
inerrancy is an attribute of Scripture, the inference seems 
clear enough from the close association that he makes 
between Scripture and inerrancy. Volume 4 is especially 
replete with phrases such as "scriptural inerrancy," 
"inerrancy of the Bible," and "biblical inerrancy," all of 
which are phrases expressing the attributive status of 
inerrancy. Sometimes Henry describes inerrancy as "a 
doctrine" which characterizes the Bible as "error— free" and 
disallows “the possibility of error from the text of 
Scripture."i
As is the case with other attributes, Henry sees in 
inerrancy a term that describes a quality which the Bible 
possesses as the Word of God. It denotes "errorless 
transmission of the message that God desired them [sacred
them, where he responds to their penitent pleas and bestows 
his healing presence" (GRA. 4:249).
Henry writes of Scripture as "transcendent 
cognitive—verbal revelation" which acts as a "carrier of 
abjective truth transcending our social location in 
history.1* For him, "God has intelligibly disclosed his 
transcendent will. The truth of God can be stated in all 
cultures; it does not need to be restated in any culture 
except by way of linguistic translation and repetition" 
(ibid., 4:53). Further, one need not be a believer to 
understand biblical truth (ibid., 1:229).
For Henry, "Special revelation does not continue 
sporadically throughout the post—biblical era; it is once— 
for— all" (ibid., 4:276). Henry considers this attribute as 
an important one in maintaining a strong authority of 
Scripture. For him, if the canon is only fluid and not 
closed, there can be no fixed meanings of biblical truth and 
Scripture would, thereby, stop being the final norm in 
doctrine and morals (ibid., 4:95).
1 I bid., 4:163, 207.
r
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writers] to communicate to mankind."1 But, unlike other 
attributes, inerrancy is set apart by Henry as a “governing 
epistemological principle."3 Henry makes use of this point 
in arguing that inerrancy keeps the interpreter of Scripture 
from the temptation of distinguishing what is true and false 
in Scripture.3 For him, such an enterprise can only be 
subjective and arbitrary since there is no obj'ective 
criteria for making the distinctions."* In other words, 
while the other attributes generally explain how the Bible 
functions as the Mord of God, inerrancy is really an 
a priori attribute of Scripture. The commitment to biblical
1Ibid., 4:207.
3Ibid., 4:238. Henry does not consider it 
unjustifiable in principle when critics charge that 
conservative "hermeneutics is assertedly governed by a 
prejudiced a priori, that the Bible is inerrant and that its 
errorlessness is to be understood principally as 
"correspondence with reality" . . .“ (ibid., 4:173). What
Henry is opposed to is the idea that conservatives alone 
approach Scripture with “an exegetical a priori" and the 
implication, therefore, that the conservative approach is 
not open but closed to the facts at hand. For him, “One 
approaches Scripture either on the premise that its teaching 
is reliable unless logical grounds exist for its rejection, 
or on the premise that what the Scripture teaches is errant 
unless independent grounds can be found for crediting its 
content" (ibid.). Henry compares inerrancy with the 
approach used by "scholars who, affirming a major 
explanatory hypothesis in the physical sciences, are 
confident that apparent factual conflicts can be resolved 
within the context of the theory itself and which only 
overwhelming incompatible evidence seriously jeopardizes" 
(ibid.). According to Henry, "No scholar views the 
phenomena— whether of Scripture or of nature— in terms of 
isolated discrete units; some interpretive framework there 
must be, if the data are to be coherent and meaningful" 
(ibid.). See also ibid., 4:191.
3See ibid., 4:238.
"*Ibid., 4:181.
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inerrancy, Tor m?nry, precedes the reading of Scripture.1
In order to explore the meaning of inerrancy more 
specifically, it is appropriate to discuss Henry's concepts 
of proposition, error, and truth. The folljwing three 
sub—sections are aimed at fulfilling that purpose.
Inerrancy as a Characteristic 
of Biblical Propositions
Henry understands the contents of Scripture in terms 
of propositions.3 According to him, "a proposition is a 
verbal statement that is either true or false; it is a 
rational declaration capable of being believed, doubted or 
denied."3 Other words which Henry uses in a manner that 
appears to make them synonymous with propositions are 
sentences, judgments, truths, statements, and information.-* 
Henry prefers the concept of "proposition" to other terms in
1Ibid., 4:173.
aIt is Henry's conviction that "revelation is
primarily correlated with communication of propositional
truth" (ibid., 3:417).
SIbid., 3:456.
*1 bid., 3:429, 430; 4:198. The idea of 
"proposition" is an aspect of philosophy called deductive 
logic. See Gary Iseminger, ed., Logic and Philosophy: 
Selected Readings (New York: Appleton—Century—Crofts, 1968), 
3—34. Clark used deductive logic in explicating the truth 
of scriptural revelation. For him, truth is logical and 
revelation is propositional in a full logico—philosophical 
sense. See Clark's God's Hammer. 24—38, 175—85, and the 
second of his three lectures given at Wheaton College, "The 
Axiom of Revelation," in The Philosophy of Gordon Clark, ed. 
Ronald Nash, 57—92. A historical connection between Clark's 
and Henry's use of propositional logic, on one hand, and 
Aristotelian logic, on the other, has been suggested by Alan 
Padgett, review of GRA. 6 vols., TSF Bulletin 9 (Jan—Feb 
1986): 28-29.
s---------
i
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
29
describing biblical contents for two main reasons. One 
reason is that other passible alternatives— concepts and 
words— are limited in their capacity to bring the truth of 
Scripture to the forefront.1 Furthermore, a proposition is 
a universal "minimal unit of public meaning and truth."3 As 
an association of a predicate with subject, it can be 
"stated externally in print or verbally, or internally 
thought and either volitional ly acted upon or disregarded.1,3 
In other words, a proposition is a unit of thought that 
conveys a complete, objective, and intelligible logical 
meaning .
The implications of Henry's assertion that biblical 
revelation is propositional may be seen from a number of 
related perspectives. First, the contents of the Bible are 
all explicable in terms of propositions.3 For Henry, the
1He states that "If revelation is a communication of 
sharable truth, it will consist of sentences, propositions, 
judgments and not simply isolated concepts, names and words. 
To be sure, concepts and words are instrumentalities of 
God's disclosure; divine disclosure is conceptual and 
verbal. But neither a concept nor an unrelated word can be 
true or false" (GRA. 3:429—30). See also ibid., 3:302;
4:202.
“ Ibid., 4:314.
3Ibid., 4:282.
^Further discussion of the term proposition is 
included in chapter 4. Meanwhile, the proposition refers to 
a logico—verbal unit of thought in Scripture which is 
capable of being true or false. Where a proposition is not 
explicit in Scripture, it is at least implicit.
3It is Henry's view that "The inspired Scriptures 
contain a body of divinely given information actually 
expressed or capable of being expressed in propositions. In 
brief, the Bible is a propositional revelation of the 
unchanging truth of God" (ibid., 3:457).
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presence of anthropomorphisms and literary genres in the 
Bible— like poetry, figurative language and symbolism— does 
not vitiate the propositional character of scriptural 
contents.4 He maintains that even these genres convey valid 
and objective truth in the propositional sense.3
“■Henry clarifies the fact that "While evangelicals 
insist that theological truth is true in the same sense that 
any and all truth is true, they do not ignore the difference 
between literary genres. To imply that evangelicals are 
wooden-headed literalists who cannot distinguish between 
literary types is a resort to ridicule rather than to 
reason. No evangelical takes literally what biblical 
writers explicitly declare to be figurative (cf. Rev 11:8) 
or what biblical writers explicitly declare to be figurative 
(cf. Rev 11:8) or what they portray metaphorically as, for 
example, the Isaiah statement that 'the trees of the field 
shall clap their hands' (55:12, KJV). In no way can the 
claim for the literal truth of the biblical revelation mean 
that prose is the only vehicle of truth or, on the other 
hand, that truth cannot be conveyed by poetry. That 
Scripture contains metaphors, similes, parables and verbal 
techniques such as hyperbole in no way excludes the truth of 
what the Bible teaches. Metaphor is used for drama and 
color and not because the truth strains the resources of 
prose. Some literary techniques more than others sharpen 
the communication of truth by rousing the imagination, 
stirring the emotions, and stimulating the will. Prose does 
not wholly lack such potentialities. Poetry can usually be 
restated in prose form; prose is a kind of linguistic 
shorthand for poetic expression. Such statements as 'the 
Lord hath made bare his holy arm in the eyes of all the 
nations' (Isa 52:10, KJV) or 'the eyes of the Lord are in 
every place' (Prov 15:3, KJV) can with little effort be seen 
to mean that Vahweh will accomplish his sovereign purpose 
internationally, and that nothing is hid from God's 
omniscience” (ibid., 4:109).
This passage summarizes Henry's understanding of the 
relationship that exists between truth of Scripture and the 
various genres of Scripture. It seems clear that, for him, 
intelligible truth is embedded in all literary types and, if 
these genres are not propositional in form, they can be 
formulated into propositions. In essence, Henry seems to 
argue that genres are only different means of expressing 
truth.
a Ibid. Henry admits that literary units such as 
commands and God's name cannot possibly be referred to as 
propositional. However, they can be formulated into 
propositional form. He explains: "Commandments like 'thou
f
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Second, by referring to biblical revelation as 
propositional, Henry appears to mean that the contents of 
Scripture are intelligible or rational to the human mind.1 
According to Henry, biblical revelation is not some esoteric 
or classified information which only the initiated or the 
qualified can understand.2 Any reasonable person—  
irrespective of whether or not he is a believer can
shalt not kill' are indeed imperatives, . . . but their
grammatical form does not cancel the fact that revelation is 
primarily correlated with communication of propositional 
truth. Imperatives are not as such true or false 
proposition; but they can be translated into propositions 
(e.g., 'to kill is wrong') from which cognitive inferences 
can be drawn" (ibid., 3:417). Further, "It is the case that 
in the Bible God not only reveals sentences, or 
propositional truth, but also reveals his Name, or Names, 
and that he gives divine commands. Such disclosures 
assuredly are capable of being formulated propositionally, 
but that is something other than expressly identifying them 
as propositional disclosure. Yet even the revelation of 
God's name requires a meaning—context for intelligibility; 
isolated concepts do not convey truths. Even were God to 
say, 'Moses, my Name is Yahweh,' that would be a 
proposition. . . .  If it is too much to say that divine 
revelation must be propositionally given to be both 
meaningful and true, it is nonetheless wholly necessary to 
insist that divine disclosure does indeed take propositional 
form" (ibid., 3:480—1).
1Henry states that "divine revelation is a mental 
act, for it seeks to convey to the mind of man the truth 
about the Creator and Lord of life, and to write upon the 
spirit of man God's intelligible holy will” (ibid., 3:271). 
Further, Scriptural truth is "rationally persuasive and 
defensible" (ibid., 3:280).
=He stresses that "One need not take a master's 
degree in biblical theology, nor even read Greek and Hebrew, 
to know the sense of most scriptural propositions” (ibid., 
4:267). In addition Henry emphasizes that "revelational 
truth is intelligible, expressible in valid propositions, 
and universally communicable" (ibid., 1:229).
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understand the message of the Bible because it is addressed 
to man's rationality.x
Third, propositional revelation implies that the 
Bible contains objective knowledge. For Henry, biblicax 
truth is not different from any other kind of truth.3 It 
is, rather, genuine information about reality.3 In this 
sense, biblical contents can be related to other kinds of 
truth such as history and science and proved to be 
compatible with them.'*
Fourth, by virtue of the propositions being rational 
and objective, Scriptural truth is capable of being tested
xHenry argues that "If a person must first be a 
Christian believer in order to grasp the truth of 
revelation, then meaning is subjective and incommunicable” 
(ibid., 1:229).
aFor Henry, “theological truth does not differ from 
other truth in respect to intelligibility; therefore, truth 
must be rationally cognized if it is to be meaningfully 
grasped and communicated" (ibid., 1:228).
3Henry stresses that "Scripture's chief sphere is 
God's self—revelation of his own nature and will. Its 
primary concern is therefore theological and ethical. This 
is a very extensive range of authority, to which every other 
authority claim is subject" (ibid., 4:42). Yet, Henry 
writes, while it is not comprehensive in its coverage of 
"subjects like astronomy, botany, economics, geography, 
history, and politics, . . .  God's Scripture contains 
authoritative teaching about many so-called secular matters 
. . ." (ibid.). In addition, "The Bible constitutes a
propositionally consistent revelation whose principles and 
logical implications supply a divinely based view of God and 
the universe" (ibid., 4:251}.
*Ibid., 1:237. It is to be noted that, for Henry, 
truth and reality are mutually correspondent. According to 
Henry, "truth is held to refer to reality” by those, like 
Thomas F. Torrance, who advocate "representational 
epistemology," while for him, "truth is itself the realitv" 
(ibid., 3:222). It appears, in that case, that truth is the 
verbal extension of reality, while reality is knowable only 
in terms of truth.
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for validity and truth.1 The testing procedures that Henry
proposes for biblical propositions consist of three
elements. The first element seems to be that biblical
propositions must first be arranged into axioms and theorems
for their meanings to come out fully.3 This task is the
domain of theology which has the mandate to explicate
biblical contents in logical terms. Henry writes,
Theology, we shall insist, sets out not simply with God 
as a speculative presupposition but with God in his 
revelation. But the appeal to God and to revelation 
cannot stand alone, if it is to be significant; it must 
embrace also some agreement on rational methods of 
inquiry, ways of argument, and criteria for 
verification.3
It needs to be pointed out at this juncture that the
dividing line between Scripture and theology in Henry is
very thin."*
The second element is Henry's argument that to test
1In response to some persons who "think that tests 
of revelation or truth are highly inappropriate, and that 
human creatures ought to accept the divine without 
question," Henry states that "tests of truth are wholly 
appropriate. The old Testament required the people to 
distinguish prophets from pseudoprophets; Jesus warned of 
false Christs (John 5:43); and the early Christians had to 
discriminate true from false apostles" (ibid., 1:232).
aIbid., 1:238—40. For Henry, "axiomatization is 
simply the best means of demonstrating the logical 
consistency of a given system of thought, and showing that 
all logically dependent theorems flow from the basic axioms" 
(ibid., 1:239).
3Ibid., 1:14.
■^Despite his observation that there exists a 
distinction "between the canonical content of revelation and 
systems derived from it" (ibid., 1:240), Henry contends that 
“the content of revelation does indeed lend itself to 
systematic exposition, and the more orderly and logical that 
exposition is, the nearer the expositor will be to the mind 
of God in his revelation" (ibid., 1:240—1).
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biblical propositions for truth, Mhat neeJs to be done is to 
test the logical validity of the statements made in 
Scripture.1 The point here is that Henry understands 
logical validity of a proposition to be a significant 
indication that the proposition in question is true.2 
Consequently, he contends that the most critical tool in 
testing the truth of any proposition is to apply the law of 
non—contradiction.3
A third element in the testing procedures is what 
Henry calls the "principle of verification.""* After 
rejecting all other criteria for testing truth as limited 
and biased, Henry proposes that "divine revelation is 
Christianity's principle of verification.“a While divine 
revelation refers to a phenomenon larger than the Bible, 
Henry makes it clear that at the center of divine revelation 
stands Scripture. He writes,
For revelational theism, verification rests centrally on
^For Henry, " . . .  what is logically contradictory 
cannot be true" (ibid., 1:233). Further, "whatever is
logically contradictory and incapable of reconciliation 
simply cannot be accepted as truth" (ibid., 1:174).
3 Ibid.
3Henry maintains that "A denial of the law of 
contradiction would make truth and error equivalent; hence 
in effect it destroys truth" (ibid., 1:233).
*Henry does not define "the principle of 
verification." However, on the basis of what he writes, it 
seems that it is a norm or criteria by which one knows that 
some given proposition, idea, or concept is objectively true 
(ibid., 1:229—32). Henry also refers to this principle as a 
principle of falsification or confirmation or a science of 
contraries, according to Aristucie (ibid., 1:248).
SIbid.
F
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authoritative witness [of biblical writers]. . . .  The 
Old Testament representation that there is no higher 
verification appeal than God's word is heightened by New 
Testament emphasis on the UJcrd (rheoia): Scripture is an 
authoritative witness.1-
Further, "what the propnets and apostles teach, and hence
the inspired Scripture, [is] in any case Christianity's
ultimate principle of verification. . . . "a On the basis of
what Henry writes, it seems that, for him, no humanly
devised criteria can be applied to test the truthfulness of
scriptural propositions.3 In effect, Henry maintains that
the Bible is self-authenticating."* Thus, Henry concludes
that, on the basis of Bible's own testimony, Scripture is
inerrant in all the propositions that it makes.3
So far, a proposition has been shown to constitute 
the minimum unit of logical thought to which Henry attaches 
his meaning of scriptural truth. As a logical element, a 
proposition can be subjected to testing procedures which
Ibid., 1:265.
2 Ibid., 1:269.
’According to Henry, “It [empirical test] cannot at 
all decide the objective meaning or existence of the 
supraempirical. . . .  Although given in the context of the
space—time continuum, knowledge of God must be gained— even 
if in concrete experience— from its own proper ground, that 
is, from God's revelation in his word" (ibid., 1:262).
*Henry argues that "Only because Scripture in fact 
has its source and sustaining authority in God does it 
confront us as self—authenticating" (ibid., 4:257).
“Henry refers to Warfield in stressing that "the 
Bible not only teaches the divine origin and full 
inspiration of scripture but also explicitly teaches the 
doctrine of verbal inerrancy, thus disallowing the 
possibility of error in the text of Scripture" (ibid., 
4:163).
r
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indicate whether the proposition is erroneous or truthful.
In the next two sub—sections, the concepts of error and 
truth are discussed to further clarify Henry's understanding 
of the meaning of inerrancy.
Inerrancy as Absence of Error 
in Biblical Propositions
Henry's concept of error is based on his 
understanding of a proposition. As it was earlier pointed 
out, Henry conceives a proposition as a logical unit which 
is capable of being tested for validity and truth.1 The 
criteria which Henry holds to be of vital importance in 
testing propositions is the law of non—contradiction.a This 
law is further explained as having two levels: the level of 
logical consistency (absence of inner contradiction) and the 
level of logical coherence (absence of external 
contradiction).3 The two levels may be described as 
follows: The level of logical “consistency is a negative
test of truth."'* The implication of this statement is that 
this level does not affirm any proposition as being true. 
What it does is to disqualify a particular proposition as
ASee pages 28—29.
2Henry makes a distinction between rational and 
empirical criteria for testing truth. While he gives credit 
to “scientific verification" for its contribution to 
cc>itemporary civilization, a fact which theology can ignore 
only “at its own expense," he, nonetheless, considers 
rational verification of truth to be of a higher calibre 
than empirical and experiential criteria (ibid., 1:250—1).
sHenry explains the law of non-contradiction along 
with its two le’els (ibid., 1:232—8).
*1 bid., 1:232.
f
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erroneous or false on the basis of the presence of a logical 
contradiction in it.* For Henry, a proposition which is 
self—contradictory is logically invalid, false, or erroneous 
and, therefore, not true.3
The other level is logical coherence Mhich Henry 
calls a subordinate test.3 This level checks the 
correlation which a particular proposition has with the rest 
of reality and life. According to Henry, one of the 
evidences that divine revelatior. t - i s  its logical 
compatibility or coherence with "ail other information, 
including empirical data involving chronology, geography, 
history, and psychological experience" can be shown to be 
compatible with it.4
In view of the two laws, Henry's concept o-f error 
may be expressed as follows: An error is any proposition
which is logically self—contradicting and one which is 
incompatible with known facts . bout reality and life. When
x"Logical consistency is not a positive test of 
truth, but a negative test; if it were a positive test, 
logical consistency would accredit all views. . . . As a
test, it disqualifies any serious contender whose truth— 
claim is characterized by logical contradiction" (ibid.,
235) .
3Henry characterizes error as "what is wrong, 
inaccurate, incorrect, mistaken . . . "  (ibid., 1:177).
3 Ibid., 1:232.
■*Ibid. , 1:237. Henry's point here seems to be that, 
because all knowledge has one source in God, it is coherent. 
If, for some reason, a proposition is shown conclusively to 
be incoherent or incompatible with the rest of knowledge, 
that would be a clear indication that proposition is false 
and not true. That is the reason why, for Henry, it is 
important that biblical truth is shown to be compatible and 
coherent with other knowledge.
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Henry refers to Scripture as inerrant, therefore, he means 
that there are no logical contradictions within Scripture or 
between the propositions which the Bible makes and other 
aspects of reality.
Inerrancy as Presence of 
Truth in Scripture
From one perspective, the above discussion on error 
is closely related to Henry's concept of truth. The absence 
of error in a proposition and the compatibility of a 
proposition with "all other information" is at the same time 
a sign that truth is present. Truth is the absence of 
contradiction and falsehood in a proposition.1 It seems, in 
fact, that the length to which Henry goes in defending the 
idea of an "error— free" Bible is partly attributable to his 
desire to preserve the truth of Scripture.3 Yet, from 
another perspective, the mere absence of error in a 
proposition does not exhaust Henry's concept of truth. 
According to Henry, truth has an ontological status. That 
is, it is universal and eternal.3 Furthermore, its 
existence is not accounted for by mere sense experience or
11 bid., 4:233.
aSee ibid., 4:170.
3This observation is based on Henry's statements 
about truth such as the following: "Truth does not refer to 
reality. It is itself the reality" (ibid., 2:222). Truth 
is "absolute, fixed, definitive, [and] final" (ibid.,
1:168). "True knowledge . . .  means nothing more or less 
than truth as God knows and reveals it, and that will 
include whatever any philosopher and any scientist says 
without need of retraction" (ibid., 1:93). Truth is "above 
all human contingency and change, . . .  timelessly true as 
the truth of mathematics" (ibid., 3:474).
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logical reasoning. It is Henry's view that man does not 
create or invent truth.1 He only discovers it?
Henry categorizes truth into two main types. (]ne 
type is biblical truth, which includes theological 
affirmations derived from it, and the other is knowledge 
which man acquires independently of the Bible.3 In one 
sense, biblical truth is the same as other truths. Like 
them, it is abjective, intelligible, and verifiable.-* But 
in another sense, it is different. It is "infallibly 
certain and divinely authorized. 1,5 Other truths are, in 
comparison, only tentative and under constant revision.4* In 
this case, Henry seems to elevate biblical truth to a
1In one chapter in vol. 1 on various theories about 
the source of knowledge and truth, Henry discounts 
intuition, experience, and reason as origins of truth. For 
him, all truth is a revelation of God (ibid., 1:70—95).
=Henry emphasizes that "The biblical doctrine of 
religious knowledge everywhere presupposes man's ability to 
reason logically and to understand truth conveyed by God 
about himself and reality." Further, "God is the 
revelational source of all truth; revelation is his 
disclosed truth and the evoking cause of knowledge. Reason 
is a divinely gifted instrument enabling man to recognize 
revelation or truth" (ibid., 4:227—B).
3See ibid., 1:228; 3:384; 4:109.
'•ibid., 1:228.
“Ibid.
‘For Henry, science, for example, is "a method of 
knowing that accepts nothing as filial (let it be said with 
finality!) and stands always ready to revise its findings 
(the word findings may itself be less than accurate). . . .
Because of limitations of method, science has so little 
basis for fixed and final truth about reality that it must 
stand ready to alter every pronouncement it makes and then 
to alter that alteration ad infinitum. But Christian 
theology has historically identified such affirmations not 
as scientific truth, but as dated opinion" (ibid., 1:173).
r
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
40
position where it alone can be described with certainty as 
"absolute, fixed, definitive, and final."*
From the meaning of inerrancy discussed so far, it 
seems that Henry's idea of inerrancy entails more specific 
and fundamental concepts than first meets the eye. For 
Henry, inerrancy applies to the original autographs only. 
It also applies to specific propositions in which all 
biblical truth is capable of being expressed. These 
propositions are without error and, hence, they constitute 
divine truth. More specifically, inerrancy may be defined 
as a term which denotes total validity and truthfulness of 
the propositions which the Bible explicitly or implicitly 
makes about God and the whole of reality. In the next 
section, this discussion about the meaning of inerrancy is 
continued in terms of the extent to which Henry views the 
Bible to be inerrant.2
The Extent of Inerrancy
Henry's idea of inerrancy covers all Scripture.3 
For him, partial inerrancy, if such a thing exists, is
* Ibid., 1:168.
aHenry quotes two writers in his emphasis of the 
pervasive inerrancy of Scripture. According to him, "John 
Wesley's position is clear: 'If there be one falsehood in 
that book it did not come from God of truth' (Journal. 
6:117). Lindsell writes: 'If inspiration allows the
possibility of error then inspiration ceases to be 
inspiration' (The Battle for the Bible, p. 31)" (ibid., 
1:191) .
3 Ibid., 4:184-5.
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untenable.1 If some aspects of the Bible can be accepted to
be erroneous, there exists no longer any basis for trusting
anything that Scripture says.3 Thus, Henry maintains that
the Bible is inerrant in all the -^ttsrs that it addresses,
including historical and scientific facts. He writes,
Verbal inerrancy implies that truth attaches not only to 
the theological and ethical teaching of the Bible, but 
also io the historical and scientific matters insofar as 
they are part of the express message of the inspired 
writings.3
This general application of the term "inerrancy” raises 
certain issues which Henry both recognizes and attempts to 
answer.
One of these issues concerns the coverage of 
subjects. Some critics of inerrancy have argued for a 
distinction between essential truths and incidental matters 
in the Bible as a means of limiting the extent of biblical 
inerrancy.-* Henry considers such an approach as self- 
defeating since all the matters that the Bible addresses are 
inseparably connected with the central message of the
AIbid. For Henry, "partial inerrancy" as a term is 
as confusing as "partial virginity" (ibid., 4:220, n .).
3Henry contends that "once errancy of the texts is 
accommodated, the universe of controversy enlarges. If 
geographical and historical are untrue, why should the 
events or doctrines correlated with them be true?" (ibid., 
4:178).
3Ibid., 4:205.
*Donald G. Bloesch, Essentials of Evangelical 
Theology. 2 vols.: God. Authority and Salvation. (New York: 
Harper & Row, Publishers, 1978), 1:64, 65; McKim, What
Christians Believe. 82—94; Beegle, Scripture. Tradition, and 
Infal1ibi1itv.
r
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
42
Bible.* If the Bible is inerrant, Henry avers, it is so in 
all the subject matter that it addresses.3
According to Henry, when the critics charge that 
there are errors in the Bible, they make one of three 
mistakes, or a combination of them. First, they fail to 
recognize that some of the so-called errors are only 
apparent and not actual.3 For Henry, a closer study of the 
passages in question soon reveals that contradictions can be 
harmonized."* Secondly, Henry maintains that some biblical 
propositions are said to be in error for lack of sufficient 
information about the subject(s) covered.3 He points to 
many archeolonfcai discoveries which have vindicated the 
truth of several historical facts previously thought to be 
erroneous.* Henry's advice is that none of the errors in
*GRA. 4:1B1. Henry illustrates this point by 
stressing that "Without the assumption that the specifics 
are reliable, a great deal of contemporary biblical study 
would collapse into confusion" (ibid., 5:329). In addition, 
"not even the narrative details [of Jesus' life and 
ministry] can be considered insignificant when it comes to 
making a spiritual decision" (ibid., 4:169).
aIbid., 4:170-1.
3Ibid., 4:173.
“Henry refers to Warfield in stating that "the 
attempt to exhibit harmony [in Scripture] should indeed be 
made and earnestly pursued" (ibid., 4:172).
3In this connection, Henry quotes Roger Nicole to 
stress that "‘a number of these (errors] are so far from 
being demonstrable mistakes as to be barely more than 
inconsiderable difficulties . . .'" (ibid., 4:354).
‘Henry discusses to some detail some specific 
achievements of biblical archaeology which he considers to 
be on the side of inerrancy (ibid., 4:316—367).
i
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the critics' list has conclusively been proven to be so.1 
£3n the other hand, Henry cautions biblical scholars against 
harmonizing seeming contradictions if that enterprise 
involves overstretching sound methods of biblical 
interpretation. To leave such cases unharmonized is better 
than engaging in questionable exegesis.3 Thirdly, for 
Henry, critics often forget that the errors they point out 
are in the apographs only.3 This means that none of the 
errors mentioned by the critics necessarily threatens 
Henry's idea of inerrancy. Thus, Henry maintains a concept 
of full inerrancy in spite of claims that there are errors 
in the Bible. Expressed otherwise, the above arguments may 
be summarized as indicating that, for Henry, an error is not 
an error unless it is shown to meet the following criteria: 
It must exhaust the exegetical possibilities of the biblical 
text; it must conclusively be proven that all the relevant 
information on the subject is not in favor of inerrancy; and 
error must be shown to have existed in the original 
autographs.
bid . , 4:354.
“Ibid., 4:172.
30n this fact, Henry approves Augustine's statement
that "'I most firmly believe that the authors were
completely free from error. And if in these writings I am 
perplexed by anything which appears to me apposed to truth,
I do not hesitate to suppose that either the manuscript is 
faulty, or the translator has not caught the meaning of what 
was said, or I myself have failed to understand it.'
('Letter to Jerome,' B2.3)” (ibid., 4:248).
~It appears from the nature of these tests that
Henry makes it impossible to falsify anything in the Bible.
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Despite the stringent criteria set abave, Henry 
disassociates himself from the view which may be called 
"absolute inerrancy."1 Henry considers his own view to be 
more flexible than "absolute inerrancy" for one main reason. 
He states that one should not expect to find "scientific 
precision" in the Bible. For him, such an expectation 
imposes modern and, therefore, foreign modes of thought on 
the Bible. In clarifying this position, Henry offers two 
explanations. First, the Bible was written thousands of 
years ago. As such, its level of technology should not be 
expected to be compatible Mith ours.3 Second, the Bible 
writers often employ "everyday phenomenological language"—  
such as sunrise and sunset— which is definitely not meant to 
convey scientific facts.3
Henry maintains that inerrancy extends to all the
1GRA. 4:176. The term "absolute inerrancy" is used 
by Millard Erickson in Christian Theoloov (Nashville: Baker 
Book House, 1985), 222. Erickson associates the view with 
Harold Lindsell who advocates the view in The Battle for the 
Bible (Grand Rapids: Zondervan Publishing House, 1976).
According to Lindsell, the truths which the Bible 
teaches on any subject are inerrant in the same sense that a 
factual statement in chemistry or history is inerrant today. 
Lindsell argues that "The Bible is not a textbook on 
chemistry, astronomy, philosophy or medicine. But when it 
speaks on matters having to do with these or any other 
subjects, the Bible does not lie to us. It does not contain 
error of any kind" (Lindsell, The Battle for the Bible. IB).
aGRA. 4:176. This allowance in Henry effectively 
exempts the Bible from the charge that it contains error in 
many areas. Henry lists these areas specifically: 
statistics, measurements, historiography, genealogies, 
historical data, and cosmological matters (ibid., 4:201).
3Ibid., 4:109. This argument is used also by other 
conservative evangelical theologians. See, for example, 
Lindsell, The Battle for the Bible. 37—38.
r
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subject matter which the Bible addresses. For him, if the 
Bible makes assertions in matters of theology, moral? , 
history, or science, it does so inerrantly. However, Henry 
cautions against employing inappropriate criteria in judging 
certain aspects of truth. This qualification seems to 
strengthen his understanding of inerrancy. It shows, among 
other things, that, although Henry's view covers all 
Scripture, it is realistic. One reason why Henry finds it 
preferable to retain the concept of inerrancy by qualifying 
it rather than undermine its usefulness through lack of 
qualifications is the role which inerrancy plays in Henry's 
theology. In the next section, attention is given to this 
role.
Inerrancy in Henry's Theology
The concept of inerrancy is not an isolated idea in 
the theology of Carl Henry. Like other aspects of Henry's 
thought, inerrancy stands within a web of several related 
ideas, all of which are aimed at demonstrating the 
comprehensive coherence of his theological structure.1 In 
this section, the question being addressed is the place the 
concept of inerrancy occupies in the theology of Henry. The 
answer to this question is sought by first examining in 
brief the basic structure of Henry's theological system and 
then by assessing the place of inerrancy in that system.
1Henry holds that “Christian theology is the 
systematization of the truth—content explicit and implicit 
in the inspired writings." Thus, the task of a theologian 
is to present biblical teaching as a "comprehensive whole" 
(BRA. 1:238, 239).
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
46
Henry does not define what a system is nor does he 
explain the meaning of various technical terms which he uses 
in connection with the system. But general observations 
can be made on the basis of his writings in this regard. A 
system may be defined as a comprehensive but coherent body 
of theological truths in the form of axioms, theorems, and 
other propositions which gives an account of all the reality 
there is.*" Henry recognizes the existence of many 
conflicting systems of truth in the modern intellectual 
arena. In his assessment of these systems, Henry concludes 
that "there can be only one system of truth, however many 
theoretical models may be constructed."2 For Henry, this 
system is the one advocated by evangelical theology and one 
which Henry himself defends.3
Henry's system consists of axioms and theorems."*
*"This description of a "system" is based on Henry's 
statements such as the following: "Christianity supplies
impetus for a comprehensive and consistent interpretation of 
reality and it is applicable to all the experiences of life" 
(ibid., 1:238); "If rationality and system are intrinsic to 
theology, then the arrangement of theological teaching in 
axioms and theorems remain a legitimate and ideal goal" 
(ibid., 1:240).
A system is variously described as a view, world­
view, theory, or explanation of reality. For a 
philosophical explanation of "system," see Fernando Luis 
Canale, A Criticism of Theological Reason: Time and 
Timelessness as Primordial Presupposition (Berrien Springs, 
Michigan: Andrews University Press, 1987), 44. For a 
explanation of various systems and the factors that 
constitute a system, see Ronald H. Nash, Faith and Reason: 
Searching for a Rational Faith (Grand Rapids: Zondervan
Publishing House, 1988), 21—79.
aGRA. 1:237.
3Ibid., 1:241.
"Theorems are general principles which a
?---
f
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
47
According to him, an axiom is a "first principle," an 
assumption, or a presupposition which is not demonstrable 
and from which all other truths and theorems are derived.A 
An axiom is self-evident and it is neither verifiable nor 
flexible.3 Henry continues to assert that every system of 
truth about reality— be it in natural science or in 
philosophy— is built on some basic axioms or
presuppositions.3 Accordingly, Henry posits two axioms as 
the foundations of his theological system: the 
epistemological axiom and the ontological axiom.^Henry 
states clearly that divine revelation is Christianity's 
epistemological axiom.9 By this designation he seems to 
mean that whatever assertions a Christian makes about 
knowledge— its origin, nature, and content— is derived from,
systematician formulates as implicates of the axioms. These
do not detain us here as they are outside the scope of the
present discussion. See ibid., 1:239—41.
■’"This characterization of an axiom is based on 
Henry's usage of the three terms— axiom, first principle, 
and presupposition. See Henry's usages in GRA. 1:223, 239; 
1:219; and 1:230, 231, respectively.
3 Ibid. Further information on "axiom" as Henry uses 
the term can be found in Kis, "Revelation and Ethics," 228.
See also a lecture by Henry's college mentor, Clark,
entitled "The Axiom of Revelation," 57—92.
“"Consciously or unconsciously," Henry maintains, 
"belief systems rest on fundamental assumptions which 
decisively and comprehensively interpret all reality and
life" (GRA. 1:180). Further, "No historian and no scientist 
approaches historical or physical events without 
presuppositions" (ibid., 1:261).
■*The epistemological axiom is discussed here while 
the ontological axiom is examined in chapter 3.
9GRA. 1:213-24.
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grounded in, and sanctioned by divine revelation.1
For Henry, divine revelation is an essential guide 
in all pursuits after knowledge and truth. It helps man to 
see reality from God's perspective without which any 
knowledge that man possesses is superficial and distorted.3 
It is in this sense that divine revelation is an axiom, a 
first principle, or presupposition in Henry's epistemology.3
Henry views divine revelation as consisting of 
general revelation and special revelation.-* For Henry, 
general revelation refers to God's self-disclosure in four 
main areas:3 in nature,* in the mind of man,7 in the moral
1Henry concedes that "biblical writers provide no 
extended treatise on religious epistemology.“ However, "on
the basis of revelation and its implications he [the 
Christian] can adduce some specific and highly significant 
epistemic considerations" (ibid., 1:224).
3Ibid., 4:205.
3As  mentioned above, the axiom of a system is 
undemonstrable. It is self-evident. These are the grounds 
on which Henry refers to his theological method as 
presuppositionalist. For him, this designation is not 
something to be ashamed of but a source of contentment. By 
recognizing and openly admitting his presuppositions, Henry 
maintains that he is being objective and that he is hiding 
nothing under the table. According to him, what he is doing 
is the same as what every systematician in every field does. 
See Henry's defence of presuppositionalist methodology in 
ibid., 1:171, 179, 205, 219-20, 226-36.
*1 bid., 2:86.
“Henry lists the four areas in ibid., 2:87.
*Henry refers to Ps 19 and Rom 1:18—20 as biblical 
basis for this variety of general revelation (ibid., 2:84).
^According to Henry, the mind consists of two 
things: human reason which enables man to be a recipient of
divine revelation (ibid., 2:84) an also the consciousness of 
"the existence of God" (ibid., 2:133—4).
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conscience of nan,1 and in "the whole sweep of history.'^ 
Some of the other terms which Henry uses in reference to 
general revelation are "primal revelation"3 and "general 
cosmic—anthropological revelation.""* According to him, this 
general revelation is important for three main reasons. 
First, it is “a presupposition of ongoing individual and 
collective existence in all times and places."3 Second, 
"Scripture declares it to be the basis of man's morality and 
responsibility to God."* Henry stresses that "rejection of 
God's general revelation is what makes men and women 
heathen.”7 Third, "general revelation is the presupposition 
of redemptive revelation.""
The other type of divine revelation is what Henry 
refers to as "special revelation."* This revelation is 
"soteriological" or "salvific" in content and purpose. Like 
general revelation, it is "addressed to the whole world." 
But, unlike it, special revelation is given in specific
1For Henry, the conscience is the "inner, secret, 
guilty knowledge of the true God and of his demand for 
spiritual submission and moral obedience" (ibid., 2:85).
= Ibid., 2:87, 247-56.
3Ibid., 2:84.
■•ibid., 2:86.
3Ibid., 2:85.
"I bid.
^Ibid., 2:86.
"Ibid., 2:90.
"Ibid., 2:86.
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historical events. Henry writes the fallowing regarding
what special revelation includes:
In redemptive revelation, God discloses himself in once— 
for-all saving acts of Judeo—Christian history, 
particularly in Israel's exodus from Egypt and the 
consequent founding of the Hebrew nation, and in Jesus' 
resurrection from the tomb and the consequent founding 
of the Christian church. And he is disclosed in Jesus 
Christ the incarnate Logos. He is revealed, moreover, 
in the prophetic—apostolic Word, in the whole canon of 
Scripture which objectively communicates in 
propositional verbal form the content and meaning of all 
God's revelation.1
Both general and special revelation comprise divine 
revelation which is Henry's epistemological axiom. For 
Henry, this axiom is the basis for the Christian world­
view. It "supplies the impetus for a comprehensive and 
consistent interpretation of reality.”2 Not only does it 
reveal “knowledge of the ultimate world" and anticipate 
“man's future destiny" but it also
exhibits the wonder of the cosmos, the meaning and worth 
of individual existence, the purpose of history and the 
role of society and culture, the grip of moral values 
and the power of love.3
□n the basis of what God has given in his revelation,
therefore, Henry projects the possibility of constructing a
complete Christian epistemolagy.“*
It is to be noted, however, that the utility of the
axiom of divine revelation in the construction of a
Christian epistetnology hinges to a large extent on the fact
Mbid. , 2:87.
2Ibid., 1:238.
3 Ibid.
“•ibid., 1:224.
f
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that Scripture is part of that revelation. Certainly, Henry 
argues that God's revelation is not to be identified 
exclusively with the Bible.1" To do so is to obscure "the 
full range of divine disclosure."3 Yet, the role that Henry 
accords Scripture in the revelation axiom is central. For 
him, it is Scripture which “objectively communicates in 
propositional verbal form the content and meaning of all 
God's revelation."3 In relation to general revelation, the 
Bible has a logical priority: it "republishes the content of
general revelation objectively. "■* In addition, "it enables 
man to assess fully the revelation in God's created works."3 
In relation to God's revelation in history, Scripture 
communicates both the "historical act" and "its 
interpretation."* In other words, God's acts in history 
would have remained unknown and unintelligible were it not 
for the existence of Scripture. Thus, as these 
illustrations indicate, the Bible plays a significant role 
in Henry's epistemological axiom.
Given the important role that Henry accords 
Scripture in his theory of knowledge, it becomes easy to 
understand why he seeks to shield the Bible from any
1Ibid., 2:80.
“Ibid.
3Ibid., 2:87. 
'‘Ibid., 1:223. 
3Ibid., 2:90. 
**Ibid . , 2:330.
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suggestion that it is less than a totally reliable source of 
objective truth.1 For Henry, if Scripture has any kind of 
flaws, it cannot be trusted as an obj'ective expression of 
"the content and meaning of all God's revelation."* If its 
truth is questionable, it cannot be expected to play the 
role of making known and intelligible other aspects of 
divine revelation. In other words, to propose that 
Scripture is erroneous is to undermine the basis on which 
Christian epistemology is founded.3 It is in this context 
that Henry proposes the idea of inerrancy as "a governing 
epistemological principle."'* That is, inerrancy guarantees 
Scripture's total trustworthiness and this, in turn,
1Henry explicitly states, "The fact of inerrant 
autographs is both theoretically and practically important"
(ibid., 4:209).
3Ibid., 2:87.
3The major problem which Henry associates with the 
view that the Bible has errors is that it "provides no 
adequate basis for a sound apologetic. Only logical 
imprecision can begin with errancy and conclude with divine 
authority" (ibid., 4:192). According to him, what "errancy" 
does is to "destroy the objective truth of the Christian 
religion, trivialize theology, and lead finally to 
skepticism" (ibid., 4:193).
*The context in which this phrase occurs is Henry's 
response to critics who think that inerrancy is dispensable. 
Henry retorts, "But if inerrancy is irrelevant as a 
governing epistemological principle, why should any specific 
issue of faith and practice be thought beyond the 
possibility of apostolic error? . . .  To argue that the 
modern exegete can trustworthily distinguish what is true 
and false in Scripture, even if the inspired prophets and 
apostles could not do so, is like swallowing a camel and 
straining a gnat" (ibid., 4:238). These statements seem to 
imply that inerrancy is indispensable if the Bible is to 
play the role it should in the Christian theory of 
knowledge. The fact that Henry considers inerrancy to be a 
"governing presupposition," particularly in hermeneutics 
appears to be implied (ibid., 4:173, 191).
f
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establishes the case for a Christian epistemology. When a 
single error is admitted to exist in Scripture, Henry 
stresses, the door is wide open for individuals to find all 
kinds of errors in the Bible. According to Henry, only if 
and when Scripture is shown to be totally reliable can it 
play the decisive role which Henry accords it in his 
theology.3 It is Henry's view chat, without inerrancy, one 
is left with “an unstable religious epistemology,"3 and by 
implication, a vulnerable theological system.
Conclusion
The case for inerrancy which Henry presents covers a 
wide range of areas. The concept of inerrancy denotes total 
reliability of scriptural contents, the logical consistency 
and coherence of the propositions in which biblical truth is 
expressed, absence of error and presence of truth in 
Scripture as the document of revelation. As it has been 
shown, inerrancy has the original autographs as its referent
1For Henry, "once errancy of the text is 
accommodated, the universe of controversy quickly enlarges.
. . . Once biblical inerrancy is set aside, errancy is
readily correlated with much broader spheres of conflict" 
(ibid., 4:178).
^Commenting on the "importance of probing the nature 
and implications of biblical inerrancy," Henry argues, "An 
unsatisfactory view of Scripture will soon undermine itself, 
if we cannot rely on the gospels and Epistles to tell the 
truth, we can say little or nothing about Jesus Christ whom 
they represent" (ibid., 4:366—7). Further, "Without 
persuasive epistemic credentials, Christianity will be 
assimilated to the historical approach prevalent in the 
modern intellectual world where all events are set in the 
context of developmental contingency and any claim to 
finality and absolute uniqueness is leveled" (ibid., 1:213).
3Ibid., 4:366-7.
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since only they bear the quality of being inspired by God. 
Although Henry does not espouse absolute inerrancy, he, 
nonetheless, insists that the Bible is fully inerrant both 
in part and in whole. It has also been pointed out that 
inerrancy occupies an important place in Henry's 
epistemology and, hence, in his theological system. A 
natural conclusion from these observations seems to be that, 
without inerrancy, Christianity has no "epistemic 
credentials" since Scripture would thereby be no longer a 
reliable interpreter of the revelation axiom.
It is recognized that all these aspects of inerrancy 
cannot be evaluated in full in this study. Such a task 
would demand more time and space than is presently 
available. However, it is important to conclude thxs 
chapter with an assessment of some of the underlying 
arguments on which Henry bases his case for inerrancy. 
According to investigation, there are four main arguments 
which Henry uses to defend inerrancy. These are: (1)
argument from text of Scripture, (2) argument from the 
phenomena of Scripture, (3) argument from history, and (4) 
argument from the doctrine of inspiration.
First, Henry maintains that the concept of inerrancy 
is supported by Scripture's witness about itself. He states 
that the Bible "explicitly teaches the doctrine of verbal 
inerrancy."1 The passages which he cites are 2 Tim 3:16,
1 Ibid., 4:163.
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John 10:35, Rom 3:2, and 1 Cor 2:13.x Farther investigation
of these passages reveals two points. The first one is that
the passages do not refer to inerrancy. If they do, the
reference is indirect and, therefore, dependent on
subjective factors of interpretation. The second point is
that Henry himself elsewhere indicates that inerrancy is not
an explicit teaching of Scripture. He writes, "inerrancy is
implicitly taught, logically deducible. and is a necessary
correlate of Scripture as the word of God."2 In fact, Henry
points out that inerrancy may not be a correct biblical
interpretation. According to him,
While Warfield held that the Bible explicitly teaches 
its own inerrancy, he left open the possibility that 
inerrancy is not a correct biblical interpretation:
'This evidence is not in the strict sense 
"demonstrative;" it is "probable" evidence. It 
therefore leaves open the metaphysical possibility of 
its being mistaken.'3
What these statements seem to indicate is that Henry
considers inerrancy to be deducible from Scripture.
However, the evidence is not conclusive and, as such, Henry
seems hesitant to rest the case for inerrancy wholly on
evidence from Scripture.
Henry's second argument for inerrancy comes from the 
phenomena of Scripture.'* Henry maintains that the phenomena
1These texts are based on the Brief Statement of the 
Doctrinal Position of the Missouri Synod which was adopted 
by the Lutheran Church— Missouri Synod in 1932, p. 1548 
(ibid., 4:168).
2 Ibid., 4:168. Emphasis supplied.
3Ibid., 4:168.
*This phrase, "phenomena of Scripture," is used here
r
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of Scripture vindicates the inerrancy of the Bible.1 He 
also does not consider any of the so-called errors in the 
Bible to be an error unless it is demonstrated that the 
exegetical possibilities of the text are exhausted (through 
harmonization), that all the relevant data in the text in 
question made available, and that error is shown to have 
existed in the original autographs.3
Yet, Henry also concedes that scriptural phenomena 
is not always compatible with inerrancy. He recognizes that 
some apparent contradictions in Scripture cannot be 
harmonized successfully without engaging in "strained or 
artificial exegesis."3 Henry discourages such an exegesis 
and even states that harmonizing is "a second—order 
concern.""* For him, some passages are better left 
unharmonized. In one instance, he even considers the appeal 
to the original autographs to be, at times, an 
oversimplification of some textual problems. He notes that 
"the most troublesome discrepancies occur not in passages 
where the biblical text is in doubt, but rather where the
to refer to the nature of the text of Scripture, that is, 
the known facts about scriptural contents.
LHenry holds that "Harmonizing the phenomena with 
biblical teaching is not unimportant as Warfield sees it; 
the attempt to exhibit harmony should indeed be made and 
earnestly pursued" (GRA. 4:172).
2See ibid., 4:172-3, 316-67.
3Ibid., 4:172.
*1 bid.
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text is not in question."1. Given these observations, it 
seems that Henry does not rest his case for inerrancy mainly 
on the phenomena of Scripture.
A third argument which Henry appeals to in support 
of inerrancy is history. Henry refers to inerrancy as "the 
historic commitment of the Christian church."3 It is to be 
noted that, in this context, Henry means, by inerrancy, a 
belief in the total reliability of Scripture. In that 
sense, Henry is certainly right in stating that the total 
reliability of the Bible was always the position of the 
church from the biblical times until the rise of the 
critical theories in the last two or three centuries.3 As 
far as inerrancy as a theological concept is concerned, 
however, Henry traces its earliest origin to Lutheran 
theologians of the seventeenth century in Europe and the 
Princeton theologians of the nineteenth century here in 
America.
If a distinction is to be maintained between
inerrancy as a theological concept and total reliability of 
the Bible as some scholars appear to suggest,9 it seems that
1Henry illustrates this point by comparing the 
difference between Gen 50:4—13 and Acts 7:16 in regard to 
where Abraham bought a burial place (ibid., 4:231—5).
a Ibid., 4:367.
3See Hasel, Biblical Interpretation Today. 4— 10.
“*1 bid . , 4:369.
“Van Bemmelen, Issues in Inspiration. 373—5. The
distinction between inerrancy as a theological concept, on
one hand, and confidence in the Bible as the word of God, on
the other, seems to be made also by Geoffrey W. Bromiley,
r
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the appeal to church history c.s a supporting evidence for 
inerrancy is not very helpful. Available studies on 
inerrancy and history reveal that history can be interpreted 
in favor of inerrancy or against it.1 Henry seems to be 
aware of these facts and, therefore, does not rest his case 
for inerrancy wholly on history.
The fourth argument which Henry adduces for 
inerrancy is the biblical concept of inspiration. The 
affinity that exists between the concept of inerrancy and 
inspiration in Henry is particularly notable. First, it is 
not uncommon to find the words inerrancy and inspiration 
combined in a single phrase. Henry writes of "inerrant 
inspiration" in a manner that suggests a close relationship 
between inerrancy and inspiration.2 Second, in his
"Church Doctrine of Inspiration," in Revelation and the 
Bible. ed. Carl F. H. Henry (Grand Rapids: Baker Book House, 
1950), 205-17; and Mark Noll, "A Brief History of Inerrancy, 
Mostly in America," in The Proceedings. 1987. 9—25.
1For the view that the Bible and church history are 
on the side of inerrancy, see, for example, Carl Henry, ed., 
Revelation and the Bible (Grand Rapids: Baker Book House, 
1958), and John D. Hannah, ed., Inerrancy and the Church 
(Chicago: Moody Press, 1984). For the opposite view that 
Scripture and history are against inerrancy, see, for 
example, Beegle, Scripture. Tradition, and Infallibility; 
and Jack B. Rogers and Donald K. McKim, The Authority and 
Interpretation of the Bible: An Historical Approach (San 
Francisco: Harper & Row, 1979).
“ ibid., 4:206. The following statements also shed 
more light on this point: "It is no accident that those who
deplore the concept of biblical inerrancy are increasingly 
uncomfortable with the doctrine of inspiration as well" 
(ibid., 4:192); ". . . inerrant inspiration is what assures
the absence of logical contradictions and verbal 
misrepresentations" (ibid., 4:206); and "in all cases 
inspiration safeguards the writers from error in 
communicating the content of their message" (ibid., 4:207).
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treatment of the subjects of inerrancy and inspiration, he 
discusses inerrancy immediately after his chapter on 
inspiration.1 Henry develops his themes in logical 
sequences and, therefore, it is noteworthy that the two 
concepts are juxtapositioned in that manner. Third, it was 
earlier mentioned that the term "inerrancy” is applied in 
reference to the autographs for the simple reason that only 
they are designated as "inspired.” According to Henry, the 
apographs are Infallible, not inerrant. The reason for this 
is that they are not expressly said to be inspired in the 
Bible.
Henry maintains that inspiration is "a divine 
activity."3 For him, inspiration is descriptive of God's 
activity in the particular context of revealing himself at 
specific times and places and to particular individuals. On 
the basis of what Henry writes, the basic issue involved in 
designating inspiration as a divine activity is an important 
one. In effect, it raises the question of the nature of 
God's activity in the world and how God relates himself with 
the world. The implication of this observation is that in 
order to fully understand and appreciate how Henry views 
God's activity in inspiration, one has to examine Henry's 
views on the nature of God's activity in and relationship 
with the world. Given Henry's systematic and integrative 
approach to theological subjects, it is not likely the case
1See GRA. vol. 4.
3 Ibid., 4:130.
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that Henry's understanding of haw God acts in inspiration 
differs radically from his views on how God acts in other 
contexts. As investigation seems to indicate, Henry's views 
on the nature of God's activity in the world are explicated 
in his concept of sovereignty.
Accordingly, the next chapter is devoted to an 
analysis of Henry's concept of sovereignty as a means of 
bringing to light the basic ideas which underlie Henry's 
understanding of the nature of God's activity in the world. 
That discussion sets the stage for chapter 4 in which an 
attempt is made at identifying the nature of the correlation 
between inerrancy and sovereignty in Henry.1
1It is to be noted that the sequence of topics, from 
inerrancy to sovereignty, is dictated by the nature of the 
subject and the delimitations of the study. At first, it 
might appear that a discussion on sovereignty should precede 
the chapter on inerrancy, given the fact that the case being 
advanced here posits the concept of sovereignty as the 
"presupposition." Yet, since the study is undertaken 
primarily in the interest of the doctrine of inerrancy, a 
clarification of this primary concern takes precedence over 
that which it presupposes. Another support for the present 
sequence arises out of the case for inerrancy itself. As 
argued in this chapter, there are pointers in the concept of 
inerrancy itself which indicate that inerrancy derives its 
main impetus from considerations outside the perimeters of 
its meaning and those arguments which constitute its 
foundations.
n ~
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CHAPTER III
THE CONCEPT OF SOVEREIGNTY
In chapter 2, Henry's concept of inerrancy was 
analyzed in terms of Henry's sources, the meaning of the 
concept, the role of inerrancy in Henry's theology, and the 
arguments which Henry uses as basis for taking the inerrancy 
position. It was also noted that inerrancy is closely 
connected with Henry's idea of inspiration. In Henry's 
words, "The biblical doctrine of inspiration . . .  connects 
God's activity with the express truths and words of 
Scripture.1,1 To understand inspiration fully as an activity 
of God, it is appropriate to address first the wider issue 
of the nature of God's activity in the world. One reason 
for taking this approach is that, without the wider context 
in which specific ideas are set, it is often difficult to 
grasp the full force of Henry's concepts.
As investigation reveals, Henry's ideas on the 
nature of God's activity in the world find expression in the 
concept of sovereignty. In this chapter, the concept of 
sovereignty is analyzed descriptively for the purpose of 
clarifying Henry's ideas about the nature of God's activity 
in general. After the analysis in this chapter, attention
‘'GRA, 4:144.
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is given, in chapter 4, to the issue of how inerrancy 
presupposes the concept of sovereignty.
This chapter it is divided into five main sections. 
The first is general and introductory. It is an enquiry 
into Henry's theological orientation out of which the 
concept of sovereignty arises. That background leads to the 
second section which is on the meaning of sovereignty. As 
becomes evident in the discussion, the approach used here in 
the search for the meaning of sovereignty is neither 
beinantic nor linguistic. It is oriented to Henry's theology 
of sovereignty. The discussion on the meaning of 
sovereignty is continued in the section on the extent or 
scope of sovereignty, that is, whether or not Henry's 
concept of sovereignty has limits. This prepares the ground 
for the larger issue in section four concerning the place of 
sovereignty in Henry's theology. Finally, a conclusion is 
made on the basis of the material presented in this chapter 
and in view of the theme of this study.
Sovereignty and Henry's Tradition
An attempt is made here at setting Henry's concept 
of sovereignty in Henry's theological tradition. The 
investigation conducted here is not intended to be 
exhaustive but to give a bird's-eye view on the sources and 
the tradition which lie behind Henry's concept of 
sovereignty. To achieve that goal, a brief survey is made 
of the clues which Henry himself gives in God. Revelation 
and Authority concerning his intellectual ancestry.
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Henry's theological tradition is not easily 
detectible from his series. One characteristic of Henry's 
style of writing is his frequent use of diverse sources of 
information to strengthen his arguments.1 This practice 
gives Henry's writings an ecumenical orientation.31 In 
addition, Henry describes himself as a defender of "historic 
Christianity" and "evangelical faith," in particular,3 both 
of which terms can be used for wide varieties of Christian 
traditions.'* Yet, the difficulties which these terms pose
1D. B. Knox has checked vol. 6 alone and found that 
there are 750 different books quoted and 850 authors 
referred to (Review of GRA. vol. 6, Reformed Theological 
Review 43 CJan—Apr 1984]s 19).
aAt least two theologians see Henry as a partner in 
ecumenical dialogue: Mark Ellingsen, review of GRA. vol. 4—
6, Dialogue 24 (Winter 1985): 76; and Peter D. Fehlner, 
review of GRA. vol. 6, Theological Studies 44 (Dec. 1983): 
708. The former is a Lutheran theologian and the latter a 
Roman Catholic.
3 Ibid., 5:34, 136; 1:28, 212. Henry also refers to 
his theology as "revealed theology" (ibid., 1:196, 199), 
"biblical Christianity" (ibid., 1:248), and "Judeo—Christian 
religion" (ibid., 1:248; 5:136).
*According to George Marsden, the term "evangelical" 
is elusive." He writes that it refers to "anyone who 
promotes proclamation of the gospel to salvation through the 
atoning work of Christ and has a traditional high view of 
Scripture alone as authority." See his article, "Reformed 
and American" in Reformed Theology in America, ed. David F. 
Wells (Grand Rapids: William B. Eerdmans Publishing Company, 
1985) 2. Barr adds that an evangelical can be a Calvinist 
or an Arminian in his theology (Fundamenta1 ism. 188).
It appears that the reason why Henry does not 
identify himself closely with any specific theological 
tradition is because such an identity would jeopardize his 
apologetic goal which is aimed at making a wide appeal on 
behalf of Christianity. Henry laments the "fragmented 
condition of evangelical Christians" and calls for "a 
corporate fellowship of believers" with a "vanguard of 
scholars to exhibit the truth of revelation with an 
intellectual power that confronts non—Christian ideologies"
(GRA. 1:133). It is in his autobiography where one learns
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in establishing Henry's theological roots are not 
insurmountable.
The evidence considered here comes mainly from 
Henry's use of sources in his major work, Bod. Revelation 
and Authority. In several instances, Henry makes favorable 
references to theological positions of John Calvin and 
various Reformed Confessions written before 1650. Among 
Calvin's ideas which Henry approves explicitly are Calvin's 
aprioristic methodology,1" an emphasis on God's nature rather 
than his existence,2 the essential divinity of the Trinity,3 
the importance of the doctrine of predestination,'* the
that Henry is a Baptist and that he has been intimately 
involved in the interdenominational evangelical revival for 
about fifty years (Henry, Confessions of a Theologian. 62— 
107, 144ff).
1After surveying various methodological approaches 
to theology, Henry endorses Calvin's "apriorism" in an 
extended comment. "Aprioristic methodology" is described by 
Henry as the view that a person is born with a certain 
fundamental knowledge about God and other principles that 
make human life— search for truth, interpersonal 
communication, etc.— possible (GRA. 1:334—43). This seems 
to be a basic epistemological principle in Henry.
2 Ibid., 5:135. Henry here paraphrases Calvin: "What 
is God? Men who pose this question are merely toying with 
idle speculations. It is more important for us to know of 
what sort he is and what is consistent with his nature."
See The Library of Christian Classics, vol. 20. Calvin: 
Institutes of the Christian Religion, ed. John T. McNeil, 
trans. Ford Lewis Battles [Philadelphia: Westminster Press, 
1960], I, 2:2. Hereafter, this resource is referred to as 
John Calvin, Institutes. followed by book number in Roman 
numeral, and chapter number, and section number in Arabic 
numerals.
3GRA, 5:206.
*1 bid., 6:76.
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function of the law as a teacher of righteousness,1 emphasis 
on universal revelation and “a fractured image of God" in 
man after the fall,3 limited atonement,3 and the Holy Spirit 
as the source of all truth.'* In addition to Calvin, Henry 
also uses the pre— 1650 Reformed Confessions as definitive 
statements on matters of doctrine. Thus, he cites The 
Westminster Confession (1647) as teaching the foreknowledge 
of God3 and Article 12 of the Belgic Confession (1561) on 
the purpose of the doctrine of providence.* On one hand, it 
may appear as if, in these instances, Henry is merely adding 
more sources indiscriminately in order to strengthen his 
arguments.7 On the other hand, while Henry writes
1I bid., 6:253.
“ Ibid., 6:424.
3 Ibid., 6:88, 10O. 
*1bid., 6:372.
9Ibid., 5:279. Henry mentions The Formula of 
Concord (1576) here as also teaching God's prescience. This 
is rather strange. Besides being a Lutheran rather than a 
Reformed Confession, the view of God's foreknowledge in The 
Formula is quite different from that of The Westminster 
Confession which is Reformed. In The Formula, foreknowledge 
is not tied to foreordination of particular events. Compare 
The Formula of Concord, XI:2—5 and The Westminster 
Confession V:l, 2, Philip Schaff, The Creeds of Christendom 
(New York: Harper & Brothers, 1919), 165—166 and 612,
respectively.
*GRA. 6:478.
7That is the impression of Paul Helm who, in 
reviewing vol. 6 of GRA writes, "Any apt quotation, from 
whatever source, is grist to the author's mill. Thus 
extracts from Eulalio R. Bulthazar jostles with those from 
Karl Barth, and quotations from Hegel with those from 
Harpers magazine" (Churchman 98 C1984]: 74). A thorough 
reading of Henry's volumes reveals a more deliberate choice 
and use of the sources than Helm seems to allow.
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approvingly of many ideas from various sources, he also 
criticizes other ideas from the same sources.1 In this 
regard, Calvin and the pre-1650 Reformed Confessions are an 
exception. The investigation has demonstrated only 
approvals of these sources and no criticisms. Henry's 
burden with Calvin and the Reformed Confessions is to defend 
their orthodoxy and correct those interpretations of them 
which he considers to be misguided.2 These observations, 
among others, have led reviewers of GRA to conclude that 
Henry is "deeply steeped in the Calvinistic heritage."3
Given the above observations concerning Henry's 
theological heritage, it is most unlikely that in his 
exposition of the concept of sovereignty, Henry will 
deviate, at least significantly, from his tradition. In the 
next section, Henry's understanding of sovereignty is 
explored with his theological background in mind. No
1One example here is James Barr the author of
Fundamental ism— whose ideas Henry uses (GRA., 4:10, 17, 132) 
but whom he also criticizes sharply (ibid., 4:121—30, 144— 
50, 329—35). Another example is the Seventh—day Adventists. 
Henry commends them for teaching creationism and praises 
scholarly contributions of Adventist scholars like Edwin 
Thiele and Gerhard Hasel (ibid, 6:149; 4:360—1, 466—7). But 
he also criticizes them for honoring "Ellen G. White on a 
level with inspired prophets" (ibid., 4:204).
“Henry considers Karl Barth (1886—1968), Emil 
Brunner (1889—1966), G. C. Berkouwer (1903— ), Jack B. Rogers 
(1934— ), and a host of other modern theologians as 
unorthodox interpreters of the Reformed faith (ibid., 6:91— 
97) .
3E1lingsen, review, 75, 76. See also reviews by 
John Eddins (Perspectives in Religious Studies 11 C19B4]: 
73); Knox (19, 20); and Padgett (785-6). Eddins, after 
remarking that Henry's theology is "a slightly modified 
Calvinism," hastens to add that Henry "defends a Calvinistic 
doctrine of God with vengeance" (73).
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thorough comparative study is intended between Henry's ideas 
and those of the Reformed tradition since such a task lies 
outside the scope of this investigation. But, where 
appropriate, brief comments are made in assessing the extent 
to which Henry reflects the influence of his tradition on 
specific aspects of the concept of sovereignty.
The Meaning of Sovereignty
Henry's understanding of sovereignty is primarily 
found in a chapter entitled "The Sovereignty of the 
Omnipotent God."A The following descriptive analysis of the 
concept is based on the ideas in that chapter and other 
relevant ideas in the rest of GRA. In this section the 
meaning of sovereignty is analyzed in terms of what the 
concept signifies.
Henry's usage of the word "sovereignty" may be said 
to include five significations: independence, freedom, 
power, lordship and causality of God. These significations 
have been carefully chosen as best representing what Henry 
means by the term "sovereignty." Since the focus of the 
study is the relationship between sovereignty and inerrancy, 
the selected significations are described and analyzed in 
view of that focus.
First, divine sovereignty stands for the 
independence of God in his existence.3 God is self—
XGRA. 5:307-33.
=Henry refers to God's independence in terms of 
God's aseitv. a term which, according to Henry, means that 
God has "life from and by himself in independent freedom" 
(ibid., 5:69).
r
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sufficient and his being and life have their origin only in 
himself.1- He is not dependent on anything outside himself 
for anything.a In fact, if everything turned into 
nothingness, God Mould still exist."*
Second, sovereignty points to the freedom of God in 
his decisions and activity. God does nothing out of 
necessity.'* The creation of this particular world, the 
choice of Israel as the people of the covenant, the 
salvation of sinners and other things that God does are a 
result of the free will of God. Had he chosen to do so, he 
would have created a different type of a world or chosen 
another nation as his people.0 In other words, God is 
sovereign in the sense that he can do anything, anytime, and 
anywhere as he sees fit.* Yet, Henry cautions that God's
1Ibid.
2Henry asserts that God is "independent of all 
compulsory relations to anything and anyone outside himself" 
(ibid., 6 :37).
3 Ibid., 5:69. In stressing this point, Henry argues 
that one of the major flaws in process philosophy is its 
refusal to view God in terms other than his relationship 
with the world (ibid., 5:68).
The same idea is expressed by Reformed theologians as 
follows: "It is independence by which in being and operating
God depends on no one else but possesses for himself an 
essence sufficient to make him a se in essence and also in 
operation, so that everything outside him depends upon him 
in existing and in operating" (Heinrich Heppe, Reformed 
Dogmatics. rev. and ed. Ernst Bizer, trans. G. T. Thompson 
[London: George Allen & Unwin, 1950], 63).
"*GRA. 5:317.
°Ibid .
*Arthur Pink, a Reformed theologian, describes God 
similarly as being "free to decree or not to decree, and to 
decree one thing and not another" (The Attributes of God
r
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freedom does not lead him to do unreasonable things.A God 
has not only a logical mind but also a personal Mill and a 
good character. These factors are the ground from which the 
freedom of God springs.3
Third, God's sovereignty signifies divine power.3 
Henry views this power as that energy which God possesses 
and which he manifests in various ways if and when he 
chooses.'* For Henry, it is not a blind force but, like 
divine freedom, an aspect of God which is grounded in God's 
mind, personality and character.® For purposes of clarity, 
Henry distinguishes between God's inherent power and 
manifest power.4 The latter is revealed to us through the 
self—revelation of God in Scripture and through what God
CSwengel, Pennsylvania: Reiner Publications, 1964], 11).
xGad's action is "rationally consistent and 
intrinsically good" (GRA. 6:274).
3Henry states that "God's will or nature implies 
certain limitations on his actions . . ." (ibid., 5:319).
Further, "God’s own activity is a free divine activity, 
grounded in, yet not necessitated by, his nature (ibid., 
317) .
3The word "omnipotence" generally conveys this
notion of power unlimited power. The term is avoided in
the discussion because its exact meaning in Henry is 
ambiguous, despite its frequent mention. At times it is 
synonymous with sovereignty. At other times, it means just 
power as it is described in the third signification of 
sovereignty. Compare, for example, Henry's usage in ibid., 
5:308 and page 311 in the same chapter.
"*Ibid. , 5:314, 317.
®Ibid.
AIbid., 5:316, 317.
E---
I
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does, has done and has promised to do in the future.1 
Divine acts such as creation, preservation of the universe, 
and redemption are examples of manifest power of God.3
Fourth, Henry refers to God's lordship over all 
nature and history as another aspect of divine sovereignty. 
In this connection, Henry views God as King, Monarch, Judge, 
Administrator, and Governor of the universe.3 The titles 
are not idle terms since behind them lie the notions of 
independence, freedom, and power of God which make his 
lordship an actual reality. God is lord by virtue of his 
creatorship and continual preservation of the universe.'* He 
is the highest power there is anywhere.3 For Henry, God is
1Henry stresses that it is on the basis of manifest 
power that we can speak of God's inherent power (ibid.).
This emphasis corresponds with Calvin's idea of omnipotence. 
Calvin writes, "And truly God claims . . .  omnipotence— not 
the empty, idle, and almost unconscious sort that the 
Sophists imagine, but a watchful, effective, active sort, 
engaged in ceaseless activity. Not . . .  a general 
principle of confused motion . . .  but one that is directed 
toward individual and particular motions" (Institutes. I, 
16:3).
aGRA. 5:308. Were we to classify the 
significations, inherent power would be listed alongside 
God's independence and freedom as these characteristics 
describe God as he is in himself whereas manifest power 
.vould be classified together with God's lordship and 
causality as these aspects are descriptive of God's 
relationship with the world.
3Henry uses all these terms for God (ibid., 5:309; 
6:67; 27; 15; and 36, respectively).
* Ibid., 5:316, 317.
3Ibid., 5:318.
F
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“the sovereign Lord of the cosmos, . . .  lord and judge of 
the whole space— time processes."1
The ideas of independence, freedom, power, and 
lordship of God define or qualify the concept of 
sovereignty. But they do not spell out haw God actually 
exercises his sovereignty in the world. In other words, if 
God is the highest Power and the supreme Lord in the 
universe, in what way are these divine properties effected 
in the world? The answer to this question seems to lie in 
Henry's idea of divine causality which also signifies divine 
sovereignty.
The word “causality" is itself not one of Henry's
favorites. Henry uses it mostly to show that the papular
meaning of the term belongs to "conjectural philosophy of
religion, and not to the Bible.,,at However, Henry does not
consider the term “causality" to be one that can easily be
dispensed with. He writes,
Causality is a complex subject in the theological no 
less than in the physical realm, but to simply dispense 
with it in order to advance personal factors creates as 
many problems as it solves.3
While, in one instance, Henry states that the notion of
causality brings confusion, he also stresses that "to do
%
1Ibid., 6:27. Calvin also holds that "the universe 
is ruled by God, not only because he watches over the order 
of nature set by himself, but because he exercises especial 
care over each of his works" (Institutes. I, 16:4).
aGRA. 5:153.
3Ibid., 6:93.
r
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without causality seems to invite ambiguous s y n o n y m s . F o r  
him, creation is certainly not a "mechanistic causal 
reality," but it involves, nonetheless, divine causation 
whereby God voluntarily reenacts constantly his presence and 
power.2 In addition, Henry notes approvingly that in the 
Synod of Dart, "causal categories" are used "to describe 
God's sovereign work."3 One of the reasons why Henry 
retains the idea of causality in his theology seems to be 
his belief that God's relations with man and the world are 
"causal” in nature.-* For him, God is a “divine principle 
immanent in all reality . . .  a spiritual—rational-moral 
shaping force at work throughout cosmic existence and all 
historical events."3
Henry distinguishes between God's causality and the 
causality of creatures. He refers to God as the "ultimate 
cause of all that is,"*" the "sovereign causal creator of 
all,"’3' the "independent personal cause of the universe,”" 
the "metaphysical Absolute,"* the “fundamental power of
Ibid., 6:49.
Ibid.
Ibid., 6:90.
Ibid., 6:42,
Ibid., 3:202
Ibid., 6:37.
Ibid., 5:332
Ibid.
Ibid.
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creation, the cause of existence,"1 the "chief causal 
principle,"= an "operative reality who impinges on the whole 
universe to the very limits and details of man's daily 
life,"3 and the "one and only creative causality in the 
universe and in history."-*
In addition to divine causality, Henry also believes 
in the existence of "ongoing causes"3 which he also refers 
to as "causality of nature."** In one instance, he even 
mentions "secondary causes" in a manner that closely 
identifies them with the finite causal agents.7 Elsewhere, 
the causality of nature bear the designation "agency of 
creatures."*
On the question of the relationship between the 
causality of God and the causality of creatures, Henry's 
position may be outlined as follows: First, Henry maintains
that God's relationship with the world does not imply that 
God is ontologically continuous with the world. For him, 
the world is not necessary to God's being, neither is it a
1Ibid., 5:333.
=Ibid., 6:64.
3 Ibid., 5:149.
*Ibid., 6:232.
3Ibid., 6:49.
*“Ibid . , 5:311.
’’Ibid., 6:49.
•ibid.,6:84.
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mode of God's being or a phase of divine life.* Henry holds 
that God transcends the world in a manner that makes his 
contact with the world both objective and external.3 
Second, God is not impersonal or blind but personal and 
intelligible in his relationship with the world.3 Third, 
divine causality is voluntary, that is, free and without 
internal or external necessity on the part of God.-*
According to Henry, "God's own activity is a free divine 
activity, grounded in, yet not necessitated by his nature."3 
Fourth, divine causality is teleological in perspective.** 
Henry maintains that God "is now purposely at work not only 
in the religious sphere but also in the realm of socio­
political, scientific and economic spheres."3 Further, 
"Christ is advancing the eternal good of believers 
throughout the entire space— time process."" Fifth, Henry 
understands the relationship between God's causality and 
that of the creatures in terms of "concurrence." The word 
"concurrence" is used by Henry in a context where its 
presence is by no means incidental. The passage in which
xHenry considers such views to be closer to 
pantheism than to his own (ibid., 6:39).
=Ibid., 6:40.
3Ibid., 6:331-3.
*1 bid. , 6:49.
3Ibid., 5:317.
"I bid. , 6:50, 303-4, 492-513.
31bid., 6:505.
"Ibid.
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the word occurs reads as follows:
God is not a divine being who acts only behind, outside 
or between cosmic and historical processes; he is
present in these processes and works in them. The
universe does not exist without his support and 
concurrence. God both acts on the events of nature and 
history from without and is purposely and meaningfully 
engaged within the universe as well.*
Although Henry leaves many questions unanswered about
causality,3 his usage of the word "concurrence" in the above
context provides a basis for understanding his views on the
relationship between God's causality and the causality of
the creatures.
First, the word "concurrence," in its dictionary 
meaning, suggests association, cooperation, and union or two 
or more agents in producing a single effect.3 In applying
xIbid., 6:48. Emphasis supplied.
3Henry is extremely cautious about using the 
language of causality which entails referring to God as the 
First Cause and the agency of the creatures as secondary 
causes. He is certainly against using the phrase First 
Cause for God. Even the phrase "secondary causes" is used 
very advisedly (ibid., 6:49). The problem which this 
caution on the part of Henry poses is that there are no 
statements in Henry's series showing clearly how God's 
causality relates itself with the causality of the 
creatures, a distinction which Henry certainly makes but one 
which has also to be made on the basis of certain statements 
here and there. Perhaps the reason for Henry's caution is 
that Henry, as an apologist, seeks to appeal to a wide 
evangelical constituency and if he came out strongly on 
causality, chances are the the appeal could be diluted.
Yet, the possibility of explicating Henry's views on the 
nature of the relationship between the two causalities 
exists despite these obstacles. There are a few key words 
and ideas which Henry uses which unmistakably link him with 
the traditional Reformed dogmatics where the relationship is 
more explicit. In this section., the few links which Henry 
provides are mentioned as a way of clarifying the 
relationship.
’According to Webster's Third New International 
Pictionarv. the word "concurrence" denotes, among other
r
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the word to the relationship between God and the creatures, 
it seems that "concurrence" denotes that the activity of God 
and that of the creatures are not merely simultaneous but 
also harmonious. Further, the implication is there that 
one agent cannot produce an effect without the active and 
contributary involvement of the other. In the present case, 
this implication applies only to the creatures since God 
does not always act in conjunction with the creatures.1
Second, the word "concurrence" links Henry directly 
with the traditional Reformed dogmatics™ where 
"concurrence," or concursus. stands for a specific
things, "agreement or union in action, combination of power 
or influence," and "cooperation." The verbal root, "to 
concur," means "to act together to a common end or to 
produce a single effect," while the adjectival derivative, 
"concurrent," is defined as follows: "occurring, arising, or
operating at the same time often in relationship, 
conj'unc tion, association, or cooperation; acting in 
conj'unction: marked by accord, agreement, harmony, or 
similarity in effect or tendency" (see Webster's Third New 
International Dictionary, ed. Philip Babcock Gove 
(Springfield, Massachusetts: Merrian—Webster, 19B6), s.v.
"concurrence," "concur," and "concurrent."
1It was previously mentioned that God's activity is 
free and independent of any compulsory relations with the 
world. This leaves concurrence as a necessary condition for 
the activity of the creatures only since, unlike God, they 
are not free to act independently.
=As used in this study, the phrase "traditional 
Reformed/Calvinistic dogmatics/theology" refers to the 
theological position of John Calvin and his followers. 
Since that tradition has many varieties today, I have in 
mind particularly those schools of thought which make no 
allowance for independent or uncaused activity of the 
creatures. For a description of the four major schools of 
thought in Reformed theology, see David Basinger, "The New 
Calvinism: A Sheep in Wolves' Clothing," Scottish Journal of 
Theology 39 (November 1986): 483—99. My understanding of 
the term "traditional" school excludes the fourth school in 
Basinger's scheme.
r
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theological concept.1 According to Johannes Heideggerus, a
Reformed theologian who lived around 1700,
Concurrence or cooperation is the operation of God by 
which He cooperates directly with the second causes as 
depending upon Him alike in their essence as in their 
operation, so as to urge or move them to action and to 
operate along with them in a manner suitable to a first 
cause and adjusted to the nature of second causes.2
As this statement indicates, the word "concurrence" is used
in the context of the relationship between God as a first
cause and the creatures as second, or secondary causes. It
is not insignificant to note that Henry, too, sets the word
"concurrence" in a context where he discusses the notion of
causality, raises "the question of how God acts in the
world" and "injects himself into the ongoing causes," which
Henry advisedly also calls "secondary causes."3 What this
fact implies is that the meaning of the word "concurrence"
as Henry uses it can be illumined by the way traditional
Reformed theologians understood the relationship between
God, as the primary or the First Cause and second or
secondary causes.
For both Henry and Reformed theology, the
AGiven Henry's theological tradition— Reformed or
Calvinist as argued at the beginning of this chapter and
the theological importance of the word "concurrence" in 
traditional Reformed theology, it seems that Henry's usage 
of the term, particularly in the context of the passage 
cited above, is neither accidental, coincidental, or 
incidental. Rather, its mention is a deliberate effort on 
Henry's part to clarify the manner in which God, "the one 
and only creative causality" (GRA. 6:232) relates himself to 
the activity of the creatures.
^Johannes Heideggerus, quoted in Bizer, 258.
3GRA, 6:48-49.
UT”
r
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relationship in question is characterized by three main 
features. First, the activity of God and that of the 
creatures constitute not two separate, different, or 
contradicting activities but a single activity. In other 
words, what may be referred to as an act of the creatures is 
at the same time an act of God.x
Second, "concurrence" consists of not natural laws, 
maintenance of existence, or general guidance by God 
primarily but a direct, voluntary, and "constant reenactment 
of God's presence and power" in each and every activity of 
the creatures.2 The point here is that the creatures, evsn
^According to Henry, "The Psalms frequently speak of 
the operations of nature as the very operations of deity: 
thunder is God's 'voice,' lightnings 'his arrows,' 
earthquakes 'his doings.' Without dwelling on secondary 
causes the biblical writers here attribute the phenomena of 
the creation directly to the creator" (ibid., 6:48—49). 
Similarly, Johannes Heideggerus writes that "concurrence is 
simultaneous" in the sense that God "produces one and the 
same action along with the second cause, so that the action 
of the first and second cause is one" (Johannes Heideggerus, 
quoted in Bizer, 260).
2Ibid., 6:49. For Henry, God "acts not only behind, 
outside or between cosmic and historical processes" but "is 
present in these processes and works in them. . . .  God both 
acts on the events of nature and history from without and is 
. . . engaged within the universe as well" (ibid., 6:48).
Further, Henry states that "God is no less implicated in the 
falling of the rain than in the resurrection of the 
Redeemer" (ibid., 6:15).
As far as the Reformed dogmaticians are concerned on 
this point, the following statements seem to be 
representative: "But this cooperation of God must not be
conceived as a mere maintenance of natural forces, or the 
mere setting up of a natural and moral law, or as the
effecting of an indifferent, general movement, to be
determined first of all by the creatures themselves, or as 
an activity of God different from the activity of the
creatures and only coinciding temporally with it, working
not upon the creatures themselves but only upon their 
activity. On the contrary it is an activity of God such 
that by it God directly and predeterminedly grasps the
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with their God—given capacities to act, are impotent until 
and unless God "immediately" causes them to act in a certain 
way.1
powers of the creatures and so arouses them to activity in 
their natural way that the activity of the creature is God's 
own action" (Bizer, 258-9). Further, “This cooperation is 
not to be placed (1) either in sheer preservation of 
strength to work, (2) or in the giving of some law natural 
or moral, by which all things act oroorio motu. (3) or in a 
general, indifferent movement, to be determined by the 
creatures, like the inflow of the sun, as is claimed by the 
Jesuits. Socinians. Remonstrants. (4) or in the simultaneous 
act of God distinguished really from the action of the 
creatures, by which God in no wise inflows into creatures, 
but only into their actions— but in all creatures' direct—  
as regards power and what underlies, by a previous,
predetermining method not of time but of order impulse and
move to action, so that in this way the action of creator 
and creature is really the same, merely differently named" 
(Johannes Marckius C1690], quoted in Bizer, 259).
^According to Johannes Heidegerrus, God's part in 
the "concurrence" is "direct, not because He alone operates 
alone without the application of any second cause, but 
because between God's action and the result there is no 
intervention of creaturely efficacy, which touches the 
result more nearly than God. God does not merely so assign 
and preserve to the creature a faculty and power of action, 
that the creature meantime emits an action or produces an 
effect close at hand and directly, while God does so solely 
by the medium of the power which He gave and preserves to 
the creature;— on account of the nature of the creature's 
dependence He attains to every action and result of the 
creature directly.— Hence 'all things' are said to have been 
done 'through Himself," i.e., by this direct and proximate 
power as first cause Rom 11:36 (of him and through him and 
to him are all things)” (Johannes Heideggerus, quoted in 
Bizer, 260. The language of the Reformed dogmaticians, if 
Heideggerus is a theologian to go by, seems to make the 
connection between God's causal role in the activity of the 
creatures quite clear. That role is immediate and direct 
and the natural capacities of the creatures are only 
instruments through which that role is actualized.
Although Henry does not use the word "direct" in 
describing God's relationship with the results of creatures' 
activity, he makes statements which unmistakably suggest 
that he concurs with the views expressed in the above 
passage. The following statements are particularly 
en1ightening:
"for theism nothing happens that God does not 
foreknow and foreordain" (GRA, 5:280);
r
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Third, God's causality comes logically prior to the 
causality of the creatures and, therefore, it is
determinative of the effects of the "concurrence." It is
not the case here that the causality of the creatures is 
totally cancelled in terms of the creatures themselves 
deciding and acting voluntarily, but that their decisions 
and actions are causally preceded by God's prior causality. 
This idea seems to be the basis of Reformed doctrines such
as God's decree, predestination or foreordination,
foreknowledge, and election, all of which Henry affirms.1
"it is the purposing will of God, and not 
omniscience, that governs the certainty of events" (ibid.);
"God has so sovereignly disposed the course of the 
universe and of history that even the severest hostility to 
his will instrumentally displays and promotes his 
sovereignly redemptive plan" (ibid., 5:330);
"If God can foreknow human decisions and acts before 
their psychological self-determination, and can do this 
compatibly with man's free will, then why should divine 
foreordination be considered any less compatible?" (ibid.,
5:2B4);
“God's foreknowledge is a predeterminative 
knowledge” (ibid., 5:285);
"Scripture contravenes the claim that divine non- 
determination is necessary for human freedom and 
responsibility, for God's foreordination includes even such 
events as fallen man's rejection and crucifixion of Jesus 
Christ . . . "  (ibid., 5:284).
xThe force of these doctrines is expressed in the 
following statements from Reformed dogmaticians (Henry's 
statements which seem to come closest to the position of the 
dogmaticians are also included):
". . the object of the divine decree is not the
abstract order of the physical, moral and saving 
dispensation in the abstract which is present in the world 
and in God's kingdom of grace, but the concrete existence 
and life of the world and of individual men with their 
complex o t  causes and effects" (Bizer, 142).
Henry writes that "In biblical theology everything 
that God does is the outworking of his sovereign decree. In 
this respect man is no different from the stars or the sands 
of the sea; that humans stand at a definite place in history 
is no more an accident than that the planets move in their
r ~
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The essence of these doctrines is that there is no decision, 
action, event, circumstance, or destiny of a creature in the 
universe which is not predetermined by God. As Henry
orbits ar.d that the nations have their given bounds" (GRA. 
6:78).
"Predestination is God's decree by which He has 
appointed rational creatures from eternity to fixed limits 
beyond this temporal and natural life, they to be led 
thereto by fixed means likewise foreordained from eternity" 
(Amandus Polanus [ 1 6 2 4 ], quoted in Bizer, 154).
According to Henry, "predestination is but a part, a 
particular phase of God's decrees" (GRA. 6:478). He states 
that this doctrine may not be the easiest one to proclaim 
from the pulpit but the fact is that "the Bible itself 
thrusts upon us this theme of divine predestination" (ibid., 
6:76). For Henry, the word "predestination" is synonymous 
with the word "foreordination" (ibid., 6:80).
"Gad's foreknowledge is that knowledge by which God 
is signified as foreseeing and foreknowing from eternity 
everything that is said to be future, as far as we are 
concerned" (Amandus Polanus [1624], quoted in Bizer, 75). 
Further, "Since as the actuosity of the divine Being 
foreknowledge is the proof of God's nature over against the 
world, it is determinative . . . "  (Gulielmus Bucanus [1609], 
75.
Henry asserts that "what creaturely minds grasp in 
their time sequences God knows immediately as a 
comprehensive totality; his decree to create a specific 
universe involves knowledge of all its eventualities and 
possibilities" (GRA. 5:277). For him, "God's foreknowledge 
is predeterminative knowledge" (ibid., 5:285).
"We define the election in question as God's eternal 
and immutable decree, by which from the entire human race 
that had fallen by its own fault from primaeval integrity 
into sin and destruction He elected a fixed multitude of 
individual men, neither better nor worthier than the rest, 
of His sole good pleasure, to salvation in Christ Jesus, and 
resolved to give them to His Son to redeem, and by a 
peculiar and effectual mode of operating to bring them to 
living faith in Himself and to a sure perseverance in the 
same living faith, and that for a proof of His gracious 
mercy and for the praise of His glorious grace" (Leiden 
Synopsis, quoted in Bizer, 163).
Henry writes of God "in his love electing some 
undeserving human beings to salvation" and in justice 
"redemptively passing over others who are equally 
undeserving" (GRA. 6:107). He maintains that election is 
not a "class election" but election of particular 
individuals (ibid., 6:104—7). Like other doctrines 
mentioned above, the doctrine of election stresses God's 
prior choice in both the existence and destiny of creatures.
r
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
writes, "For theism, nothing happens in time that God does 
not foreknow and foreordain."1 Even in regard to man, Henry 
asserts that,
everything that can be predicated of man whether his 
existence and continuance, or his responsible decisions 
and deeds and final destiny, finds its necessary 
presupposition in a divine reality beyond himself.3
In view of the above discussions, it seems that the 
word “concurrence," as Henry uses it, has a specific 
theological connotation. Not only does it denote 
cooperation of divine and creaturely causalities but it also 
signifies total dependence of creatures on God for any and 
all given aspect(s) of their existence. The significance of 
this fact for the concept of sovereignty cannot be 
overemphasized. Basically, sovereignty means rulership, 
kingship, lordship over a domain. Sovereignty is not a 
passive but an active quality. One exercises sovereignty 
over some domain. While the range of possibilities of how 
one exercises sovereignty is certainly very wide, the case 
which Henry seems to present suggests that God exercises his 
sovereignty in the universe in a comprehensive and yet 
detailed manner. For Henry, God does not rule the world by 
merely allowing or permitting creatures to decide and do 
what they will. Through his causal relations with the 
world, God exercises his sovereignty by directly causing the 
creatures to do what he both foreordains and foreknows. As 
such, divine sovereignty is a term which has far— reaching
‘GRA , 5:280.
3 Ibid.
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effects on how Henry views God's activity in the world.
From the above survey, it seems that without the 
ideas of God's independence, freedom, lordship, power, and 
causality, the concept of sovereignty lacks specificity of 
reference and the dynamics which make it functional as a 
term that expresses God's authority in the universe. Yet, 
if the discussion were to stop here, Henry's concept of 
sovereignty would only be partially understood. A need 
exists of showing the extent to which God is sovereign in 
the universe. In the next section, an attempt is made at 
describing the absolute nature of God's sovereignty in 
Henry's writings. This description includes some examples 
of Henry's application of the concept of sovereignty to 
specific aspects of his theology.
The Scope of God's Sovereignty
Henry states explicitly that "God's sovereignty is 
absolute."1 This means that there is nothing anywhere in 
the universe which does not have its origin or cause in the 
sovereignty of God. All things exist or happen because God 
both originates them and controls their activity.3 The 
sphere or the domain in which God exercises his sovereignty 
is limitless in both time and space. Since the complete
1Ibid., 6:107.
’These ideas are expressed by Henry in various ways 
he describes God as "absolutely sovereign" (ibid., 6:67), 
One "whose sovereign purpose fashions and governs 
everything" (ibid., 6:133), the One who "governs and 
determines all limits of possibility for himself and the 
universe" (ibid., 5:319), and One whose sovereignty is both 
"universal and eternal" (ibid., 5:308).
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scope of God's sovereignty in Henry cannot be covered here 
as that would entail going beyond the goal of this study, 
three specific areas have been selected to demonstrate the 
consistency with which Henry maintains his concept of 
absolute sovereignty. These areas also help to bring out 
some aspect of sovereignty which have not been covered so 
far. The areas themselves are the problem of evil, and 
providence.
The Problem of Evil 
Henry recognizes evil as a formidable problem for 
theism and atheism alike.1 Fortunately, Henry observes, the 
Bible is not silent about the subject. It accepts and 
confronts "the horrendous reality of sin and pain in moral 
and physical evil."3 The context in which this problem must 
be accepted and confronted, Henry suggests, is not 
philosophical or theoretical. For him, "Not even theistic 
arguments can fully vindicate God's righteousness in the 
face of human evil" on theoretical grounds alone.3 Henry's 
recommendation, rather, is that evil is "a religious 
dilemma" whose solution can be found only in revelation and 
scriptural doctrine of eschatology
Henry deals with evil in terms of "natural and moral
AI bid., 6:282.
3Ibid., 6:284.
3Ibid., 6:282.
■*1 bid . , 6:282, 299.
r
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evil."1 He does not see any evil as gratuitous (meaningless 
or unwarranted) as that would imply lack of purpose in some 
aspect of a providential universe.3 In actual exposition of 
his views on evil, however, Henry does not appear to make a 
distinction, at least a clear one, between moral and natural 
evil. In that case, both types of evil are here explained 
together.
The question which seems to concern Henry most is 
that of the origin of evil. Before giving his own views, he 
first denies certain proposed solutions to this problem. 
According to him, evil is not "an essential aspect of finite 
and creaturely existence*'3 or an "imperfection either in the 
created substance of the world or in the created nature of 
man."'* In other words, evil is not an "ultimate 
metaphysical principle as is good."3 As God created it, the 
universe is "unconditionally good and hence free of 
intrinsic evil."* Henry states that, originally, “all 
angels were morally good on the basis of divine creation."7 
In addition, when God declares in Genesis that the created 
universe is "very good,” he "underscores its intelligible
‘■Ibid. , 5:312.
a Ibid., 6:291.
3 Ibid., 6:239.
*Ibid., 6:294.
“Ibid.
**Ibid. , 6:124.
^Ibid., 6:233.
r
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order, moral perfection and aesthetic beauty, in short, its 
excellence."1 If evil were a metaphysical necessity, Henry 
argues that there would be no "hope for any sure triumph 
over it" and God's victory over it would imply "eliminating 
the finite and the creaturely."3
Henry is also opposed to the idea that man's will or 
man's desires are the source of evil.3 In this regard,
Henry raises the objection that an appeal to man as the 
source of evil ignores "satanic and demonic influences in 
human affairs."'* For Henry, "evil's ultimate source lies 
not in, but beyond man."3 Other theories on the origin of 
evil which Henry rejects are those which view evil in terms 
of "divine deficiency," "cosmic inevitability,"
"evolutionary necessity," "intrinsic historical disorder," 
"human illusion," and "psychiatric aberration."*
Henry points to Satan as "directly or indirectly
'ibid., 6:252. Henry conceives God's goodness as 
consisting of the three qualities: rational, moral, and 
aesthetic perfection which are then reflected in the things 
that God creates and/or declares to be good— like the 
original creation (ibid., 6:252-3).
=*Ibid., 6:239.
3Henry does not indicate whether or not the will and 
desires are identical. He deals with them in two separate 
contexts. But his exposition of each of the two concepts 
seems to suggest that the will and the desires refer to the 
same thing (ibid., 6:244-5, 272—3).
*Ibid., 6:272. See also ibid., 6:244—5.
“Ibid., 6:270.
*Ibid., 6:284.
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responsible for a terrible trail of terror and shame."1 He 
describes Satan as "a living power hostile to God and 
external to man."2 In Genesis, Henry observes, "the origin 
of human sin" is connected with the serpent as the one who 
“occasions human apostasy."3 After Adam fell through 
Satan's deception, Henry states that "the sin principle" 
which resulted in "human sinfulness" flows representatively 
through Adam to all persons in the totality of their being, 
and conditions both their individual acts and community 
life."* Yet, Henry hastens to add that, although Satan is 
responsible for a lot of evil in the world, he is not to be 
posited "as if he were a rival deity unsubject to Elohim."3 
According to Henry, "the Bible nowhere teaches that world
history is outside God's control and directed by the
.
devil." Although Scripture attributes "some of the radical 
evil in the world to satanic forces," Henry explains, these 
forces are themselves bound by "God's creative power and 
will."'2' It is Henry's view that Satan is not "a principle 
of primordial evil" and that "God uses Satan s acts to
Ibid., 6:249.
Ibid., 6:245.
Ibid., 6:244-5.
I bid., 6:248.
Ibid., 6:249.
I bid.
I bid. , 6:274.
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Henry emphasizes the fact that "Everything that comes from 
God, beginning with his work of creation, is good."A For 
Henry, Gad declared his creation to be good because he 
"brings the good with him; he is himself the source of the 
good.I,a Elsewhere, Henry writes, "To be sure, in speaking 
of God as good, we mean that he is the creator and sustainer 
of what we call good in the creatures."3 The original 
creation is something which God desired and became its 
author and creator. In that case, the original creation was 
good and perfect in all dimensions.
As concerns evil, God's relationship with it is only 
causal. On the same page where Henry states that God is the 
"cause of the factors in the created universe which we 
consider evil," he also makes it clear that God is not the 
author of sin, that evil is not an aspect of God, and that 
"sin is the antithesis of the divine and of the truly 
godly."1* Thus, sin and evil exist because God caused them 
to be but since they do not reflect his goodness and 
perfection, God is not their author.
In explaining the fact that not all that which has
God as its "cause" reflects his goodness, Henry writes,
God can be an ultimate cause of evil . . .  without 
himself being an aspect of evil, or of evil being an 
aspect of him as its cause. God created giraffes, but
AIbid., 6:252.
aIbid., 6:133.
3Ibid., 6:257.
“Ibid., 6:294.
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he is not a giraffe, nor are giraffes aspects of God.x 
These statements seem to indicate that, for Henry, God is 
the cause of evil despite the fact that evil is not 
reflective of God's character or goodness. Another point to 
note in this context is that Henry does not consider evil to 
be something which God merely permits to exist. Such a 
view, Henry argues, is essentially "incipient dualism" as it 
suggests that, apart from God, there is another source of 
reality in the universe. In fact, it questions the 
sovereignty of God.3
Another matter that Henry addresses is the divine
rationale for the existence of evil. Henry here appeals to
the idea of God's freedom in his sovereignty. He states:
Although God had sufficient reason for creating the 
present universe, he might indeed have created a 
different one, or even two or more dissimilar universes. 
. . . The transcendent God's freedom is what accounts
for space—time realities.3
Henry here seems to imply that a world in which evil exists
is one which God freely chose to create and it should be
accepted as such. Thus, Henry demonstrates that God remains
sovereign even in the face of evil. Not only is God the
cause of evil but he is also its Judge who intends to
eradicate it in the end-time.
*Ibid., 6:294.
3Ibid., 6:295.
3Ibid., 6:78.
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Providence
Henry considers providence as the doctrine which 
underscores the fact that the "time-space universe” is not 
metaphysically ultimate" but "entirely contingent, moment by 
moment upon God."1 Providence is to be distinguished from 
creation in that, although both are "works of divine 
omnipotence," creation is "an already accomplished activity" 
of God which antecedes and anticipates what God subsequently 
"freely sustains, universally governs, and deploys for 
special redemptive ends."3 It is this subsequent 
preservation of what God created which is the arena of God's 
providence.
In his explication of God's providence, Henry 
distinguishes between universal providence and special 
providence. Henry refers to the two aspects of providence 
also in terms of "universal dominion" and "special covenant 
dominion."3 Universal or general providence is the dominion 
which God "exercises over all creatures."4 It stands for 
the idea that the "all—perfect omnipotent One fulfills his 
divine purpose in creation and redemption by ordering both 
nature's movements and human affairs.1,3 It implies that God 
is "nature's everpresent ground and administrator" who
1Ibid., 6:455.
3Ibid., 6:456.
3Ibid., 6:457.
■*Ibid.
3Ibid., 6:7B.
r~
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exists "perpetually in providential relationship to man and 
the world."1 For Henry, "God is no less implicated in the 
falling of the rain than in the resurrection of the 
Redeemer . 1,3
Special or particular providence affirms that "God 
works out his purposes not m e rely in life’s generalities but 
in the details and minutiae of life as well."3 It relates 
to "personal experiences" and "life's peculiarities."-*
Henry writes: "Since all things fall within God's purview,
even seemingly chance events should be considered divine 
providences."3 Yet, special providence has its focus mainly
on God's people. For Henry, "God's special providence works
selectively for the good of all who trust him."* He adds, 
"God promises the overruling benevolence of sovereign
providence not to rebellious and impenitent worldlings but
to his people."7 However, this emphasis is not to be 
understood as implying that the "rebellious and impenitent" 
are outside God's providence. In this respect, Henry 
stresses that "God's providence . . . embraces even the acts
11 bid., 6:15.
3 Ibid.
3Ibid., 6:459.
*1 bid.
3Ibid . , 6:459.
*1bid . , 6:461.
3 Ibid . , 6:460.
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of those who rebel against his purposes."4' Within the 
categories of universal and special providence, then, Henry 
affirms "God's al1—comprehending providence."3 The goal and 
purpose of God's providence may not yet be achieved till the 
final "climactic consummation" at the "end of time" but it 
seems clear that, for Henry, nothing, even in the present 
world, falls outside God's providence.
One question which naturally arises in view of God's 
providence is the place of human freedom in the whole 
scheme. Henry's main exposition on human freedom is given 
in the context of abjections against the idea that "God 
ordains the entire course of world and human affairs."3 
According to Henry, the critics charge that "comprehensive 
divine foreordination is inconsistent with human freedom."'* 
In response, Henry affirms that "God preserves man's 
responsible moral agency and that divine election in no way 
transforms human beings into robots."3 Further, he states 
that "God preserves relative freedom and independence of 
creatures."* He even dismisses "secular theories of 
determinism that eclipse human moral responsibility."7"
41bid., 6:461.
=Ibid.
3Ibid., 6:84.
■•ibid.
sIbid.
•■Ibid., 5:311.
7Ibid., 6:84.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
95
However, Henry explains that the human freedom he 
has in mind is a qualified type of freedom. For him, "man 
does not have, nor has he ever had, the freedom to decide 
and act in a manner that contradicts all his indicated 
decisions and deeds."1 Henry describes this sort of freedom 
as "the Pelagian 'liberty of indifference. ' 1,2 He views it 
as "arbitrary," "unpredictable," "unrestrained," "capricious 
and random," "abnormal and subrational .1,3 The fault with 
that kind of freedom, Henry argues, is its insistence on 
"man's ability in each action to totally reverse his course 
and be today the living contradiction of all that he was 
yesterday. . . ."■* For Henry, "That sort of 'free will'
would make responsibility impossible."9
Mhat Henry proposes is a view of human freedom which 
is compatible with divine foreordination.* That freedom has
xIbid. What Henry seems to emphasize in this 
sentence is the fact that human decisions and actions are 
predictable. His concern here is not so much that God 
predetermines human decisions and actions as to refute the 
“libertarian" view of freedom where it is possible for man 
to decide and act in a manner that contradicts all present 
causal factors in the experience of deciding and acting.
For Henry, "indicated decisions and deeds" are theoretical 
possibilities based on certain "givens" and which are later 
confirmed by actual decisions and deeds.
=Ibid.
3 1 bid.
'‘Ibid.
9Ibid., 6:84-85.
*Henry uses this term as a synonym for 
predestination (ibid., 6:80). For Henry, the two terms 
denote God's unconditional determination beforehand of all 
circumstances that prevail and all events that take place 
anywhere in the universe (ibid., 5:277—80; 6:76—78).
r
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the following characteristics: First, it excludes divine
coercion. Henry states clearly that "God does not force man 
to sin."1 Second, it consists of "voluntary choice." 
According to Henry, "Human beings voluntarily choose to do 
what they do.,,= This sense of freedom, Henry maintains, is 
perfectly compatible with divine foreordination and 
foreknowledge.3 He writes, "The fact that God has 
foreordained human choices and that his decree renders human 
actions certain does not therefore negate human choice.”"*
For Henry, "If humans voluntarily choose to do what God 
foreknows to be certain, then the conditions of voluntary 
human agency are fulfilled."3 In fact, Henry adds, "We do 
not choose because God has determined our choices.'"*
It is significant to note that Henry affirms both 
human "freedom" to choose and act and God's providence and 
foreordination at the same time. The language which Henry 
uses can be particularly misleading in this respect if care 
is not exercised in interpreting what Henry means by the the 
term "freedom." In addition, Henry does not always use the 
traditional terminology of Reformed theology— such as the 
"bondage of the will" and "reprobation" of some to eternal
JIbid., 5:283. 
ZI bid . , 6:85. 
3Ibid., 5:280. 
"*1 bid . , 6:85. 
3Ibid., 5:282.
*1 bid.
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damnation. Instead, he uses expressions Mhich many non— 
Calvinists would find quite acceptable— such as "relative 
independence of creatures,"1 "man's responsible moral 
agency," "responsible free agency of man"2 and man's 
voluntary decisions and actions.3 Yet, Henry's language 
should not be understood as indicating that he is no longer 
a Reformed theologian. It is to be noted that, in his 
treatment of human freedom, nowhere does Henry suggest that 
man can choose contrary to what God both foreordains and 
foreknows. For Henry, human choice and activity is 
essentially an effect or a result of a decision and action 
which God has previously taken. This point is illustrated 
by Henry in the following statement: "While confession of
Jesus' name is and must indeed be human decision and choice 
. . . its very possibility reflects Yahweh's prior choice."*
Further, "God's foreordination includes even such events as 
fallen man's rejection and crucifixion of Jesus Christ, 
events for which mankind is held responsible."3 
Consequently, Henry maintains that "God's decree renders 
certain not only good acts but wicked acts as well."* That
xIbid. , 5:311.
3Ibid., 6:85.
3Ibid., 5:282.
*1 bid., 6:83.
3Ibid., 5:284.
**Ibid., 6:86. The meaning of this statement seems 
to be that God makes the occurrence of the said acts 
unconditional. On the same page, Henry also writes that 
"the certainty of events that God decrees includes man's
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being the case, Henry concludes that, in God's causal
relations with the world, man is not different from the non-
moral world. Henry writes:
Everything that God does is an outworking of his 
sovereign decree. In this respect, man is no different 
from the stars or from the sands of the sea; that humans 
stand at a definite place in history is no more an 
accident than that the planets move in their orbits and 
that the nations have their given bounds.1.
It seems to me that, on the basis of Henry's views 
on the relationship which God has with his creatures in 
general and with man in particular, Henry's position is best 
described as a form of "compatibilism" or "soft 
determinism." According to John Feinberg, "compatibilism" 
is a way of relating God's sovereignty and human freedom in 
a manner that shows that they are compatible. He states 
that "genuinely free human action" is "compatible with 
nonconstraining sufficient conditions which incline the will 
decisively in one way or the other."3 Feinberg goes on to 
explain that "compatibilism" is a form of determinism which 
affirms both the Calvinistic doctrine of divine sovereignty
sinful no less than righteous acts" (ibid.). See also 
ibid., 6:461. For Henry, God's foreordination of an evil 
act is not itself evil" (ibid., 5:315). As the Reformed 
dogmatician, Johannes Heideggerus expressed this point, 
"between God's action and the result there is no 
intervention of creaturely efficacy, which touches the 
result more nearly than God" (Johannes Heideggerus, quoted 
in Bizer, 260).
xI bid., 6:78.
3John S. Feinberg, "God Ordains All Things," in 
Predestination and Free Hill: Four Views of Divine 
Sovereignty and Human Freedom, ed. David Basinger and 
Randall Basinger (Downers Grove, Illinois: Interversity
Press, 1986), 25.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
99
and the idea that humans are free.1 The two main 
characteristics of this view are that human decisions and 
actions are "causally determined" but that they are free in 
the sense that God's causation is nonconstraining.3 On the 
basis of Henry's views analyzed in this chapter, the 
conclusion seems to be in place that the term
"compatibilism" adequately expresses Henry's concept of the 
relationship between God's sovereignty, on one hand, and 
human decisions and actions, on the other.
So far, the meaning of sovereignty in Henry has been
discussed in terms of what the concept signifies and the 
extent to which it is absolute. An equally important aspect 
of the concept is the place which it occupies in Henry's 
theology. Such a setting helps to underscore the overall
importance of sovereignty in Henry's thought. In the
following section, this setting is analyzed and its 
significance in Henry's theology described.
Sovereignty in Henry's Theology
The concept of sovereignty is not an isolated idea 
in the theology of Carl Henry. Like other aspects of 
Henry's thought, sovereignty stands within a web of related 
ideas, all of which are aimed at demonstrating the 
comprehensive coherence of Henry's theological structure.
In this section, the question being addressed is the place 
which the concept of sovereignty occupies in the theology of
AI bid., 22, 24.
3Ibid . , 24.
i
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Henry. The answer to this question is sought by examining 
sovereignty in two related contexts: its place among the 
attributes of God and in the wider context of Henry's 
theology.
Sovereignty as an Attribute of God 
Henry describes sovereignty as one of the attributes 
of God.1 Attributes are characteristics that define the 
nature of God.3 They include such qualities as omniscience, 
omnipresence, omnipotence, love, wisdom, immutability, etc.3 
By placing sovereignty among these attributes, Henry lays 
significant theological weight on the concept. He thus 
implies that the concept is not a mere inference from other 
considerations but a subject that deserves to be treated 
like other important biblical teachings.'*
’"GRA, 5:295.
3Henry refers to attributes also as properties and 
perfections. He does not think that there are any 
meaningful differences between the two words (ibid., 5:99).
’Nowhere in the series does Henry give a complete 
list of the divine attributes. He only writes of two kinds 
of attributes: communicable and incommunicable (ibid.).
This classification has been used traditionally by Reformed 
theologians. See Heinrich Heppe, Reformed Dogmatics. 60— 
64.
However, those properties of God which Henry 
considers to be important are specifically referred to as 
attributes and they are discussed in individual chapters in 
GRA. vol. 5. These attributes are: personality (chap. 7), 
Spirit (chap. iO), infinity (chap. 11), timelessness (chap. 
12), omniscience (chap. 14), immutability (chap. 15), 
sovereignty (chap. 16), and rationality (chap. 17).
*Those theologians who view sovereignty as an 
inference from other teachings of Scripture consider 
sovereignty as so comprehensive a concept that to place it 
among the attributes somehow limits its coverage. See James 
Montgomery Boice, The Sovereignty of God (Downers Grove,
r
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While he counts it among the attributes, he also 
distinguishes sovereignty from them. Henry stresses the 
fact that "without it all other attributes of God lose their 
efficacy."1 This qualification has two implications, among 
others. First, despite Henry's assertion that no attribute 
is higher or more important than others,3 it seems that 
sovereignty can be exempted from that requirement.
Certainly, Henry chooses his vocabulary carefully so that 
there is no obvious contradiction between his assertion that 
the attributes are equal and his reference to sovereignty as 
having a logical priority over other attributes.3 Vet, it
Illinois: InterVarsity Press, 1978), 150.
*GRA. 5:295.
3Henry emphasizes the "equal honor that Scripture 
bestows on all God's attributes" (ibid., 6:136).
sOn one hand, Henry considers all attributes to be 
equal (ibid.). On the other hand, he also makes certain 
statements which, properly interpreted, tend to support the 
idea that sovereignty is a fundamental attribute. Consider 
the following statement: "Even if one does not consider
sovereignty the fundamental divine attribute, without it all 
other attributes of God lose their efficacy" (ibid., 5:295).
In another passage, Henry uses the word 
"omnipotence" to express the same idea: "It is indeea divine
sovereignty that permeates the Bible narrative- whether one 
turns to the creation, incarnation or final judgment. If 
one considers the omnipotence of God as foundational, then 
all other divine attributes or activities express that 
omnipotence as applied to different historical situations" 
(ibid., 5:325). That the word "omnipotence" here is 
interchangeable with the word "sovereignty" is supported by 
three considerations. First, the sentence preceding the one 
in question is the first in the paragraph and it clearly 
indicates that the subject which the author has in mind is 
sovereignty. Second, the chapter where the passage occurs 
is entitled, "The Sovereignty of the Omnipotent God."
Third, Thomas licNeal , in his dissertation on Henry's concept 
of God, observes that "Henry links the notions of God's 
sovereignty and omnipotence together" (A Critical Analysis 
of the Doctrine of God, 180).
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seems clear that the least which can be said about 
sovereignty is that, for Henry, it is the first attribute 
among equals. It is definitive of the other attributes.
Second, the distinction which Henry accords 
sovereignty among the attributes seems essentially to 
disqualify it as an attribute. Although as a general rule, 
an attribute must be shown to hp compatible with other 
attributes in order to maintain coherence within one's 
concept of God, x it appears unusual to qualify one 
attribute, as Henry does with sovereignty, so that a 
relative independence of the other attributes is precluded. 
If without sovereignty "all the other attributes lose their 
efficacy,"3 it would appear that Henry has not quite 
established sovereignty as "one of" the divine attributes.
To me, it seems that sovereignty is given the status of an 
attribute mainly for systematic purposes. That is, as a 
divine attribute, the concept of sovereignty is not an 
appendage to systematic theology but a proper Christian 
dogma. Otherwise, its significance transcends the role of 
an ordinary attribute.
Furthermore, sovereignty is a key concept in Henry's 
understanding of the nature of God. Without it, none of the 
other aspects of the nature of God have any significance.
It needs to be pointed out here that, for Henry, the
1See Nash, The Concept of God. 12—13.
3GRA, 5:295.
r
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attributes of God and his essence are identical.A When this 
fact is understood, it becomes easier to appreciate the 
implied logic that if a concept is significant in the 
description of the nature of God, it is so also for the 
whole doctrine of God as far as Henry is concerned. In this 
case, this means that if sovereignty is a fundamental 
"attribute" in the nature of God, it is equally significant 
for the whole doctrine of God. This theological weight of 
the concept of sovereignty has, of necessity, tremendous 
consequences when it comes to Henry's view of God's 
relationship with the world. In fact, Henry maintains that 
"God's sovereignty is an aspect of his ontology, and it is 
God in his total being who decrees, and does so freely, that 
is, free of all external constraints.1,2
Sovereignty in Henry's Theological System
In chapter 2, it was mentioned that Henry sets his 
ideas in the context of his theological system. It was also 
observed that his system consists of two main axioms—  
epistemological and ontological, theorems and propositions. 
After discussing the epistemological axiom in chapter 2, it 
now remains for us to focus attention on the ontological 
axiom.
Henry clearly states that "the triune God is
1Henry states clearly that attributes "are identical 
with the divine essence and serve more fully and precisely 
to define God's nature" (ibid., 5:132).
=Ibid., 6:9*?. Henry conceives God's decrees to be 
those relations which God has with realities outside himself 
(ibid., 6:80).
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Christianity's basic ontological axiom."A In other words, 
for Henry, God is Christianity's ontological first principle 
or presupposition. Further evidence shows that by referring 
to God as the "ontological" axiom, Henry means that God is 
the ground of all existence and One in whom everything has 
its being. Henry maintains that "God is the source of all 
substance and structures of existence, metaphysical ground 
of the true and the good."3
In view of what was mentioned previously concerning 
sovereignty as an attribute, the case for the significance 
of sovereignty in Henry's theological system may be stated 
as follows. Henry distinguishes sovereignty as the single 
most important attribute of God. That being the case, 
sovereignty must logically be considered to be a very 
significant concept in Henry's doctrine of God since God's 
nature and his essence are identical and both constitute all 
that can be asserted about God. From these observations, it 
appears that if an axiom is a basic element in Henry's 
theological system, and God is the ontological axiom, then 
sovereignty must be considered a concept of vital importance 
in that system.3 In fact, it seems safe to infer that, for 
Henry, the concept of sovereignty, along with its
*Ibid., 1:219.
31 bid. , 6:67.
3Henry himself seems to support this conclusion when 
he writes that "God's sovereignty is in fact an aspect of 
his ontology, and it is God in his total being who decrees, 
and does so freely, that is, free of all external 
constraints" (ibid., 6:99).
f
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significations, plays a significant presuppositional role in 
the whole structure of his system.1
Conclusion
In this chapter, Henry's concept of sovereignty has 
been analyzed in terms of Henry's tradition, the meaning of 
the concept, its scope and also its place in Henry's 
theology. It was pointed out at the beginning that the 
investigation is done for the purpose of analyzing Henry's 
views on the nature of God's activity in the world. As 
such, this evaluation has its focus mainly on those aspects 
of the concept which are descriptive of that phenomenon.2
1That the concept of sovereignty plays a key role in 
Henry's theological system is not by any means a strange or 
new approach to theology. The concept of sovereignty has 
been affirmed by other Reformed theologians as an 
interpretive principle in theology. Ben A. Warburton, for 
example, writes, "The one rock upon which Calvinism builds 
is that of the absolute and unlimited sovereignty of the 
eternal and self—existent Jehovah" (Calvinism; Its History 
and Basic Principles. Its Fruits and Its Future, and Its 
Practical Apolication to Life CGrand Rapids: William B. 
Eerdmans, 1955], 63). See also H. Henry Meeter, Calvinism: 
An Interpretation of Its Basic Ideas, vol. I: The 
Theological and the Political Ideas (Grand Rapids:
Zondervan, 1939), 31—38; William K. B. Stoever, "The 
Calvinist Theological Tradition," in Encyclopedia of the 
American Religious Experience: Studies of Traditions and 
Movements, vol.II. e d . Charles H. Lippy and Peter W.
Williams (New York: Charles Scribner’s Sons, 19B8), 1039; 
Arthur W. Pink, The Sovereignty of God (Grand Rapids: Baker 
Book House, 1930); James Montgomery Boice, Foundations of 
the Christian Faith, vol. 1: The Sovereignty of God (Downers 
Grove, Illinois: InterVarsity Press, 1978); and John Murray,
Calvin on Scripture and Divine Sovereignty (Philadelphia:
The Presbyterian and Reformed Publishing, 1960), 55—71.
2A full assessment of the concept is not intended 
here as that involves more issues than the purpose of this 
investigation allows. It should be remembered that the 
issues raised in this chapter have been debated for 
centuries and a study of this size cannot hope to do deal 
adequately with the whole question. Those aspects of the
f
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Henry views divine sovereignty as signifying God's 
independence, freedom, power, lordship, and causality, 
divine sovereignty is, therefore, a complex of other 
attributes that underlie God's authority and ability to act 
as he pleases. For Henry, sovereignty is the most important 
divine attribute. Without it, all other attributes lose 
their efficacy. This being the case, and in view of the 
significance which Henry attaches to the doctrine of God ,x 
it is not surprising that sovereignty plays a definitive 
role in Henry's theology. Because the concept of divine 
sovereignty describes the basis and the nature of God's 
action in the world, it necessarily follows that divine 
sovereignty surfaces in many contexts.
Divine sovereignty is the perspective from which 
Henry understands many theological problems. One of these 
is the problem of evil. For Henry, God causes evil because 
he is the only one who can ultimately cause anything. Gad 
causes all the decisions and actions of man. Those who are
"God's people" may have special favors from God but all
human decisions and actions, be they righteous or wicked, 
are caused by God.3 Another issue which the concept of 
sovereignty illumines is the concept of providence. It is
concept of sovereignty which are deemed significant for the
objectives of this study are briefly mentioned.
1When asked in an interview what doctrine he thought
to be most important, Henry rc;-Ii_'d that the doctrine of God 
is the most fundamental (Butler D. Hochstedt, "An Interview 
with Carl F. H. Henry," TSF Bulletin 10 (Mar— Apr 19Q7): 17.
3GRA. 5:280, 312; 6:83, B 6 , 461.
f
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Henry's view that the place of every individual person or 
thing in the world and in history is definite and certain 
because God so provides.1 The natural processes, too, 
operate under direct command of Gad.3 Gad's sovereignty is 
implicated in the rainfall as it is in the resurrection of 
Christ.3 For Henry, any suggestion that any thing in the 
universe is caused by some agent other than God is 
"incipient dualism."'* In essence, divine sovereignty 
denotes God as the absolute causal agent throughout the 
universe and no creature, man included, can act contrary to 
what God makes certain through his causality.3
For our present purposes, it is of particular 
importance that Henry understands divine sovereignty in 
terms of causality, among other significations, and that 
this causality is absolute. The connection being made here
xI bid., 6:78.
=Ibid.
3Ibid . , 6:15.
*1 bid . , 6:295.
3Jack W. Cottrell admits that the "Bible certainly 
speaks of God's ability to turn a person's heart and actions 
(e.g., Ps 16:1; 21:1), and it gives many examples (e.g.,
Gen. 50:20; Exod 10:20; Ezra 1:1). The Calvinistic fallacy, 
however, is to generalize from these particulars and to 
assume that they are paradigms for the way God works in 
every decision without exception." See Cottrell's article, 
"The Nature of the Divine Sovereignty," in Clark Pinnock, 
ed., ft Case for Arminianism. 113.
*The word "absolute" is used here and in the study 
as a whole to signify the fact that there is no aspect of 
reality and existence which does not have God as its direct 
cause, including the decisions and actions of free moral 
agents like human beings.
r ~
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between sovereignty and causality is one in which causality 
is not merely a qualifier in the concept of sovereignty but 
the means by which God exercises his sovereignty. For 
Henry, sovereignty is not some general concept of God's 
authority and rulership in the universe where created agents 
are free to decide and act independently to some degree. 
Rather, the notion of divine sovereignty entails a very 
specific description of the exact manner in which God rules 
the universe and how he guarantees effectiveness in his 
exercise of authority in the world. On the basis of the 
connection between sovereignty and the idea of causality, 
there are three inferences which can be drawn from that 
f ac t .
First, God exerts his sovereignty by himself being 
the ultimate, independent, causal principle in the universe. 
Henry does not leave any room for anyone or anything other 
than God himself to independently originate, create, or 
cause any thing, any event, or any condition, even evil 
itself. This means that the chief cause for any given 
aspect of created reality is external to the agents that 
constitute that reality. For Henry, God is not 
ontologically continuous with the world and it is in that 
sense that his causality must be considered to be objective 
and external to the world and the agents that constitute it.
Second, divine sovereignty implies absolute certainty 
and unconditionality of the events and circumstances which 
God intends to cause to exist. In this respect, Henry 
states that God's decrees "eventuate with certainty" and
r
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that "all history reveals the certainty of events decreed by
God."1 It is Henry's view that
If God's plan achieve what he did not purpose, if parts 
of it conflicted and competed, if his purpose itself 
requires constant revision, then God would be neither 
all-wise nor all-powerful. God’s decrees will eventuate 
with certainty whether they come to pass solely by his 
own causality or through the agency of his creatures.
. . . All history reveals the certainty of events
decreed by God.3
The meaning of these statements seems to be that the "causal
chain" between God and the created universe is so necessary
that God's decisions and actions cannot be qualified,
modified, or changed by any factors or considerations
outside God. For Henry, not even human freedom is capable
of affecting the certainty of God's decrees.
Third, divine sovereignty implies that the decisions 
and actions of created existents are not, indeed cannot be, 
in competition with or opposed to God's decisions and 
actions. God’s actions and those of nature are harmonious 
ar.d compatible. To expresses this idea, Henry uses the word 
"concurrence." For him, "The universe does not exist 
without his [God's] support and concurrence."3 It is to be 
noted that, while Henry emphasizes the logical priority of
1 1 bid . , 6:04 .
3Ibid. It is to be noted that in this passage, 
Henry does not place the causality of God and that of the 
creatures on the same level. The phrase, "or through the 
agency of his creatures," seems to suggest that the 
creatures do not have an independent causality running 
parallel to Gao's. The role of the creatures is that of 
agency and instrumentality through which God may choose to 
effect his plans and purposes.
3 Ibid., 6:48.
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Gad's activity in this "concurrence" or "compatibilism," he 
does not thereby eliminate the relevance and significance of 
the activity of created agents. In fact, Henry considers 
the activity of the creatures to be "voluntary."1 What 
Henry teaches is that "the operations of nature" are at the 
same time the "operations of deity."a
The material presented in this chapter has focused on 
Henry's concept of sovereignty in general terms. It 
consists of an analysis of how Henry views the nature of 
God's activity in the world. In chapter 4, an attempt is 
made at examining the sense in which Henry's concept of 
sovereignty is a presupposition in his concept of inerrancy.
xThis is best illustrated by Henry's concept of 
human freedom which is discussed in this chapter under 
"providence." Freedom of activity here is not the 
"libertarian 'freedom of indifference'" but "freedom of 
voluntary choice" and activity (ibid., 6:84—5).
3Ibid., 6:49.
r
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CHAPTER IV
SOVEREIGNTY AS A PRESUPPOSITION 
IN THE CONCEPT OF INERRANCY
In chapters 2 and 3, attention has been focused on 
clarification of Henry's understanding of inerrancy and 
sovereignty as individual concepts. Each was described and 
analyzed in terms of Henry's sources for the concept, the 
basic meaning of the word, the scope covered by the concept, 
and its place in Henry's theology. An evaluation Mas also 
made of each for the purpose of highlighting those aspects 
that point in the direction of this study. The analysis 
made in regard to the concepts of inerrancy and sovereignty 
thus far makes possible the investigation of the proposition 
that "sovereignty is a presupposition in Henry's concept of 
scriptural inerrancy.-1
It Mas observed in chapters 2 and 3 that the terms 
inerrancy and sovereignty encompass several concepts and 
that these concepts exist in logical chains Mith other 
ideas.2 Thus, discussion on hoM inerrancy presupposes
AThis propositional phrase expresses the central 
focus of this chapter. It appears in the discussion in two 
forms: “sovereignty is a presupposition in inerrancy" and 
"inerrancy presupposes sovereignty." Both forms are used 
interchangeably in this study.
^Inerrancy represents such ideas as logical 
consistency and coherence of biblical propositions, absence
111
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sovereignty cannot be limited only to the dictionary 
definitions of the two words. It must include other related 
ideas also.
In keeping with this guideline, the present chapter 
is divided into two main sections. The first section, 
entitled "Primary Considerations," is devoted to those ideas 
and concepts which are related to sovereignty and inerrancy 
in an effort to establish fundamental principles on which 
the proposition, "sovereignty is a presupposition in 
inerrancy," is predicated. The second section examines how 
Henry applies those principles in his understanding of the 
process of inspiration. It is in this context that specific 
observations are made on how Henry confirms the proposition 
that "inerrancy presupposes sovereignty." The two main 
sections of the chapter are fallowed by a conclusion which 
highlights the main concerns of the chapter.
Primary Considerations
The first task in this chapter is to lay the 
foundation on which the proposition, "Henry's idea of 
inerrancy presupposes his concept of sovereignty," seems to 
be established. It is a search for basic principles which 
underlie that proposition and which make it metaphysically 
significant. One important consideration in this respect is
of error from and truthfulness of scriptural contents. It 
is closely associated with Scripture, the doctrine of 
revelation and the structure of Henry's epistemology. 
Sovereignty signifies God’s independence, freedom, power, 
lordship, and causality. It is connected with the nature of 
God as a divine attribute and it plays a vital role in 
Henry's ontology.
Fl
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the -fact that both sovereignty and inerrancy belong to 
realms of meaning which have no obvious relevance to each 
other. One way of expressing the distance between the two 
is to view sovereignty as belonging to the realm of ontology 
and inerrancy as belonging to the realm of epistemology.1 
Another way of expressing the same distance is to describe 
sovereignty as an aspect of the supernatural God while 
inerrancy is a characteristic of Scripture, something which 
belongs to the natural world.3
These distinctions help to clarify what is involved 
in examining the proposition that “inerrancy presupposes 
sovereignty." Before considering the specific nature of the 
proposition, therefore, one must determine if there is a 
possibility of relating such diverse realms of reality as 
epistemolagy and ontology in Henry's writings. If the realm 
of ontology (being), and the concept of God, on the one 
hand, and the realm of epistemology (knowledge) and the
‘•That is, sovereignty attaches to the realm of 
“being" while inerrancy attaches to the realm of 
“knowledge.“
Allusions to the relevance of these broad 
philosophical categories were made in previous chapters. As 
it is pointed out later, ontology and epistemolagy are not 
separable. The categorization made here is for the sake of 
argument and clarification of Henry's ideas.
aHenry also considers these distinctions as 
necessary categories in philosophical and theological 
argumentation. For him, “However difficult may be a precise 
definition of nature, such definitions are essential to any 
resolution of the issues in debate. . . .  Judeo—Christian 
theology declares the universe— the cosmos and the whole 
world of creatures— to be God's creation. It distinguishes 
God as the uncreated Creator of all else, and hence as 
supernatural; the term nature, by contrast, applies to 
everything derived from God. No part of the created 
universe is to be considered supernatural“ (GRA. 6:13).
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concept of what belongs to nature, on the other, cannot be 
shown to be related in any manner, there remains little, if 
any, hope that the proposition, "inerrancy presupposes 
sovereignty," can be affirmed. In other words, the 
proposition in question involves, at a primary level, a 
relationship between ontology and epistemology, being and 
knowledge, and God and the world.1
Henry's ideas which are considered here to be 
"primary considerations" in the discussion are: God's 
epistemological sovereignty, God's ontological sovereignty, 
and the concept of divine Logos. It is to be noted that the 
notions of epistemology and ontology have been mentioned 
briefly in chapters 2 and 3 in connection with Henry's 
theological system. In this chapter, these notions are 
further clarified with more attention being focused on their 
relevance to the proposition under investigation. Henry's 
concept of divine Logos is discussed for the first time. 
However, as the investigation seems to reveal, its novelty 
lies more in its integrative role in Henry's metaphysics 
than in its constitutive meaning.
God's Epistemological Sovereignty
Henry's concept of sovereignty has definite 
implications on Henry's epistemology. In this study, the
1In dissertation, Fernando Canale has shown 
convincingly the absolute necessity of relating together 
ontological and epistemological frameworks in the 
construction of theological systems. He considers it naive 
to fail to see the relationship between them. See A 
Criticism of Theolooical Reason. 27—51.
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phrase "epistemological sovereignty" is used to express
Henry's view that
God's sovereignty requires the confession that all 
existence and all knowledge have their ultimate source 
in the divine Logos. Truth is truth because God thinks 
and twills it; in other words, truth depends on the 
sovereignty of God.x
It is Henry's view that God is the "ultimate explanation of
the rational structure of the world and men”a and that “the
fixed orders of created existence, both rational and moral,
are God— given . 1,3
From what Henry writes, it appears that God is
sovereign in respect to moral and rational order in the
universe. By moral structures, Henry makes reference to
ethical categories and all other factors which make the
moral experience of man possible.'* All these have their
*~GRA. 5:334. Although the phrase itself, 
“epistemological sovereignty,“ occurs in connection with 
Henry's depiction of self—conceptions of the secular man 
(ibid., 5:315), it is used in this study in reference to God 
since the context in which the phrase occurs suggests that 
"epistemological sovereignty" is a divine prerogative which 
man wrongly assumes to be his.
It is to be noted also that Henry's epistemology is a 
broader subject than what can possibly be covered in this 
section. But a number of important ideas are embedded in it 
and these need to be taken into account if the validity of 
the presuppositional premise of sovereignty in the concept 
of inerrancy is to be demonstrated.
“ Ibid., 5:350-1.
3 I bid., 6:2“'? .
*These categories include “God's revealed commands 
and principles" which form “the core structure of biblical 
ethics," “man's moral understanding, . . .  his created 
relationship both to the sovereign God and to moral 
imperatives which man even in his unbelief retains through 
the imperishable cognitive links of reason and conscience .
. . moral categories implanted by creation, . . .  the voice
of the sovereign holy Lord both in general and in special
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source and ground in God.1 Henry especially emphasizes the 
fact that it is God who originates and defines both good and 
evil as moral referents.3
Closely related to moral categories is the rational 
content and order of the universe which is also a dimension 
of God's sovereignty. The rational categories refer to laws 
of logic, mathematical structures, laws of language, and 
other natural laws.3 Of special significance to Henry is 
the ■'logical" distinction between truth and falsity. For 
Henry, what is true is also logically consistent and valid.* 
He laments the loss of this distinction in modern theology, 
a fact which he attributes to the influence of secular 
philosophy. As a result of this loss, theology is deprived 
of its goal and content, and truth is relativized.9
revelation" (ibid., 6:252, 256).
xAn incisive study of the divine origin of Henry's 
ethics has been done by Miroslav Kis. See especially 
chapter 9 of his dissertation, "Revelation and Ethics," 275— 
326. Commenting on the origin and ground of Henry's ethics, 
Kis observes that "from its transcendent source, Christian 
ethics gains an eternal and absolute quality. Its content 
and sanction and dynamic and goal are derived from God” 
(ibid., 277).
aGRA. 6:296, 84.
3 Ibid., 5:319-25.
*Henry emphasizes that “The Christian religion is 
wholly on the side of rational method of determining whether
or not conditions necessary to truth of any statements are
met" (ibid., 1:266). Further, "Logical consistency is a
negative test of truth and coherence a subordinate test"
(ibid., 1:232).
9After criticizing “the absurdities of dialectical 
theology," Henry writes that "what is logically 
contradictory cannot be true. A denial of the law of 
contradiction would make truth and error equivalent; hence
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Gad's sovereignty also extends to aan's moral and 
rational powers. According to Henry, these originate from 
God.1 They are dependent on their giver in the sense that 
they recognize but do not create the moral and the rational 
concents of the universe.3 It is God alone who defines, 
creates, and maintains the moral and rational order in the 
universe. In this sense, Henry maintains the concept of 
sovereignty in the origin, nature, and experience of 
knowledge.
One of Henry's ideas which appears to form the 
backbone of his concept of epistemological sovereignty of 
God is the notion that reality is rational.3 Although Henry 
does not actually define what reality is, his repeated 
mention of a triad of elements— God, man, and the world'*—  
seems to suggest that those three entities constitute the
in effect it destroys truth" (ibid., 1:233).
^According to Henry, "man was divinely made with 
rational and moral aptitudes for intelligible communion with 
his maker and for the joyous service of God” (ibid., 1:227).
3 Ibid., 225-6.
3This idea is developed in the rest of this sub­
section. There are, however, specific statements in Henry 
which point in that direction. Three examples can be used 
as illustrations: For Henry, truth, which we have seen to
be a rational category, does not refer to reality. "It is 
itself the reality" (ibid., 3:222). Henry also calls for an 
"awareness of the meaning of God as the revelationally given 
reality that certifies the rational coherence of created 
reality" (ibid., 3:170). Further, "the logical law of 
noncontradiction is necessarily and objectively true, and 
hence integral tc the real world" (ibid., 3:229).
*For a few examples, see ibid., 2:95; 5:347, 350, 
354-5, 388.
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main referents of his concern when he uses the term 
reality.1
God is Rational
Henry maintains that God is rational.3 He further 
states that God's rationality consists of laws of reason and 
logic, which are the framework of the divine mind and the 
way God thinks and acts.3 For Henry, these laws are also 
conceivable in terms of propositions.’* Accordingly, God's 
mind consists of propositions or “self-evident truths" which 
God, by virtue of his omniscience, knows in their totality 
and in all their relationships.3 Henry does not consider 
rationality to be an independent system of impersonal laws 
to which everything in the universe, including God, is 
subject.* Rather, it is an intrinsic attribute of God which 
is as eternal as God himself.7 On this basis, Henry 
proposes, therefore, that because reason, laws of logic, and
‘Angels are another dimension of reality which Henry 
mentions (ibid., As229-50). Our* exclusion of this dimension 
is primarily due to the fact that angels are not an 
immediate concern in the present discussion although much of 
what is asserted here is equally applicable to them.
“For a fuller treatment of the idea by Henry, see 
ibid., 5:334-58.
3Ibid., 5:334.
*1 bid., 5:336.
3Ibid., 5:336-7.
‘Henry writes that "constancy [referring to logical 
laws in the universe] does not imply an ontological or 
logical or moral order independent of Gad to which God must 
conform . . .” (ibid., 5:319).
7 Ibid., 5:334.
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propositianal truth are the stuff out of Mhich God's mind is 
nade,1 they have an ontological status.a For him, they are 
neither created by God3 nor produced by man's thinking 
process.'* Rather, their existence is grounded in the very 
essence of God.3
Man Is Rational
The transition from God's rationality to the 
rationality of man and the world is fairly straightforward. 
If rationality signifies the way the divine mind works, it 
is reasonable to expect that the activities which God 
engages himself in and the creatures which he makes reflect 
God's rational nature.** Man, above all, reflects God's 
rationality more than other creatures.7 That is so because
Mbid., 5:334-5.
3 It is Henry's view that the "biblical emphasis an a 
rational Creator . . .  elevates the role of reason and the 
laws of logic to timeless significance" (ibid., 5:342). For 
the ontological status of truth and reason, see ibid.,
5:351, 354, respectively.
3Henry quotes Gordon Clark in stressing that "'the 
laws of reason may be taken as descriptive of the activity 
of God's will, and hence dependent on it though not created 
as the world has been created.*" (ibid., 5:335).
* "Human reason is a divinely fashioned instrument of 
recognizing truth; it is not a creative source of truth" 
(ibid., 1:225).
“"God's rationality is the ultimate explanation of 
the primacy and ubiquity of rational structure in the 
created world of men and things . . ." (ibid., 5:350— 1).
*■"The rational God fashioned both the mind of man 
and the intelligible world to harmonize with each other"
(ibid., 5:347).
3 "Endowed with more than animal perception, gifted 
in fact with a mode of cognition not to be confused with
i
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man is. not has, the image of God.x Henry argues that the 
image refers to rational, moral, and spiritual capacities of 
man.a It is worthwhile to note that although Henry 
considers all the three powers as equally important, he 
accords a logical priority to man's faculty of reason.3 It 
is man's reasoning capacity, Henry contends, which acts as 
the basis for the meaningfulness of man's morality and 
spirituality.* This is a result of Henry's doctrine of the 
fall which excludes human rationality from the consequences 
of sin.® According to him, the fall affected man’s
sensation, man Cis] . . .  able to intuit intelligible 
universals; as a divinely intended knower, he was able to 
cognize within limits the nature and structure of the 
externally real world" (ibid., 3:168). Further, "The image 
of God in man facilitates his cognitive transcendence of 
nature and the linguisticization of cognitive capacity" 
(ibid., 3:346).
xIbid., 5:382. The exact meaning of this emphasis 
in Henry is not clear. The context of the statement, 
however, seems to suggest that Henry is here trying to show 
how “ontologically resemblant" man's mind is to God's mind. 
Henry quotes William Clarke approvingly: “The differences 
between God and man are differences between beings that are 
essentially resemblant." Henry adds that "the nous of God 
is not a mental faculty wholly different in kind from the 
nous of mankind in its content. Man not merely has the 
image of God but is the image of God" (ibid.).
aHenry refers to these qualities as "a cohesive 
unity of interrelated components that interact with and 
condition each other" (ibid., 2:125).
3 "But in contemplating a divine image in man, it 
should be clear that the rational or cognitive aspect has 
logical priority. . . .  Only if man is logically lighted, 
and not simply morally or spiritually involved independent 
of intelligent, can he be meaningfully aware of responsible 
relationships to Sod and other selves and to the cosmos" 
(ibid., 2:125-6).
M b i d .
’Henry views man as "still capable," after the fall,
r
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
121
philosophical orientation but not his thinking mechanism.1 
Had the latter been affected, Henry holds that there Mould 
be no longer any basis for God's communication with man and, 
consequently, man's salvation.3
The World Is Rational
The manner in which the world is rational is less 
clear in Henry. The reason for this, according to him, is 
that the Bible does not reveal the order of the universe.3
However, there are some indications that Henry is not
willing to leave the rationality of the world to what anyone 
might wish to imagine. First, it is Henry's view that laws 
of logic (especially the law of noncontradiction) and 
mathematical structures are "integral to the real world.""1 
For him, it is this assumption which opens the possibility
of correlating and harmonizing "the mind of God, the mind of
"of intellectually analyzing rational evidence for the 
truth—value of assertions about God" (ibid., 1:227).
1Henry elucidates this point by referring to Gordon 
Clark: "Clark distinguishes sin's noetic effect on the 
content of man's thinking, that is, on his philosophical 
premises, from its effect on mental activity or the 
components of logic and reason. Whereas sin affects man's 
psychological activity and hinders his ability to think 
correctly, it does not affect the laws of valid inference"
(ibid., 2:135-6).
3 Ibid -
3 1bid. , 5:3GB.
''Ibid., 3:229. Henry views God as having "willed 
moral and mathematical distinctions in the creation of the 
universe . . ." (ibid., 5:319). Further, "the certainty and
universality of logic and mathematics establish a priority 
for insight into the nature of ultimate reality" (ibid.,
5 :388) .
F
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man and the rationality of nature” with each other.1 
Second, despite his methodological differences with Thomas 
Aquinas* five proofs for God's existence, Henry appeals to 
the cosmological argument in asserting that the world is not 
haphazard but full of pattern and design.3 Third, Henry 
holds that there is order in history.3 Events in the world 
are not isolated accidents but parts of a teleological plan 
which God will complete at the end of history.* Given these 
observations, it seems clear that although Henry confesses 
his ignorance on whether the rationality of the world is 
mathematical or teleological,9 he has some definite 
suggestions to make in that respect.
Rationality and Sovereignty
The idea that "reality is rational” is what gives 
substance to Henry's concept of God’s epistemological 
sovereignty. Henry's understanding of rationality, as
Mbid., 5:347, 388-
aHe makes it clear that his rejection n-f the 
cosmological argument does not require a rejection of "the 
relevance of reason to theological realities" as the 
neoorthodox theologians do. Ibid. He dismisses also as 
secular "the notion that nature is haphazard, history 
intrinsically unpredictable, all events unique" (ibid., 
2:284). In addition, he appear to identify himself with the 
view that the real world is "objectively ordered and 
coherent" and nature as “a patterned reality of intelligible 
laws discoverable by human reason" (ibid., 5:359).
3Henry writes of history as being characterized by a
"pattern", "a general coherence" and a "universal plan"
(ibid., 6:460, 470-1).
*This theme can be clearly seen in Henry's doctrines
of providence and eschatology. See ibid., 6:455—513.
9Ibid., 5:388.
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discussed above, includes elements such as truth, 
propositions, reason or thinking faculty, laws of logic, 
mathematical structures, and design in nature. These 
elements, for Henry, exist in the mind of God as necessary 
constituents of and conditions of knowledge.1- Without them, 
Henry maintains that objective knowledge of anything and 
communication of that knowledge is impossible.3 If that be 
the case, and epistemology is generally defined as an area 
of study which deals with the source, nature, and limits of 
knowledge,3 it is easy to notice the link between Henry's 
concept of rationality and his epistemology. Accordingly, 
to state that God exercises an epistemological sovereignty 
means, in Henry's case, that God is the source and preserver 
of all knowledge and the conditions which make that 
knowledge possible.
The basic principle which seems to issue from the 
above discussion on God's epistemological sovereignty is 
that all reality is rationally coherent with God as its 
sovereign origin and sustainer. The implications of this
luGod the creator and sustainer of all gives the 
cosmos its intelligibility and meaning and hence its human 
knowability" (ibid., 5:3B4).
“"Valid knowledge is passible only in view of man's 
relationship to the divine mind” (ibid.). In addition, 
“Logic is indispensable to human thought and to human 
speech. Without the law of contradiction, no significant 
speech is possible, even attempts to refute the law of 
contradiction would have to be formulated in intelligible 
language that presupposes it" (ibid., 3:390).
3Norman L. Geisler and Paul D. Feinberg,
Introduction to Philosoohv (Grand Rapids: Baker Book House, 
1980), 33-35.
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principle an the proposition that "sovereignty is a 
presupposition in inerrancy" may be stated as follows:
First, propositional truth is the very structure of God's 
mind and, in special revelation, God communicates the 
contents of his own mind to man.1 In other words, Henry 
seems to identify the propositional truth of Scripture with 
the propositions which constitute God's rational mind. 
Second, propositional truth is transmittable interpersonally 
throughout reality since, as a rational element, it 
maintains the same intelligibility and objective meaning in 
man, in God, and in the world.3 The essence of these 
implications is that there are no epistemological barriers 
when God communicates propositional truth with man.3 Henry
’’This inference is deducible from the material 
surveyed above and from the following statements of Henry: 
"Evangelical Christianity . . .  acknowledges the cognitive 
and propositional nature of divinely revealed truths about 
God and his purposes conveyed by the inspired Scripture" 
(GRA, 4:332). The point becomes even clearer in the case of 
the New Testament: "The New Testament conveys the mind and 
the voice of the incarnate and risen Christ in intelligible 
propositional form" (ibid., 3:95).
3For Henry, "by true knowledge it [evangelical 
theology] means nothing more or less than truth as God knows 
and reveals it and that will include whatever any 
philosopher and any scientist says without need of 
retraction" (ibid., 1:93). Truth is eternal, "as timelessly 
true as is the truth of the mathematics,” and "above all 
human contingency and change” (ibid., 3:474).
3 It is Henry's position that "if revelation is God's 
revelation, and God chooses to communicate in human concepts 
and words, he is under no obligation to adopt * anti—faith 
reason' or to speak in verbal ambiguities. . . . If God is
the sovereign, rational God, . . .  and if God desires to 
communicate indispensable information, then no modern theory 
of linguistics can be considered a roadblock" (ibid.,
3:289). In addition, "God need not stutter when he 
pronounces his own Name nor when uttering any sentence he 
will to speak in our language" (ibid., 2:180).
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maintains that "Divine sovereignty can be thus formulated 
because it extends also to the sphere of truth.”3’
God's Ontological Sovereignty 
After discussing God's sovereignty in the realm of 
knowledge, it now seems appropriate to turn attention to 
God's sovereignty in the realm of being.a By God's 
ontological sovereignty, specific reference is hereby made 
to the concept of causality. The basic meaning of this 
concept was amply explained in chapter 3 and, therefore, the 
main focus of this discussion is on the application of that 
concept to the proposition that "inerrancy presupposes 
sovereignty." As already mentioned, Henry views God as the 
agent who is himself the original being,3 the origin of all 
other beings in existence'* and the direct cause of every
xIbid., 4:16.
aThe sequence from epistemology to ontology is not 
arbitrary. It is the same sequence followed in the last two 
chapters. The arrangement is a deliberate effort to follow
Henry's scheme in his treatment of the two subjects in God.
Revelation and Authority, a fact which, in turn, is in
accordance with the logical order of Reformed Confessions. 
See "The Second Helvetic Confession" (1566) and "The 
Westminster Confession" (1646) in John H. Leith, ed., Creeds 
of the Churches. 3rd ed. (Atlanta: John Knox Press, 1982).
3God "neither became the living God by his creation 
of the universe, nor did he become the living Gad at some 
point in eternity past; he is the only living God and is so 
eternally. He lives in eternal self-affirmation . . .  He
wills eternally to be himself in the fullness of his 
independent vitality, and never ceases to be himself" (GRA, 
5:69).
*God is "the originating principle of the cosmos and 
the ultimate foundation of the logical form of the cosmos 
and its coherent content" (ibid., 5:335).
f
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event and condition in the universe.1 In other words, 
nothing exists or happens without God's direct command.3 
The "causal relationship” which God has with the world 
seems, in fact, to be so intimate that it threatens the 
balance which Henry wishes to maintain between God's 
transcendence and immanence.3 This total causation of every 
detail in existence is what I refer to here as God's 
ontological sovereignty.
The significance of this concept to our concerns in 
this study cannot be overemphasized. The idea of causality 
stands for the principle that divine causality is the
1Henry describes God as ”a divine principle immanent 
in all reality, that is, for a spiritual—rational—moral 
shaping force at work throughout cosmic existence and all 
historical events” (ibid., 3:202). God is also the
"metaphysical absolute, . . .  the independent personal cause 
of the universe, . . .  the fundamental power of creation, 
cause of existence" (ibid., 5:332—3). He is also "the 
ultimate cause of all that is, . . .  [and] the ultimate 
source of all reality” (ibid., 6:37).
3 It is Henry's contention that “in the Bible 
creation is not a mechanistic causal reality; it involves, 
rather, a constant reenactment of God's presence and power." 
Henry calls this "voluntary" in contrast with “involuntary" 
causation (ibid., 6:49).
3Henry discusses the concepts of “God's 
Transcendence and Immanence" in ibid., 6:35—51. It seems, 
however, that despite his efforts to defend two levels of 
reality— natural and supernatural— against the tenets of 
process theology, he, nonetheless, emphasizes God's 
immanence in such ultimate and absolute terms that the 
ontological barrier between God and the world is essentially 
removed and the coherence of reality is stressed at the 
expense of God's transcendence. It may be improper to call 
Henry a panentheist on this basis but his concept of 
causality has some features which are easily comparable to 
those of panentheism. In both cases, God is directly 
implicated in every detail of existence. For a brief 
summary of the meaning of panentheisic, see Evanoe 1 ica 1 
Dictionary of Theology, ed. Walter A. Elwell (Grand Rapids: 
Baker Book House, 19Q4).
r
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
127
unifying factor in the realm of being (or ontology) which, 
in Henry's terms, is meaningful and coherent. Reality 
consists not of several free and independent causal agents 
but several elements which are tied together by their 
dependence on God as the direct and necessary cause.1 It 
seems that it is in this context that the proposition 
"sovereignty is a presupposition in inerrancy” becomes more 
evident. If it may be argued that there is no ontological 
barrier between God and man, then the idea that Gad caused 
the existence of inerrant autographs is within the limits of 
real possibility.3
The Divine Logos 
Henry's doctrine of the divine Logos is so 
comprehensive that, to do justice to it, the discussion here 
must be limited to those aspects which have a direct bearing 
on our present concern— the proposition that “sovereignty is 
a presupposition in inerrancy."3 In the previous two sub­
sections, an attempt has been made to show how Henry
Undoubtedly, Henry states that God is not “the sole 
volitional agent that pantheism projects" (GRA. 6:82). He 
even mentions the existence of “secondary causes" and causal 
agency of the creatures. Man is especially endowed with a 
capacity for moral freedom (ibid., 6:49, 84). Yet, it is 
Henry's view that to posit independent causality outside God
(even in the case of evil) is "a kind of incipient dualism 
rather than the metaphysical monism of Scripture. One 
problem with such a view is an apparent questioning of God's 
sovereignty" (ibid., 6:295). Italics supplied.
3ftore discussion on this follows below.
3Henry's exposition on the doctrine of divine Logos 
is divided into six chapters covering eighty—four pages 
(GRA. 3:164-247).
r ~
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maintains a unified epistemology and a unified ontology, 
both of which structures exhibit God's sovereignty. It is 
not being suggested here that epistemology and ontology are 
mutually exclusive, especially given the ontological status 
of rational categories in the universe. However, it appears 
that, in order to fully appreciate Henry's concept of a 
"metaphysical m o n i s m , H e n r y ' s  concept of the Logos goes a 
long way in elucidating the meaning of that nation. It 
should also be pointed out that since inerrancy of Scripture 
is an assertion which impinges on both epistemology and 
ontology at one and the same time, a concept such as that of 
the Logos is useful in illustrating the unity between realms 
of being and knowledge. Therefore, to include in this 
section a concept which seems to be the integrative 
principle in Henry's metaphysics seems to be well within the 
scope of the study.
Henry states that his concept of the Logos is 
derived from Scripture, particularly the first chapter of 
the Gospel of Jjhn.2 His interpretation of the passage in 
John yields five major ideas.3 (1) The word "logos" stands 
for “the mind, wisdom, and the truth of God incarnate."'*
For Henry, the divine Logos is an embodiment of reason and
11 bid., 6:295.
aHenry devotes two chapters of vol. 3 to a biblical 
study of the word "Logos." See ibid., 3:173—191, 482—487.
3These ideas seem to be most basic in Henry's 
interpretation of the biblical material.
'"GRA. 3:486. Henry bases this first idea on lexical 
meaning of the Greek noun "logos." See ibid., 3:482—487.
r
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
129
its attendant propositions of truth.1 (2) The Logos is 
eternal.3 He pre-existed with God in eternity and as God, 
he is an ontological personal reality.4 (3) The Logos is 
the creator and sustainer of the universe.9 (4) As the 
incarnate God—man, the Logos is the mediating agent in 
creation, in redemption, and in the coming judgment.4 
(5) The Logos, who “lighteth every man," is the agent of
^Ibid.
3Henry seems to base this idea on a phrase in 1 John 
1:1— “That which was from the beginning . . ."— and on John
1:1, 2— "In the beginning was the Word, and the Word was 
with God, and the Word was God. He was with God in the 
beginning." He comments that the Logos "in eternity past 
shared the inner life of the Godhead" (ibid., 3:184).
3Ibid.
4 Ibid., 3:167.
9This idea is in harmony with John 1:3, 4— "Through 
him all things were made; without him nothing was made that 
has been made. In him was life, and that life was the light 
of men." Remarking on the significance of this passage, 
Henry writes, "The Logos of God is the source of all the 
substance and structures of created reality (John 1:3). To 
deny that the divine Logos originates the structural 
relations of the cosmos is to dispute the Creator's 
sovereignty" (ibid., 5:384).
4The point here is most likely based on John 1:14—  
"The Word became flesh and lived for a while among us." 
Referring to Christ as “preincarnate, incarnate, and now 
glorified," Henry assigns the Logos the role of the
"mediating agency in creation, redemption and the coming 
judgment" (ibid., 3:203).
In this point, Henry's interpretation of the Logos 
is reminiscent of Plato's d ge or divine craftsman who
mediates between the Ideas and concrete world. See a 
characterization of the demiurge in Joseph Owens, A History 
of Ancient Western Philosophy (New York: Appleton—Century— 
Crofts, 1959), 235—249. Henry himself opposes the idea of 
Plato's demiurge and accuses Alfred North Whitehead of 
reviving it in his process theology (GRA. 6:59). However,
he seems to be unaware that he himself, in the doctrine of
the Lagos, is not very far from that notion.
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God's self—revelation.1 On the basis of these ideas which 
Henry considers to be the key concepts about the Logos in 
John, Henry proceeds to assign four fundamental functions to 
the Logos: cosmic, epistemic, salvific, and judgmental.3
The cosmic and epistemic roles of the Logos are
particularly significant in Henry's view of reality.3
According to Henry, the cosmic function signifies the Logos
as the creator and sustainer of the universe.-* In this
case, the Logos is the "source of created existence."3 The
epistemic function signifies the Logos as the "ground of
human knowledge"** and One who gives the universe its
"intelligibility and meaning and, hence, its human
knowability."7 Henry combines the two functions of the
Logos as follows:
The divine Logos is creative and revelatory. The ontic 
articulation (creation and preservation of the universe) 
and the noetic articulation of the cosmos (that is, its 
intelligible meaning and purpose) have their common
iThis idea is based on John 1:9. Henry interprets 
the phrase, "light which lighteth every man," to mean that 
the Logos confronts "every man in the universal general 
revelation given in nature, history, reason, and conscience" 
(GRA. 3:171).
2For a list of these roles, see ibid., 3:194. The 
first three roles are also mentioned in terms of the 
cosmological Logos, the epistemological Logos, and the 
soteriological Logos (ibid., 3:185).
3The other two roles are left out since they are 
outside the scope of this study.
Ibid., 3:185.
Ibid., 3:168.
Ibid. , 3:185.
Ibid., 5:384.
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source and ground in the divine Logos. . . .  In other 
Mords, the creative Logos is at one and the same time 
the sole originating principle of the cosmos and the 
ultimate foundation of the logical form of the cosmos 
and of its coherent content.1
For Henry, the Logos is his basis for affirming "the
ultimate meaning and coherence of the universe.“a He is, in
essence, the tie that holds reality together both
epistemically and ontically.3 One may infer from these
observations that, given such a comprehensive concept of the
Logos, there are no more barriers existing between ontology
and epistemology, being and knowledge or God, man, and the
world, since all these factors are accounted for by the
existence of one personal being, the divine Logos.'*
As evidence seems to indicate, the importance of the 
concept of the Logos is not any new significations which are
not already included in the notions of rationality and
causality previously discussed. Rather, the Logos idea 
assumes its distinctiveness from its integrative role in 
Henry's concept of sovereignty. Henry writes, "God's 
sovereignty requires the confession that all existence and 
all knowledge have their ultimate source in the divine
Mb id., 5:335.
Mbid. , 3:194.
3This seems to be the meaning of Henry's phrase 
"metaphysical monism" in ibid., 6:295.
*Henry states clearly that "the eternal and self- 
revealed Logos, incarnate in Jesus Christ, is the foundation 
of all meaning, and the transcendent personal source and 
support of the rational, moral and purposive order of 
created reality" (ibid., 3:195).
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Lagos.,>i In other words, the divine Logos combines in his 
own person both the epistemological and the ontological 
aspects of God's sovereignty.3 This appears to be the 
essence of Henry's assertion that the divinely revealed 
Logos is “the unifying principle of the cosmos.”3 For our 
present purposes, it is of particular significance that 
Henry designates the Logos as the agent of revelation.4 It 
seems safe to infer from this designation that Henry here 
establishes the concept of sovereignty as the epistemic and 
antic presupposition in the nature, the contents, and the 
product of that revelation.3
So far, the focus of discussion has been on 
examination of basic issues which underlie the proposition 
that “sovereignty is a presupposition in inerrancy.” It 
seems that, for Henry, the concept of sovereignty stands for
M b i d . ,  5:334.
“Discussion on the relationship between God and the 
Logos is not intended here as it involves extended 
investigation of Henry's understanding of Trinity, the roles 
of the three persons of the Trinity and their relationship 
with each other. Suffice it here to say that Jesus the 
Logos has, for Henry, that particular function of being the 
“unifying factor” throughout all reality.
3 Ibid., 5:388.
*See Henry's ideas on the revelatory role of the 
Logos (ibid., 3:203-15).
3This conclusion is not far-fetched given the 
following views from Henry: "God in his sovereign
initiative determines the actuality, direction, nature, 
content and diversity of his self-disclosure." Henry also 
attribute various “non—orthodox“ teachings on the doctrine 
of revelation to "a certain reluctance to approve God's 
sovereignty in regard to modes of revelation . . .” (ibid.,
2:78, 80).
r
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the May God thinks and acts and the May he relates himself 
Mith the Morld. The next section is an attempt to apply 
this general Morking principle to the proposition under 
investigation. It addresses itself to Henry's doctrine of 
inspiration as the occasion in Mhich the presuppositional 
priority of sovereignty over inerrancy is best illustrated.
Sovereignty and Inerrancy in Inspiration 
Henry's doctrine of inspiration provides some of the 
most relevant data in the investigation of the proposition 
that "sovereignty is a presupposition in inerrancy."1 The 
Mhole doctrine is not in vieM here since not all that it 
entails is of immediate concern in this study. But those 
aspects Mhich are considered vital are examined for their 
potential in illustrating the proposition in question.3 In 
order to streamline the discussion, three main emphases in 
Henry's understanding of inspiration have been selected: 
divine authorship of Scripture, providential guidance of 
Bible writers, and the Spirit's superintendence of 
inscripturation.3 Within the range of these emphases, it is
^Henry explains “The Meaning of Inspiration" (ibid., 
4:129—69). That chapter is then followed by two others on
the subject of inerrancy. That inerrancy is closely tied to 
the doctrine of inspiration is an unmistakable fact.
3The limitations mentioned here have more to do with 
the depth of analysis rather than the coverage of the 
subject. A wide perspective of the doctrine is what is 
viewed here rather than the details of Henry's ideas. The 
reason for this is that Henry's doctrine of inspiration is 
so broad that it would require another full study to cover 
it thoroughly.
3These topics encompass what in this study is 
considered significant in Henry's doctrine of inspiration.
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hoped that the veracity of the proposition, “sovereignty is 
a presupposition in inerrancy," can be shown to be 
demonstrable.1
Divine Authorship of Scripture
□n the basis of two main passages— 2 Tim 3:16 and 2 
Pet 1:19—21, Henry considers God to be the author of 
Scripture.2 The crucial element in the passage from Timothy 
is the Greek term theopneustos.3 Far Henry, this word 
expresses “God's relationship to the sacred writings.'"* It 
signifies that the "Scriptures in their written form are a 
product of divine spiration, that is, are divinely breathed 
out."3 The word theooneustos raises the inspired writings 
above “apostolic oral instruction" to a level where their 
“permanent validity and value" is made secure.* In regard 
to the passage from 2 Peter, Henry views it also as 
stressing divine authorship of Scripture. This it does 
“both negatively and positively."7 First, Henry interprets 
the passage to mean that "Scripture does not have ground in
AThe word "sovereignty" itself hardly appears in 
Henry's chapters on inspiration and inerrancy. But its 
absence is no evidence that it has not controlling influence 
in Henry's understanding of inspiration and inerrancy.
aGRA. 4:131-3.
3The background that lies behind Henry's 
interpretation of this word is given in chapter 2.
*GRA. 4:131.
3Ibid.
*1 bid.
7 Ibid . , 4:132.
F
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human inquiry and investigation or in philosophical 
reflection . . .  or human initiative.,aX Second, the passage 
'•affirms the origin of Scripture to be divine."3 According 
to Henry, “since the context so contrasts divine over 
against human origin . . .  the emphasis on divine 
origination is unmistakable."3
Henry's understanding of the two passages as 
teaching divine origin of Scripture is indeed commendable.’* 
Because of the nature of the case, it seems difficult to 
conclude otherwise.9 However, when this scriptural teaching
Mbid.
“ Ibid., 4:132.
Mbid.
*The exegetical basis for asserting the broad 
premise of divine origin of Scripture seems to be 
conclusively established by Benjamin Warfield, and more 
recently by Gordon Clark, Wayne House, and Edward Goadrick. 
See citations of their contributions in chapter 2. Efforts 
to evade that general premise through concentration of 
attention on the functions of Scripture in 1 Tim 3:17 do not 
appear to succeed in doing away with that premise. The 
avoidance of the obvious implication of the two passages 
mentioned by Henry is seen sometimes in treatments of Paul's 
or New Testament's attitude towards the Old Testament which 
totally ignores the contents of the passages. See Robert M. 
Grant, “Paul and the Old Testament" and C. K. Barrett, "The 
Interpretation of the Old Testament in the New," in The 
Authoritative Word: Essays on the Nature of Scripture, ed. 
Donald K. McKim (Grand Rapids: Wm. B. Eerdmans Publishing 
Company, 1983), 27—58. Perhaps the main reason for this is 
the critical denial of the authenticity of the epistles of 2 
Timothy and 2 Peter. However, Donald Guthrie has clearly 
shown how tentative and inconclusive the arguments adduced 
to support that denial are. See his volume, New Testament 
Introduction (Downers Grove, Illinois: InterVarsity Press,
1961), 584-634, 814-63.
9 Ibid. See also Seventh—day Adventist Bible 
Commentary. ed. Francis D. Nichol (Washington, D.C.: Review 
and Herald Publishing Association, 1980), 7:344—5, 601—2.
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is viewed in the context of Henry's concept of sovereignty, 
divine authorship of Scripture assumes new meanings.11 For 
one thing, divine authorship means, for Henry, that the 
propositions in which scriptural truth is set is a 
concretization of the mind of God.2 Consequently, on the 
basis of this identity between the mind of God and the 
contents of Scripture, propositional truth of the Bible is 
logically consistent and coherent.3 For Henry, Scripture is 
necessarily inerrant since it is impossible for God to err
xIt is possible to be correct on the level of a 
general principle and still be incorrect in the application 
of that principle to specific situations. Divine 
authorship of Scripture seems to be clearly established in
2 Tim 3:16 and 2 Pet 1:19-21, but the range of possible 
interpretations of what constitutes this authorship is quite 
wide. In the present case, this author thinks that Henry is 
right in emphasizing the divine authorship of Scripture but 
wrong in the application of that idea to a specific role 
which God played in the production of Scripture.
2This is a natural conclusion on the basis of 
previous discussion and statements of Henry such as the 
following: "Insofar as the being of the Logos is to be 
distinguished from his intelligible revelation, and 
prophetic-apostolic discourse is to be distinguished from 
the teachings of Jesus in his earthly ministry, the contrast 
is quite proper. But insofar as it implies that the 
revelational word of prophets and apostles is never 
identical with the Word of the Lord, the distinction is not 
only confusing but biblically unjustifiable" (GRA, 4:47).
3The identity between God and biblical contents is 
an emphasis which Henry considers to be central in his 
understanding of inspiration. For him, "Inspiration is 
primarily a statement about God's relationship to Scripture, 
and only secondarily about the relationship of God to the 
writers" (ibid., 4:143). He also writes: “The prophets, and 
Jesus, and the apostles all held that God had spoken and is 
speaking through the Scriptures. More that this, they 
considered Scripture itself to be 'the Word of God,' a 
designation that underscores both its origin and nature. . .
. The Word of God came not from the prophets but 'through' 
them . . .  What Moses said is 'the Word of God' . . .
Scripture is God's Word . . .  What Scripture says, God says. 
. . ." (ibid., 4:137).
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or to do or say anything that is contradictory to his 
rational nature.1
Another perspective from which divine authorship can 
be viewed which has a direct relationship with inerrancy is 
Henry's distinction between God as "author" and God as 
"cause."3 Por Henry, God is the cause of all things, be 
they good or evil.3 In that case, God is the cause of 
Scripture in the same sense that he is the cause of 
everything else. But if Henry asserted scriptural inerrancy 
on the basis of causality alone, that would not be 
sufficient reason to exclude error from Scripture."*
On the other hand, if God is not only the cause but 
also the author of Scripture, the situation becomes
1Henry views inerrancy as a defense of God's 
sovereignty and his logical nature. In his chapter on 
sovereignty, Henry states that "God's will or nature implies 
certain limitations on his actions and normatively defines 
the very conception of omnipotence in terms of his own 
omnipotence. God will not alter his own nature, he cannot 
deny himself, he cannot lie and cannot sin, . . .  Any 
concept of omnipotence that requires Gad to contradict 
himself reflects a conjectural and ridiculous notion of 
absolute power. . . .  Having willed moral and mathematical 
distinctions in the creation of the universe, God will not 
affirm vice to be virtue or two times two to be three; he is 
faithful to himself and to the relative unity and continuity 
he wills for his creation. . . .  God himself wills the law 
of contradiction as integral to both divine and human 
meaning" (ibid., 5:319).
aIbid., 6:294. This distinction was mentioned in 
chapter 3 in connection with the problem of evil.
3 Ibid., 5:332-5; 6:292-5.
*One could easily point to several things in the 
world which are mistaken, negative, erroneous or evil that 
are caused by God, to follow Henry's thought. To base 
inerrancy of Scripture on divine causality alone, therefore, 
would be absurd.
f
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radically different. As author, God not only originates and 
sustains the good (this he does also for evil), but he also 
defends and preserves it.* That Mhich has God for its 
author is good and, hence, free from imperfection of any 
kind.* For Henry, "Everything that comes from God, 
beginning with his work of creation, is good” and that 
goodness includes not only moral and aesthetic but also 
logical perfection.3 Consequently, since God is the 
"author" of Scripture, it is inconceivable for Henry that 
error should be a part of it. According to Henry, "The 
doctrine that the Bible is divinely inspired is as
^Henry's main passage on this distinction reads:
"The central issue is whether and how Gad can be regarded 
both as the cause of factors in the created universe that we 
consider evil, and also as the defender and preserver of 
what we consider good. Here a distinction must be preserved 
between cause and author" (GRA. 6:294). Significantly, the 
passage occurs in Henry's discussion of the problem of evil.
*Ibid., 6:252. Henry has a doctrine of "the good." 
His ideas on this are in a chapter entitled, "The Goodness 
of God" (ibid., 6:251—68). There are two themes in that 
doctrine which have a bearing on our study. First,
"goodness is an intrinsic perfection [or attribute] of the 
living God" (ibid., 6:251). This designation further 
clarifies Henry's distinction between good and evil. Unlike 
goodness, evil is not an attribute of God. Henry writes, 
“God can be an ultimate cause of evil, . . . without himself
being an aspect of evil, or of evil being an aspect of him 
as its cause. God created giraffes, but he is not a 
giraffe, nor are giraffes aspects of God" (ibid., 6:294). 
Second, Henry defines "the good" as "a comprehensive 
correlation of the true, the moral and the beautiful" (ibid. 
6:253). This means that when God declared the world which 
he created to be good (before the fall), he underscored 
creation's “intelligible order, moral perfection and 
aesthetic beauty, in short, its excellence" (ibid., 6:252).
3Ibid., 6:252—3. Henry does not use the term 
logical, but his mention of “intelligible" and "true" as 
necessary ingredients of “the good" strongly suggests this 
in view of his understanding of logic.
r
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incompatible with the notion that God inspired error as it
is with the doctrine that he need not have inspired truth."A
Further, he considers it "simple illogic" to suppose that,
the God of the Bible who himself is truth and who cannot 
lie . . . personally inspired error and falsehood.
Would not reason and logic instead side with a denial 
that God inspired what is declared false and errant*?3
Providential Guidance of Bible Writers 
Despite his emphasis on God's authorship of 
Scripture, Henry disowns three views of inspiration which he 
considers to be exaggerations of that emphasis. First, he 
rejects the view that human writers of the Bible were some 
kind of robots or machines in God's hands.3 He states that 
such a view is more compatible with "manticxsm"— where 
mediums in the ancient pagan world lost their consciousness 
totally at the time of inspiration— than with biblical 
teaching.'* Second, Henry denies that Scripture was revealed
Mbid., 4:191. Henry's point here is that the fact 
of divine inspiration necessarily excludes error from the 
text of Scripture and establishes the truthfulness of what 
God inspired. In other words, God does not inspire error, 
he inspires truth.
3Ibid., 4:193.
3,,The writers of Scripture are not unhistorical 
phantoms whom the divine Spirit controls like mechanical 
robots” (ibid., 4:13B).
*Henry borrows from Geoffrey W. Bromiley four 
characteristics of biblical inspiration which distinguish it 
from manticism: "'First, the Bible does not make 
unintelligible or sporadic pronouncements. Secondly, the 
divine aspect is not inscrutable providence, fate, or 
destiny. Thirdly, the biblical sayings, though often 
oracular in form, are not obscure or devious. Finally, 
there is an ethical quality about God's word and work in 
Scripture'" (ibid., 4:142).
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by dictation.1 According to Henry, dictation theory is 
faulty because it excludes the "individuality" of the human 
writer from the process of inscripturation.3 Third, Henry 
is opposed to any suggestion that the Bible came down in 
completed form from heaven like the Qur'an or from an angel 
like the Book of Mormons.3 It is Henry's contention that 
the Bible is an historical book which reflects the culture, 
history, and the personality of those who wrote it."*
For some writers, human involvement in the 
production of Scripture indicates at once that, since humans 
are fallible, the possibility, and even the presence, of 
error in Scripture cannot be completely erased from 
Scripture.3 But Henry thinks otherwise.* For him, the
‘■"Statements that depict inspiration in terms of 
supernatural dictation are untrue to the Scriptures, 
unrepresentative of evangelical doctrine, and prejudicial to 
theological understanding" (ibid., 4:138).
3Henry stresses that "The Spirit of God made full 
use of the human capacities of the chosen writers so that 
their writings reflected psychological, biographical, and 
even sociohistorical differences" (ibid., 4:148).
Commenting on the fact that "God did not dictate the words," 
Henry continues, "consistent with their differing 
personalities and stylistic peculiarities, the inspired 
prophets and apostles in fact spoke in the language of their 
time and place” (ibid., 4:14*7—50).
3 Ibid., 4:138.
*Ibid., 4:148-50.
“This reminds us of Clark H. Pinnock, for example, 
who writes that "God, in giving us literary vehicles of his 
Word, accepted a definite limitation upon himself. He shows 
himself willing to speak to us within the limits of human 
language and to accept the risks that belong to that 
decision” (The Scripture Principle. 99). Pinnock does not 
spell out the "risks" to be errors but the implication seems 
obvious. For the view that these "risks" consist of actual 
errors, see Beegle, Scripture. Tradition, and Infallibility;
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
141
cultural, historical, and personal ideas which the writers 
brought into the Bible were not their own creation. Long 
before Scripture was written, God's providence guided the 
personality and the circumstances of each individual writer 
so that at the time of writing, his style of writing, his 
personality, and other circumstantial factors were exactly 
what God had programmed them to be.1 In that case, Henry 
proposes that Scripture at one and the same time is written 
by real historical persons and is a product of God's 
authorship.3 Certainly, Henry does not consider the writers
and Bloesch, Essentials of Evangelical Theology. vol. 1.
*Henry would rather liken the human aspect of 
Scripture to Christ's humanity in incarnation. For him, the 
“authentic human nature of Christ" needed not to share in 
human fallibility” (GRA, 4:150).
xIt is Henry's view that “divine inspiration did not 
occur ex machina but crowned a long period of providential 
preparation involving diverse experiences” (ibid., 4:140).
3Henry refers to this joint venture as "special 
confluence of divine and human" and "simultaneous agency of 
God and man” (ibid., 4:142). Benjamin Warfield also used 
the same language in describing the human and the divine 
factors in inscripturation: ". . . the whole Scripture is 
the product of divine activities which enter it, however, 
not by superseding the activities of human authors, but 
confluently with them. . . .  The human and divine factors in 
inspiration are conceived of as flowing confluently and 
harmoniously to the production of a common product” 
(Warfield, Shorter Writings. 2:547). Warfield refers to his 
concept of the balance between human and divine in 
inspiration as concursus (ibid., 2:547), a term which Henry 
also uses (GRA. 4:206) . It seems quite clear that Henry and 
Warfield are agreed not only on general concept of divine 
authorship but also on the terminology also.
It is noticeable, however, that Henry considers it 
incorrect to talk of "dual authorship” or "divine—human 
coauthorship" (ibid., 4:142). Warfield differs from him on 
this. For Warfield, the Bible is "a divine—human book in 
which every word is at once divine and human” (Warfield, 
Shorter Writings. 2:547). It appears that this language 
would, for Henry, suggest a kind of "synergism” in the
e---
r
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
142
as infallible persons in their daily lives.1 But how he 
maintains human fallibility and the inerrancy of Scripture 
at the same time is the subject of the next sub—section. 
Meanwhile, it seems clear that the human factor in Scripture 
is itself part of God's providence and, as such, it does not 
threaten the inerrancy of what God revealed.
Spirit's Guidance in Inspiration 
Despite his view that inspiration has to do with 
what was spoken as well as with what was written under 
Spirit's superintendence,3 Henry considers inscripturation—
r
—the process of writing the original Scripture— to be the 
focal point in inspiration.3 For him, it is what is written 
down that has permanence and durability.1* Moreover, it is
writing of Scripture ("synergism” is a term from Greek 
svnergismos. associated particularly with Desiderius Erasmus 
in his defense of free will against Martin Luther's concept 
of the bondage of the will). This concept, which is 
essentially Pelagian, was refuted by Calvin in Institutes.
Ill, 24.1. Although Henry does not mention it except in a 
quotation from Karl Barth (GRA. 6:93), his doctrines of 
election and predestination necessarily preclude it. That 
being the case, the causal part that God played in the 
production of Scripture is just as total, absolute, and 
overwhelming as God's irresistible grace in matter of 
salvation. In general, the difference between Henry and 
Warfield on the use of some phrases seems to be only 
superficial. The underlying stress on divine causation of 
Scripture is the same in both cases.
’-GRA, 4:151.
3 Ibid., 4:31-35, 37-3B.
3 Ibid., 4:37.
'•ibid.
F
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to the Word of God written that Scripture often attaches the 
word inspiration.1
In order to clarify his position on inspiration, 
Henry first states what he does not mean by using that word. 
For him, biblical inspiration does not refer to a 
heightening of man's psychic powers.2 It is not "some 
special internal disposition of the chosen writers” or an 
experience which results in "manifestation of artistic, 
literary or poetic genius."3 Neither does inspiration refer 
to God's impartatian of thoughts or concepts into man's 
mind, in which case the writer is then left on his own to 
translate and communicate those thoughts and concepts in 
human language.4 Henry is opposed to that view because it 
leaves a lot of room for human error to creep into 
Scripture.3 Henry's anthropology, that man is totally
*Ibid., 4:40.
2Ibid., 4:142.
3 Ibid.
4Henry refers to this view as “the concept theory of 
inspiration" which he associates with A. H. Strong, the 
Baptist theologian who wrote Systematic Theology. 3 vols. 
(Philadelphia: Griffith & Rowland Press, 1901). See GRA. 
4:143.
“Henry argues that this theory "lies in representing 
inspiration as a phenomenon internal to the writers more 
than a quality of the writings" (GRA. 4:143.).
Henry's criticism of this view seems to be rather 
shallow in the sense that it does not take seriously the 
faithfulness of human instruments in communicating to their 
best ability what God revealed to them. Strong's theory 
seems to assume, and rightly so, that God chose human 
mediums who he knew would faithfully communicate what they 
knew to be truth. In my opinion, this view seems to be much 
more compatible with Bible's view of itself, phenomena of 
Scripture, and common human experience.
r ~
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depraved, is not an irrelevant issue in the evaluation of 
his exclusion of human contribution in Scripture.
Henry defines inspiration as "a supernatural 
influence upon divinely chosen prophets and apostles whereby 
the Spirit of God assures the truth and trustworthiness of 
their oral and written proclamation."1 It appears evident 
from the definition that, for Henry, inspiration extends to 
what is written down. However, this point immediately 
raises the issue of the exact manner in which the Spirit 
assured the "truth and trustworthiness" of various types of 
biblical literature. The problem involved here may be 
illustrated by the difference between the books of Luke and 
Revelation. On one hand is Luke the historian who openly 
admits that his book is a result of research.3 On the other 
is John the prophet who repeatedly assures the reader that 
his book is a result of what he saw and heard in visions.3 
Differences between the two books on the immediate source of 
their contents and the nature of Spirit's action have been 
interpreted by some scholars as indicating that there is a
11 bid., 4:129.
aLuke 1:1-4. Henry also admits that human powers 
are employed in this case. Commenting on Luke, Henry 
writes, “Sometimes a long period of providential 
preparation, and then an extended period of writing, may 
well have entered into the completion of the end product. 
Luke writes of including patient sifting of sources"
(ibid., 4:146). Elsewhere, Henry remarks that Luke is 
"completely candid about the use ct human sources" (ibid., 
4:138).
3Every chapter in the book of Revelation has such 
phrases as "I saw" or "I heard” which suggest a supernatural 
impartation of information.
r
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variety of inspiration models in Scripture.1 The 
implication here is that, even if it Mere possible to assert 
inerrancy of the autographs, the assertion cannot be applied 
in a uniform manner throughout Scripture.
Henry's response to this issue is short but
significant. He readily recognizes that there are at least
two literature types in Scripture.3 One type is the
prophetic while the other is what resulted from exercise of
some human powers. Henry borrows Warfield's terminology to
express the fact that the two literature types represent two
models of inspiration. He writes:
Revelation takes at times a form that involves the total 
personality of the recipient and communicator of it, a 
form which, in distinction from Old Testament prophecy, 
Warfield called * concursive operation' ('Revelation,' 
4:25SOa). Here the 'enunciation of divine truth is 
attained through the action of the human powers—  
historical research, logical reasoning, ethical thought, 
religious aspiration . . .  in contrast with the 
'supercessive action of the revealing Spirit' as in 
prophetic revelation."3
In other words, there is a difference in the way the Spirit
operated in different contexts of inscripturation. Yet, in
terms of the extent to which the Spirit superintended all
biblical writers, Henry insists that inspiration was uniform
throughout.'* That is, in Spirit's role of assuring the
"truth and trustworthiness" of what was inscripturated, it
xSee William Sanday's views on degrees of 
inspiration in Van Bemmelen, Issues in Inspiration. 148—58. 
See also Beegle, The Inspiration of Scripture. 135—9.
aGRA. 4:159.
3 Ibid.
“ Ibid.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
146
made no difference if the contents were immediately
revealed— as in the case of John's Revelation— or a result
of research or exercise of human capacities— as in the case
of Luke. Realizing that the latter case is especially
likely to occasion suspicion that the Spirit's role was not
so total, Henry writes that "'the human powers— historical
research, logical reasoning, ethical thought, religious
aspiration'" were "'acting not by themselves, however, but
under the prevailing assistance, superintendence, direction,
control of the Divine Spirit.' . . .“ Furthermore,
'The Spirit is not to be conceived as standing outside 
of the human powers employed for the effect in view, 
ready to supplement any inadequacies they may show and 
to supply any defects they may manifest, but as working 
confluently in, with and by them, elevating them, 
directing them, controlling them, energizing them, so 
that, as His instruments, they rise above themselves and 
under His inspiration do His work and reach His aim.
The product . . .  attained by their means is His product 
through them.'x
The manner in which Henry describes the Spirit's 
role in inscripturation seems to suggest two main ideas. 
First, it appears evident that the process of
inscripturation leaves no room for free and "uncaused" human 
involvement.3 Whatever personal, cultural, or ideological 
characteristics one may find in Scripture, their ultimate 
source is God. If the human writers were at all free, that 
freedom was itself incorporated in God's sovereignty.
^Ibid., 4:159-60.
3For Henry, “in inscripturation the divine Spirit 
selectively superintends fallible and sinful human beings in 
the inerrant oral and written proclamation of God's message" 
(ibid., 4:160).
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Second, Henry's understanding of the Spirit's role in
inscripturation means that, since the writers were totally
under the control of the Spirit, the possibility of error
was eliminated. Henry's own statement on this matter reads:
The prevailing evangelical view affirms a special 
activity of divine inspiration whereby the Holy Spirit 
superintended the scriptural writers in communicating 
the biblical message in ways consistent with their 
differing personalities, literary styles and cultural 
background, while safeguarding them from error. As J. 
Gresham Machen expressed it, the biblical writers were 
preserved by a * supernatural guidance and impulsion by 
the Spirit of God . . .  from the errors that appear in 
other books and thus the resulting book, the Bible, is 
in all its parts the very Word of God, completely true 
in what it says regarding matters of fact and completely 
authoritative in its commands.'1
The fact that this passage is a clear illustration of the
decisive role which the concept of sovereignty plays in the
formulation of the doctrine of inerrancy seems to be
unmistakable.
Conclusion
The material presented in this chapter is geared 
towards an analysis of the proposition, "sovereignty is a 
presupposition in inerrancy." The basic contention is that, 
although that proposition is not explicit in Henry, there 
are strong indications that it is at least implicit. The 
section on "primary considerations" is an attempt to set the 
problem which the proposition raises in its wider 
philosophical context. It is argued that Henry's concept of 
sovereignty of God stands for a fundamental principle in 
which God is the unifying factor in his metaphysics. In
^Ibid., 4:166-7.
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other words, divine sovereignty accounts for the objective 
intelligibility and coherence of reality. The main 
implications of this fact is that it removes all epistemic 
and ontic barriers between various levels and elements of 
reality so that it becomes possible for categories of 
meaning and existence to be uniformly applicable throughout 
the universe. In this case, divine sovereignty become the 
exercise of Gad's freedom, lordship, power, and causality in 
the existence of a unified reality in which Gad himself is 
the center. From this broad concept of reality, Henry 
approaches his doctrine of Scripture.
In revealing himself in Scripture, God vindicated 
nis sovereignty. He demonstrates his independence in making 
no consultations with anyone else about whether or not he 
should reveal himself. According to Henry, the fact of 
revelation is wholly a matter of God's initiative.1 There 
was no external necessity that God should reveal himself.
God was also free to reveal himself whenever and in whatever 
manner he chose. Henry expresses this aspect as follows: 
“Revelation has its free and independent ground solely in 
the divine Redeemer."3 God has also the power and abilities
that it takes to reveal himself in the manner that he did.
It is Henry's view that the reason why some theologians fail
to see God as revealing himself in certain ways is their
reluctance to affirm God's lordship or sovereignty in the
^According to Henry, “God need not have addressed 
[his revelation to] the Hebrews or anyone" (GRA, 2:87).
“ Ibid., 2:121.
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universe.1 For him,
The methods and means of divine revelation are not to be 
limited by any a priori foreclosing or prescribing of 
ways by or in which the God of revelation might reveal 
himself. . . God alone in his sovereign initiative
determines the actuality, direction, nature, content and 
diversity of his self—disclosure . . .  God reveals 
himself in his own time and the way when and where he 
wi1Is.3
Within the perimeters of these statements and other concepts 
discussed in this chapter, it seems evident that in his 
doctrine of Scripture, Henry stresses the priory of al] that 
his concept of divine sovereignty signifies.
Henry's understanding of the role that God played in 
revealing himself to the Bible writers is best described in 
in terms of causality. At least three facts seem clear in 
this respect: First, by holding that God is the author of
Scripture, Henry accomplishes two main things. One is that 
he attributes the contents of Scripture— in the form of 
propositional truth— to God as their causal origin. The 
other is that he eliminates the presence of error from 
original Scripture since, like original creation, but unlike 
evil, the Bible is something that God desired to actuate.
It, therefore, reflects God's goodness and perfection.
Second, God so sovereignly controls the lives of 
individual writers of Scripture through his providential 
guidance that all the thoughts which they brought into 
Scripture were exactly the way Gad would have them at the 
time of writing the Bible. This idea seems to be a
1Ibid., 2:80—81.
a Ibid., 77-79.
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consequence of Henry's view of causality which, when applied 
to inerrancy of Scripture has two implications. One is that 
God's decision and act of disclosing himself in Scripture is 
“concurrent" with the decisions and acts of the human 
writers of the Bible. In this case, the autographs which 
the human writers produced were at the same time autographs 
which God himself also produced. Another inference is that 
God's thoughts, decision and act of disclosing himself in 
Scripture logically precede and determine the nature of the 
thoughts, decisions and acts of the human writers. It is to 
be noted that in Henry's scheme, the human writers needed 
not act like robots. Mhen they wrote Scripture, they were 
"free" in the sense that their activity was not 
“constrained." Theirs was a voluntary activity which, as 
Henry would argue, is perfectly compatible with God's 
causation of that activity.
Third, the Holy Spirit so superintended the writers 
in the inscripturation process that they were supernaturally 
kept from making any error of any kind. This is the 
crowning point in the process of inspiration. More than any 
other aspect of God's disclosure, inspiration distinguises 
the Bible writers from other human beings and also the 
thoughts of Scripture from other human thoughts. As a 
result of the superintendence of the scriptural writers, 
Henry maintains that the original autographs were without 
error.
The significance of the idea that "sovereignty is a 
presupposition in inerrancy" cannot be overstated. The
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proposition implies at least three related conclusions. One 
is that a good grasp o-f the concept of sovereignty is 
necessary for a proper understanding and appreciation of 
inerrancy. Another implication is that inerrancy is best 
defended in the context of absolute sovereignty. To detach 
inerrancy from sovereignty is to remove from it that which 
renders it epistemologically important and to undermine the 
ontological base on Mhich it stands. In other words, 
inerrancy is descriptive of effects of a revelational— 
inspirational act which God performs in his sovereignty. In 
fact, Henry maintains that "inspiration connects God's 
activity with the express truths and words of Scripture."1 
Finally, any serious evaluation of the concept of inerrancy 
must include also an evaluation of the concept of 
sovereignty. The real issue in inerrancy is not so much the 
logistics of what the concept means and what it does not 
mean. These matters are peripheral and incidental to the 
case for inerrancy which Henry presents. The heart of the 
matter, rather, is the nature and extent of God's action in 
man and in the world. Consequently, to justify a rejection 
of inerrancy, for those who are uncomfortable with the 
position, requires a concept of sovereignty different from 
Henry's since, without this, it is not possible to 
systematically formulate a view of inerrancy.
xIbid., 4:144.
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CHAPTER V
CONCLUSION
The question which was raised at the beginning of 
this study was how inerrancy presupposes a particular 
concept of divine sovereignty in the writings of Carl Henry. 
Among the points made in the foregoing analysis of that 
question, a number of key ideas have emerged which act as 
milestones in the development of the study.
Chapter 2 is a descriptive analysis of Henry's 
concept of inerrancy, in the interest of which this 
investigation is primarily undertaken. The analysis has its 
focus on those features of inerrancy which are foundational 
to a thorough understanding of the concept. These features 
include Henry's sources for the concept, the meaning of 
inerrancy, the extent or the coverage of the concept, and 
the role which inerrancy plays in Henry's theology. For the 
purposes of this study, it is of particular significance 
that Henry attaches the word "inerrancy" only to the 
original autographs of the Bible. According to him, it is 
the fact that the autographs were “inspired" which renders 
them inerraot- Henry does not consider scriotural apographs 
to be inspired and, as such, they are infallible, not 
inerrant. Further investigation reveals that inspiration is 
a phenomenon which "connects God's activity with the express
152
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truths and nnords of Scripture."1 In effect, Henry conceives 
Inerrancy to be a consequence of God's act of inspiration. 
One implication of this observation is that, for Henry, 
inerrancy is not a question of the nature of Scripture alone 
but one that impinges also on the nature of God's activity 
in the world.
In chapter 3, Henry's concept of sovereignty is 
analyzed for the purpose of clarifying Henry's understanding 
of the nature of God's activity in the world. This aspect 
of the investigation is meant to set the discussion of 
inerrancy in the Mider context of Henry's theology. The 
guiding hypothesis is that, if inerrancy is an end-product 
of God's activity, there must be something in Henry's 
understanding of how God acts Mhich illumines how God's 
involvement in the production of Scripture results in the 
inerrancy of the autographs. To avoid a caricature of 
Henry's views, the concept of sovereignty is presented not 
only to meet the objectives of this study but also to 
highlight its main features as an individual concept in its 
own right. Thus, divine sovereignty is examined in terms of 
Henry's theological tradition, the meaning of the term 
"sovereignty,■ the scope covered by the concept, and the 
place which sovereignty occupies in Henry's theology. For 
the purposes of this study, however, certain aspect of 
Henry's concept of sovereignty are especially important in 
their explication of how Henry views the nature of God's
1GRfl. 4:144.
i
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activity in the MorId. Two of the main aspects may be 
summarized as follows:
First, sovereignty is a key attribute in Henry's 
doctrine of God. As "an aspect of God's ontology,*1 divine 
sovereignty is the single most important attribute of the 
divine nature since "without it all other attributes of God 
lose their efficacy."* Given such a high status of the 
concept of sovereignty, it seems pertinent to conclude that 
divine sovereignty is the basis on which God's activities in 
the world are grounded.3
Second, Henry's concept of sovereignty entails the 
idea of causality. Undoubtedly, Henry dissociates himself 
from notions of causality which depict the universe as an 
impersonal "mechanistic causal r e a l i t y . B u t  he makes it 
clear that such interpretations of the term “causality” do 
not provide sufficient reason for rejecting some basic 
concepts which the term itself represents. Henry affirms 
that God is "the one and the only creative causality in the 
world and in history."3 Henry is here not to be understood 
as precluding the existence and, indeed, the significance of
Mbid., 6:99.
*Ibid., 5:295. See also ibid., 5:325.
’Henry states explicitly that this is particularly 
so in the case of God's decrees (ibid., 6:99), predesti­
nation, and election (ibid., 6:83).
^Ibid., 6:49.
“Ibid., 6:232.
f
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causality outside God.‘ His contention is that any 
causality there is outside God is not original or creative 
but secondary, dependent, and concurrent with God's ultimate 
causality.3
One significant point that should not be ignored in 
respect to Henry's notion of causality is the distinction 
which Henry makes between God as “cause" and God as 
"author."3 From what Henry writes, it seems that the 
difference between "cause" and "author" relates to whether a 
given factor or a set of factors in the universe, though, 
nonetheless, caused by God, is or is not desired by him and, 
therefore, reflective of God's goodness and perfection.
With the concept of sovereignty thus explicated, the 
stage is set for a discussion on how inerrancy presupposes 
Henry's concept of sovereignty. This is the focus of 
chapter 4. It is to be noted that due to the complexity of 
both concepts of inerrancy and sovereignty and given the 
theological distance between them— inerrancy, in this case, 
being an attribute of Scripture while sovereignty is an 
attribute of God, certain primary considerations need to be 
taken into account in order to show the possibility of a 
connection between the two concepts in question. 
Investigation reveals that this possibility of a connection 
between inerrancy and sovereignty lies in Henry's view of
‘Ibid., 5:311; 6:49.
=*Ibid., 6:48-49.
3 Ibid., 6:294.
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reality in teres of “metaphysical monism."x For Henry, 
reality is a rational complex of related elements in Mhich 
God, himself being rational, is both the causal principle 
and the unifying factor. Moreover, since God's causality 
accounts for both the ontological and epistemological 
factors in the universe, Henry recognizes no barriers in 
God's exercise of his sovereignty in the world. With this 
comprehensive view of a unified structure of the universe, 
Henry maintains that God can act and speak in the world in a 
manner that is direct, literal, and intelligible to his 
creatures.
To be more precise, the case for a connection 
between inerrancy and sovereignty which is presented in this 
study may be stated as follows. Henry's concept of 
sovereignty provides the theological preconditions which are 
necessary to make the inerrancy of Scripture possible.
First, inerrancy requires that the inerrant truth of 
Scripture come from a rational being who is perfect. This 
requirement is met by Henry's view of God's "epistemological 
sovereignty." For Henry, God is a rational being, the only 
creative source of knowledge and truth, and one whose 
goodness includes logical, moral, and aesthetic perfection.
Second, inerrancy requires that the human elements 
in Scripture, to be inerrant, be themselves of divine 
origin. According to Henry, divine sovereignty extends to 
the personal and cultural factors which the human writers
xIbid., 6:295.
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brought into Scripture. As Henry sees it, God Mas 
providentially active in the biography of the writers so 
that, while their personalities and cultural ideas were 
truly human, they were, nonetheless, caused by God. What 
Henry means by a "concurrence" of the divine and the human 
in the production of Scripture is that human agency was 
“concurrent" with and dependent on God's causality.
Third, inerrancy requires that the whole process of 
inscripturation be totally controlled by God in order to 
preclude the possibility of error. For Henry, Gad, in his 
sovereignty, so pervaded the process of inspiration that in 
inscripturation of truth in the autographs by the human 
agents, the possibility of error was totally excluded. It 
must be added here that, for Henry, Scripture is inerrant 
not only because Gad is its cause— God is the cause of 
everything in the universe, including evil. More 
importantly, as the sovereign “author" of Scripture, God 
"desired" to disclose himself in Scripture and, as such, it 
manifests his perfection and goodness.
Implications of the Study
As it is stated at the beginning of the study, the 
purpose of this investigation is to analyze Henry's concepts 
of inerrancy and sovereignty for the sake of showing how the 
former presupposes the latter. As investigation seems to 
indicate, inerrancy presupposes Henry's concept of 
sovereignty in the sense that, as sovereign lord, God was 
the causal origin of all the factors that went into the
r
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production of Scripture, thus making the Bible inerrant.
The presuppositional connection thus established seems to be 
necessary and logically consistent. That being the case, 
this study has various implications.
First, in orienting inerrancy to the concept of 
sovereignty, inerrancy is thereby demonstrated to be a 
theory whose theological base is found mainly in the 
traditions where God's sovereignty is viewed in terms of 
causality. It seems to be commonly accepted that in 
Protestantism, this view, as Henry expresses it, is chiefly 
found among those who identify themselves with the 
Calvinistic or Reformed traditions.* It is not surprising, 
then, that the most ardent advocates of inerrancy have 
consistently been Reformed theologians. This is true of the 
°rinceton theologians who popularized inerrancy in America 
the majority of modern advocates of the position. As
'’According to Ben A. Marburton, "The one rock upon 
which Calvinism builds is that of the absolute and unlimited 
sovereignty of the eternal and self—existent Jehovah” 
(Calvinism; Its History and Basic Principles. Its Fruits and 
Its Future, and Its Practical Application to Life CGrand 
Rapids: William B. Eerdmans, 1955], 63). See also H. Henry 
Meeter, Calvinism: An Interpretation of Its Basic Ideas, 
vol. I: The Theological and the Political Ideas (Grand 
Rapids: Zondervan, 1939), 31—38; William K. B. Stoever,
"The Calvinist Theological Tradition," in Encyclopedia of 
the American Religious Experience: Studies of Traditions and 
Movements, vol.II. ed. Charles H. Lippy and Peter W.
Williams (New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1988), 1039; 
Arthur W. Pink, The Sovereignty of God (Grand Rapids: Baker 
Book House, 1930); James Montgomery Boice, Foundations of 
the Christian Faith, vol. 1: The Sovereignty of God (Downers 
Grove, Illinois: InterVarsity Press, 1978); and John Murray, 
Calvin on Scripture and Divine Sovereignty (Philadelphia:
The Presbyterian and Reformed Publishing, 1960), 55—71.
r
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Leon Hynson states, “inerrancy has emerged from a largely 
Reformed matrix."1
Second, the concept of inerrancy cannot be defended 
theologically by those Mho do not subscribe to the concept 
of sovereignty. The point here is not that one cannot 
advocate inerrancy for reasons other than theological ones.3 
Rather, it is here argued that unless there are basic 
theological grounds for holding inerrancy, such as Henry's 
concept of sovereignty, inerrancy is merely a dogmatic 
position Mith little, if any, intellectual significance. If 
the critics mentioned at the beginning of this study wish to 
charge that inerrancy is a “theology-less" position, it is 
this concept of inerrancy which is not undergirded by an 
appropriate doctrine of God towards which they need to 
direct their attacks. While inerrancy may be a view held by 
many conservative evangelicals, a distinction needs to be 
maintained between inerrancy as a theological concept and 
inerrancy as a fad of conservative evangelicals in general.
Third, the connection between inerrancy and 
sovereignty is a warning against general and simplistic 
evaluation of the concept of inerrancy. For Henry, 
inerrancy is an end result, a final product, or a surface 
effect of a more fundamental phenomenon, namely, the
1Leon 0. Hynson, "The Inerrancy Question: A 
Misplaced Debate," Evangelical Journal 5 (1987): 30—34.
“One could appeal to a family or church tradition as 
a reason for believing in inerrancy. Another could find 
inerrancy a simple and straightforward way of defending the 
reliability of Scripture.
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activity of God in his sovereignty. In this case, a keen 
evaluation of the concept is one Mhich considers inerrancy 
not as a view of the nature of Scripture only but also as 
one part of a larger context in Mhich the doctrine of God 
features prominently.
Suggestions for Further Study
The present study has focused its attention on 
Henry's concepts of inerrancy and sovereignty and hoM the 
former presupposes the latter. It cannot be claimed that 
these subjects have been exhaustively analyzed and, as such, 
there remains room for further investigation of Henry's 
vieMs to see if there are perhaps other additional data that 
could strengthen the case for a connection betMeen inr-rrancy 
and sovereignty.
Apart from studying the connection betMeen inerrancy 
and sovereignty in Henry, there exists also a need to make 
other case studies to see if the conclusions made in this 
study are demonstrable in other theologians. It Mould be 
enlightening to study other conservative evangelical 
theologians in the fclloMing categories: those, like Henry,
in the Reformed tradition Mho advocate inerrancy; those in 
the Reformed tradition who do not hold inerrancy; those 
outside the Reformed tradition who subscribe to inerrancy; 
and those outside the Reformed tradition Mho do not defend 
inerrancy.
It is hoped that the material presented in this 
study on the concepts of inerrancy and sovereignty
r
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contribute toward a clarification of some of the issues 
involved the debate over inerrancy. The subjects of 
Scripture and God to which the concepts of inerrancy and 
sovereignty are attributes are certainly valuable concerns 
far Christianity. Further investigation of these subj'ects 
can only add to the significance which Christianity attaches 
to these fundamental doctrines.
r
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